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Congress’s “power of the purse”—its authority to deny access to 
public funds—is one of its most essential constitutional authorities. A 
crucial check on executive overreaching, it may provide authority to stop 
presidents in their tracks. Yet Congress and the executive branch have 
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developed widely divergent views on the scope of this authority. During 
the Obama Administration, sharp conflicts over this issue arose in areas 
of acute policy conflict, including climate change, prisoner transfers, 
proposed closure of detention facilities at the Guantanamo Naval Base, 
and federal marijuana enforcement. Many planned initiatives of the 
Trump Administration—from immigration enforcement, to 
renegotiation of trade deals, to military operations against Islamic 
terrorists or other foreign adversaries—could present analogous 
questions. Despite the issue’s contemporary salience, however, existing 
scholarship provides no satisfactory understanding of Congress’s power 
to control the other two branches through appropriations constraints. 
This Article offers a systematic account of funding constraints as 
a separation-of-powers problem. Employing a methodology focused on 
text, structure, original intent, and the broad contours of historical 
practice, the Article argues that properly analyzing the problem requires 
disaggregating executive powers. Congress may not control some 
executive authorities, such as the veto, pardon, and appointment powers, 
through restricted or conditional appropriations. These powers are 
“resource-independent” because the president may exercise them 
personally, and because allowing Congress to control or materially 
influence their exercise would elide separation-of-powers distinctions 
essential to the constitutional structure. In contrast, certain other 
executive powers, most importantly war powers and law enforcement, 
are “resource-dependent”—they exist only insofar as Congress provides 
resources for their exercise. As to such powers, Congress properly holds 
near-plenary authority to restrict or condition use of available resources. 
Hard cases arise in two areas: selective support of resource-
independent powers and funding constraints on conduct of diplomacy. 
In these areas, an antimanipulation principle, modeled loosely on 
analogous federalism cases, provides the appropriate framework for 
balancing congressional and executive authority: conditions should be 
invalid only in narrow circumstances when the condition would unduly 
manipulate judgments that are properly the president’s alone. 
Under this framework, the separation of powers shields 
presidents from congressional control with respect to powers that exist 
principally to provide a check on Congress. At the same time, the 
framework preserves a vital congressional check on the most normatively 
important executive powers—namely, those that involve bringing the 
government’s coercive and destructive capacities to bear through law 
enforcement and warfare. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress’s “power of the purse”—its authority to deny access to 
public funds—is one of its most essential constitutional authorities. A 
central mechanism through which English parliaments clawed liberty 
from reluctant monarchs, it remains a crucial check on executive 
overreaching. It may provide power to stop a president in his tracks. 
And yet, two centuries after the founding, the scope of this 
congressional power and its relationship with constitutional executive 
authorities remains both contested and inadequately theorized. 
The executive branch, in both Republican and Democratic 
administrations, routinely disregards funding limits that infringe upon 
asserted executive authorities.1 For its part, Congress asserts the 
opposite view by routinely enacting such appropriations restrictions. 
During the Obama Administration, the issue arose repeatedly in areas 
of acute policy conflict, including climate change, prisoner transfers, 
proposed closure of detention facilities at the Guantanamo Naval Base, 
and federal marijuana enforcement.2 President Trump’s first signing 
statement staked out a broad view of his powers,3 and many of his 
administration’s planned initiatives—including enhanced immigration 
and drug enforcement, renegotiation of trade deals, and military 
operations against Islamic terrorists or other foreign adversaries—
could present the issue in acute form. Questions about the power of the 
purse, indeed, have arisen repeatedly across American history, but as 
our politics grow more polarized and erratic, and interbranch relations 
more conflictual, the problem seems poised to grow worse. Developing 
a grounded account of executive and congressional authority with 
respect to funding conditions could scarcely be more urgent. 
 
 1. For examples, see infra Section I.B.2. 
 2. For description of these and other examples, see infra Section I.B.  
 3. Presidential Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2017, 2017 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 312 (May 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/05/ 
statement-president-donald-j-trump-signing-hr-244-law [https://perma.cc/G8EU-JRX6] 
[hereinafter Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act]. 
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This Article offers a systematic analysis of funding constraints 
as a separation-of-powers problem.4 Employing an interpretive 
methodology focused on text, structure, original intent, and the broad 
contours of historical practice, I dispute both Congress’s bromides about 
a plenary power of the purse and the executive branch’s frequent claim 
that Congress holds no greater power with respect to appropriations 
than it does in passing ordinary legislation. In fact, the Constitution is 
best understood to protect some minimum degree of discretion in the 
exercise of constitutional executive authorities, but determining the 
scope of such preclusive discretion requires disaggregating executive 
authorities and attending to the nature of congressional authority over 
resources with respect to different areas of executive responsibility. 
Some executive powers, I argue, are resource-independent. The 
president may exercise these powers without regard to any direct 
conditions or limits Congress imposes upon them. Paradigmatic 
examples in this category are the president’s powers to veto legislation, 
appoint and remove officers, grant clemency to criminal offenders, and 
exercise supervisory command over the military. These authorities are 
in principle personal and costless: the president could exercise them 
even if Congress provided no public resources beyond the president’s 
salary. What is more, in most cases such powers exist at least in part to 
provide either a check on Congress or a constitutionally required degree 
of presidential control over executive functions. Allowing Congress to 
control these powers, whether through funding restrictions or by other 
means, would thus elide key separation-of-powers limits on Congress 
itself. As the Attorney General once put it, such funding controls would 
“require operation of the Government in a way forbidden by the 
Constitution.”5 Accordingly, presidents may disregard appropriations 
provisions that purport to prevent particular exercises of these powers 
or that condition availability of funds on these powers being exercised 
in a particular way. 
At the other extreme, some executive powers are resource-
dependent. These powers may be exercised only insofar as Congress 
provides resources for their exercise—and Congress accordingly holds 
near-complete discretion to impose whatever limits and conditions it 
chooses with respect to use of those resources. The two key powers in 
this category are law enforcement and use of military force. Presidents, 
to be sure, hold the constitutional responsibility to “take Care that the 
 
 4. See infra Section I.B.3 for discussion of prior scholarship. The two leading articles to date 
are J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162; and Kate Stith, 
Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988). 
 5. Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61 
(1933). 
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Laws be faithfully executed,” and Article II makes the president 
Commander in Chief of the military. Yet neither of these powers 
properly entails authority to disregard substantive limits on available 
resources for their exercise. For compelling textual, structural, 
historical, and normative reasons, Congress may deny funds for specific 
anticipated military operations or activities, limit the location or 
disposition of particular forces, bar funds for specific law enforcement 
activities, or even prevent particular prosecutions. To be concrete, then, 
Congress could deny the president resources to conduct any military 
strike against a specified country or indeed any use of nuclear weapons 
at all without advance legislative approval, and by the same token it 
could deny resources to conduct mass deportations, a marijuana 
dragnet, or other law enforcement efforts. Presidents hold no valid 
constitutional authority to disregard such limits on their authority. 
Between these two poles, hard cases arise in two areas. The first 
involves selective support for the president’s resource-independent 
powers. If Congress appropriates funds for presidential advisers and 
other support staff (as of course it routinely does), to what degree may 
it limit use of these resources? Could Congress, for example, provide 
advisers to vet pardons for bankers but not drug dealers, or to formulate 
resource-extraction legislation but not measures to reduce climate 
change? The second hard case involves conduct of diplomacy. Although 
diplomacy in practice is resource-intensive and might best be classified 
as a resource-dependent power as a matter of first principles, presidents 
have long claimed authority to exercise plenary control over the nation’s 
diplomatic communications with foreign sovereigns. Given this 
entrenched practice, the key question becomes how far either the 
president or Congress may go. Can Congress preclude use of publicly 
paid diplomats for communications with particular foreign sovereigns 
or international bodies (as indeed it has routinely attempted to do), or 
may presidents disregard such limits and employ State Department 
officials and other federal personnel as they see fit? 
Categorical answers to these questions are elusive, for the 
simple reason that they involve balancing congressional and executive 
authority—Congress’s discretion over resources on the one hand, and 
the president’s authority to make certain judgments independent of 
Congress on the other. In this context, accordingly, an 
antimanipulation principle should determine the extent of Congress’s 
appropriations power over the executive branch. Under this principle, 
while Congress holds broad authority to structure the executive branch 
by limiting advisers and diplomats to particular topics or activities, 
Congress nonetheless may not impose narrow outcome-based 
limitations on its support for key advisers or diplomats, nor may it deny 
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the president access to the officials best positioned, by virtue of their 
other responsibilities, to provide relevant guidance or support on a 
particular narrow matter. Such limitations are invalid because they 
risk manipulating particular narrow judgments that properly belong to 
the president alone, and because they do so in a manner that clouds 
both congressional and executive responsibility for resulting policies. As 
I explain below, this antimanipulation principle not only tracks 
important (but largely unrecognized) features of historical practice,6 
but also draws support by analogy from the anticoercion inquiry the 
Supreme Court has applied in related federalism contexts.7 
While some past accounts have suggested that the president’s 
authority to defy funding constraints is greater overseas than at home,8 
my analysis identifies a different boundary—the boundary marked by 
resource-dependence, rather than the water’s edge. Because the 
Constitution guarantees to presidents certain minimum authorities 
that enable the system of checks and balances to function, Congress 
cannot leverage its appropriations power to collapse these separation-
of-powers limits on Congress itself. For example, to the extent the 
Constitution requires direct presidential supervision of the military, or 
grants presidential authority to issue pardons with certain 
consequences, giving effect to funding restrictions that bring about 
different results cannot be consistent with the Constitution. Yet this 
logic does not carry over to all executive authorities. In particular, 
because warmaking and law enforcement are powers the president can 
exercise only insofar as Congress provides resources for doing so, the 
Constitution will rarely provide valid grounds for defying limits on 
those resources’ use. Distinguishing between resource-independent 
powers and resource-dependent powers thus yields the normatively 
compelling result that the government’s coercive and destructive 
capacities—its powers to kill, maim, deport, and imprison—remain 
subject to control not only by the president, but also by the people’s 
representatives in Congress. (For charts depicting my key conclusions, 
see Figures 1 and 2 below in Sections III.A and IV.A, respectively.) 
 
 6. See infra Sections III.C, IV.E.3. 
 7. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–88 (2012) (“Congress 
has no authority to order the States to regulate according to its instructions . . . [because] the 
States must have a genuine choice . . . .”). 
 8. See, e.g., Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to 
Federally Impacted Schools, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 303, 310 (1969) (opinion by future Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist drawing this distinction); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY 
OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 143 (2002) (distinguishing 
between funding conditions affecting foreign affairs and those “[i]n the domestic sphere”). 
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Some might also dismiss appropriations battles as simple 
matters of politics or convention rather than law. Yet neither courts nor 
the executive branch have analyzed them as such.9 At any rate, even if 
in the past political self-restraint might have kept us from reaching 
bare questions of legality, the bitter politics of our moment are steadily 
shredding such buffers of convention, causing legal disputes over 
separation of powers to arise with increasing frequency. To facilitate 
analysis of future questions regarding appropriations authority, I hope 
to show here that a relatively conventional approach to constitutional 
interpretation—centered on text and structure, but also taking account 
of the broad contours of past precedent and practice—can in fact yield 
a principled and normatively satisfactory framework. 
As a final preliminary caveat, I should note that because this 
Article aims to provide a general overview, my analysis necessarily 
paints with a broad brush. I cannot account for every historical 
example; nor can I resolve every disputed question about Article II’s 
meaning.10 I do hope, however, to develop a theory that not only makes 
sense of the Constitution’s basic text and structure, but also accounts 
for deep working assumptions reflected in entrenched constitutional 
practice. In analyzing past practice, I therefore concentrate less on 
narrow precedents than on deeply embedded assumptions—those akin 
to what Thomas Merrill (commenting on Henry Monaghan) has called 
“type II constitutional common law,” meaning principles developed 
through “evolved practice” that are so entrenched as to now be “binding 
on all governmental branches.”11 As I will explain, such embedded 
working assumptions about constitutional meaning—the deep currents 
 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946) (“We therefore cannot 
conclude . . . that since Congress under the Constitution has complete control over appropriations, 
a challenge to [an appropriations provision’s] constitutionality does not present a justiciable 
question in the courts, but is merely a political issue over which Congress has final say.”); 
Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33 Op. O.L.C. 
__ (2009) (ms. at 1) (finding that by “purporting to bar the State Department from using [certain] 
funds . . . [the Foreign Appropriations Act] unconstitutionally infringes on the President’s 
authority to conduct the Nation’s diplomacy”). 
 10. I strive throughout to remain as agnostic as possible about the actual content of executive 
authorities, so as to concentrate on questions regarding how those authorities (however defined) 
related to Congress’s distinct authority over appropriations. I also hold aside questions about 
executive privilege and executive control of information; I focus instead on more primary questions 
about exercise of government power. 
 11. Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453 
(2010) (discussing Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
1 (1993)). Another classic exemplar of my basic approach here is Edward Corwin, whose insights 
loom large over many aspects of the analysis. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE & 
POWERS, 1787–1984 (5th rev. ed. 1984); see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. DRONE WAR 191–93 (2016) (identifying a “mainstream” 
approach to constitutional interpretation and distinguishing it from competing recent theories). 
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beneath surface froth—resolve key textual ambiguities about 
Congress’s appropriations power while nonetheless providing critical 
purchase on more immediate trends.12 
My argument proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on 
Congress’s power of the purse, identifies the puzzle this power 
generates with respect to executive power, and discusses limitations in 
past scholarly accounts. Part II helps frame the puzzle’s solution by 
highlighting the deep working assumption that congressional 
appropriations are ultimately matters of discretion, even if Congress 
conventionally exercises its power to support the executive branch. Part 
III analyzes resource-independent powers. After defining the category, 
this Part addresses ways in which Congress may and may not limit 
those powers’ exercise through limited or conditional appropriations. 
Part IV turns to resource-independent powers. Following general 
background discussion, it addresses questions regarding war powers, 
law enforcement, and diplomacy in turn. A brief conclusion then 
summarizes my analysis and reflects on why maintaining principled 
limits on executive authority to disregard appropriations constraints is 
essential in our troubled era of partisan animosity and political 
disruption. 
I. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
A. Congress’s Power of the Purse and the Puzzle It Generates 
What is Congress’s “power of the purse”? This pithy phrase 
captures the vital constitutional principle—once described by Edward 
Corwin as “the most important single curb” on presidential 
authority13—that the people’s representatives in Congress control both 
public revenue and public expenditure. 
 
 12. My categorization of executive powers might draw some support from Justice Jackson’s 
famous three-part framework from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–
55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson distinguished between executive powers exercised 
with congressional support, powers exercised with neither affirmative congressional approval nor 
affirmative prohibition, and powers exercised in defiance of congressional restraints (his famous 
“lowest ebb” category of executive power). On some level, all the examples addressed here fall at 
Jackson’s lowest ebb—all involve funding restrictions imposed by Congress and potentially defied 
by the president. At the same time, my ultimate categorization roughly tracks Jackson’s taxonomy. 
On my account, resource-dependent powers require congressional support, resource-independent 
powers do not, and certain hard cases, particularly diplomacy and presidential advising, fall in an 
intermediate grey area of contestation. Jackson’s framework nevertheless does not form a 
centerpiece of my analysis, for the simple reason that it offers no helpful guidance in determining 
which executive authorities belong in which category. For general criticism of Jackson’s approach, 
see Michael W. McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King (Jan. 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 13. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 134 (13th ed. 1975). 
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On the revenue side, the Constitution expressly grants Congress 
authority to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and 
“to borrow Money on the credit of the United States.”14 The Constitution 
also directs that all revenue-raising legislation must originate in the 
House of Representatives,15 the house of Congress closest to the people 
(at least in the Framers’ imagination). On the expenditure side, 
Congress holds express authority “to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States,” to “raise 
and support Armies,” and to “provide and maintain a Navy,”16 although 
no army appropriation may exceed two years in duration17 and 
Congress must provide for a regular accounting of public 
expenditures.18 These powers, moreover, are exclusive. The 
Appropriations Clause, Congress’s bedrock power-of-the-purse 
provision, directs: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”19 
By the Constitution’s plain terms, then, money can flow neither 
in nor out of the public purse without advance congressional approval.20 
The Constitution thus ensures that Congress, with its distributed 
representation and resulting capacity for bargained trade-offs, holds 
ultimate authority over both collection and distribution of public 
resources.21 
Historically, the appropriations power has served another 
purpose too: it has provided an ongoing check on the other branches. 
This function implicates a deep constitutional history. From medieval 
times, the English Parliament’s assent was required to grant 
extraordinary revenues to the King.22 Though largely notional and 
uncontroversial in the Middle Ages, this authority gained greater 
significance as parliament became less pliable and the fiscal demands 
of warfare and other functions outstripped the Crown’s capacity to “live 
 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 15. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
 16. Id. art. I, § 8. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1850) (interpreting the Appropriations 
Clause to require that “[h]owever much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar 
of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanctioned”). 
 21. For discussion of risks associated with giving executive agencies control over their own 
funding, see Christopher C. DeMuth, Sr. & Michael S. Greve, Agency Finance in the Age of 
Executive Government, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 555 (2017); and Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and 
Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677 (2017). 
 22. JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 45–46 (2017). 
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of his own” from personal revenues.23 Accordingly, from the tumultuous 
seventeenth-century Civil Wars to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and 
the development of the fiscal-military state in the eighteenth century, 
the English Crown’s dependence on parliamentary appropriations 
provided a central mechanism for degrading royal authority and 
enforcing legal constraints on executive power.24 In the colonies, 
likewise, local legislative control over taxes and appropriations 
provided an important means of restraining otherwise unaccountable 
royal governors.25 Indeed, royal efforts to cut governors loose from local 
purse strings provided one important impetus for the Revolution.26 
Today, Congress’s power of the purse remains a vital mechanism 
of accountability for the executive branch. By virtue of broad statutory 
delegations and accreted executive practice, modern presidents hold 
vast powers of initiative: they may often regulate (or deregulate), set 
enforcement priorities, conduct foreign policy, and even launch military 
campaigns as they see fit. Even when Congress disapproves of such 
actions, it holds limited capacity to undo them through ordinary 
substantive legislation. The president, after all, may veto any such 
legislation, and normally the president’s copartisans in Congress can be 
counted on to prevent the two-thirds majority required in both houses 
for a veto override.27 
Congress’s appropriations power potentially reverses this 
dynamic. Through the ingenious practice, begun with the very first 
Congress, of appropriating funds only one year at a time, Congress has 
ensured that presidents must always come back every year seeking 
 
 23. Id. at 46–47. 
 24. For general accounts of this history, see, for example, WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-
HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 1–17 (1994); and CHAFETZ, 
supra note 22, at 45–53. See also JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE 
ENGLISH STATE, 1688–1783, at 144–46 (1988) (describing how English parliaments after the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 ensured the Crown’s “fiscal dependency” so as to guarantee continuing 
parliamentary control over government policy). 
 25. See, e.g., BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 18–26 (discussing colonial 
assemblies’ assertions of financial control over royal governors); JACK P. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR 
POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES, 1689–1776, at 7–8 
(1963) (describing assemblies’ efforts “in imitation of the seventeenth-century House of Commons 
to impose their sole authority over every phase of raising and distributing public revenue”). 
 26. GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 32 (2002) (“Revenue from the 
Townshend duties [controversial new taxes resisted by colonists in the buildup to the Revolution] 
was earmarked for the salaries of royal officials in the colonies so that they would be independent 
of the colonial legislatures.”). 
 27. For general discussion of the dynamics discussed in this paragraph, see WILLIAM G. 
HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION (2003); 
and Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 132 (1999). 
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money just to keep the government’s lights on.28 Key federal statutes, 
moreover, back up Congress’s constitutional authority. Under the so-
called Miscellaneous Receipts Act, all funds received by the federal 
government generally must be deposited in the Treasury.29 A second 
statute, the Purpose Act, specifies that appropriations are available 
only for the specific “objects for which [they] were made.”30 Finally, the 
Anti-Deficiency Act generally makes it unlawful—indeed, sometimes 
criminal—for any federal official to expend or even obligate funds 
without a prior appropriation adequate for the expenditure.31 
As a result of this legal structure, the president’s ability to 
advance his own agenda is constantly beholden to Congress’s 
willingness to fund it, and Congress accordingly holds ongoing leverage 
over executive policy.32 What is more, while recent presidents, 
particularly Clinton and Obama, succeeded in laying blame for 
appropriations lapses (popularly known as “shutdowns”) on their 
congressional adversaries, Josh Chafetz has correctly observed that this 
dynamic is contingent.33 Under other circumstances, the president 
might well incur serious political costs for precipitating a funding 
shutdown with presidential vetoes. 
The appropriations process is frequently ugly and political, full 
of horse-trades, special-interest giveaways, and massive omnibus bills 
assembled in secret. It is often rushed; it avoids open vetting of 
proposals by committees with substantive expertise; and it gives chairs 
and ranking members of appropriations committees and subcommittees 
 
 28. Congress derived its practice of annual appropriations from prior practice in the English 
parliament and colonial legislatures. For discussion of this history and the structural importance 
of annual appropriations, see CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 52–53, 61–66, 68–70. See also EVARTS 
BOUTELL GREENE, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA 122 
(reprt. 1906) (“[B]y the close of the colonial era, the general rule consisted in making detailed 
appropriations for short periods of time.”). 
 29. 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2012). 
 30. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2012); see also 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (providing that a law may be 
understood to appropriate funds or allow their obligation “only if the law specifically states that 
an appropriation is made or that such a contract may be made”); 1 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-6 to 4-7 (3d ed. 2004) 
(characterizing the Purpose Act as “prohibit[ing] charging authorized items to the wrong 
appropriation” or “unauthorized items to any appropriation,” because “[a]nything less would 
render congressional control [of appropriations] largely meaningless”). 
 31. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341–42, 1350. The U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel has 
described the Anti-Deficiency Act as “one of several means by which Congress has sought to 
enforce” requirements of the Appropriations Clause. Applicability of the Antideficiency Act to a 
Violation of a Condition or Internal Cap Within an Appropriation, 25 Op. O.L.C. 33, 33 (2001). For 
further discussion of the Act and its history, see infra Section IV.B. 
 32. See HOWELL, supra note 27, at 121–22 (noting that dependence on appropriations may 
reduce the president’s “powers of unilateral action”). 
 33. CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 69–72. 
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disproportionate influence.34 To paraphrase Bismarck’s famous 
metaphor, appropriations legislation is sausagemaking at its finest—
and best not observed up close. Nevertheless, in a world of broad 
delegations and expansive executive authority, Congress’s power of the 
purse is the single feature of our system that most effectively 
guarantees an ongoing political constraint on the president’s authority 
to set policy unilaterally. One might say that if it did not exist we would 
have had to invent it.35 
When it comes to constitutional executive authorities, however, 
Congress’s power of the purse generates an important separation-of-
powers puzzle. While our Constitution assigns Congress the power of 
appropriation, it also assigns the president specific powers and 
responsibilities. Among them are the obligation to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed,” the power to appoint “officers of the 
United States,” and the prerogatives to serve as “Commander in Chief,” 
“make treaties” (with Senate approval), and grant “Pardons and 
Reprieves.”36 All these powers and responsibilities require resources to 
be discharged effectively. How do they fit together with Congress’s 
power of the purse? Can Congress use its authority over funding to 
control the president’s exercise of his own powers? Or do funding 
constraints on executive action sometimes constitute unconstitutional 
conditions that the president may disregard? 
B. The Puzzle’s Undertheorization 
The executive branch has developed its own particular answer 
to the puzzle: it has claimed authority to disregard funding constraints 
on presumed executive prerogatives.37 If uncabined, this theory of 
 
 34. For these reasons, Neal Devins argued three decades ago that appropriations provisions 
were poor vehicles for substantive policymaking. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government 
Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 457–58 (discussing “institutional 
reasons” why “the appropriations process may not be conducive to sound substantive 
policymaking”). For more recent critical accounts of the appropriations process, see, for example, 
Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84–90 (2006) 
(discussing dynamics of appropriations riders and noting they may often “fly below the political 
radar, placed in the bill by a few connected members of Congress”); and Richard J. Lazarus, 
Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 
619, 635–37 (2006) (discussing opportunities to force through unpopular measures in 
appropriations riders).  
 35. For some general figures on use of appropriations riders, see Jason A. MacDonald, 
Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 104 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 766, 768 (2010) (counting, on average, roughly three hundred provisions banning 
enforcement of specified regulations each year between 1993 and 2002). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3. 
 37. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations 
Act, 33 Op. O.L.C. __ (2009) (ms. at 1) (concluding that the State Department “may disregard” 
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executive power threatens to undo the very constraints the 
appropriations process places upon presidents. And we have reason to 
fear presidents will be aggressive in asserting it. Although the question 
of funding control over the executive branch has arisen repeatedly 
across American history, presidents may well have particularly strong 
incentives to defy such restrictions in our current era of partisan 
distrust, legislative paralysis, and presidential administration. At the 
least, questions about presidential spending authority arose repeatedly 
in areas of acute policy conflict during the Obama presidency,38 and 
President Trump’s first signing statement claimed constitutional 
authority to disregard multiple provisions in a funding statute.39 The 
Framers nonetheless seem not to have held any clear view on this 
question, nor does past scholarship provide any convincing framework 
for answering it. 
1. Ambiguity at the Founding 
To begin with the Framers, the Constitution’s drafters and 
ratifiers seem not to have squarely resolved, or even adequately 
considered, the problem of funding constraints on the U.S. president. 
To be sure, in keeping with the deep constitutional history highlighted 
earlier, the Framers recognized legislative control over appropriations 
as a vital check on the other branches. In Federalist No. 58, James 
Madison even called Congress’s power of the purse “the most complete 
and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the 
immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of 
every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary 
measure.”40 “[T]he purse,” Madison elaborated, was  
that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, 
an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its 
 
unconstitutional limitation on appropriations for certain diplomatic activities); Constitutionality 
of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61 (1933) (“Congress may not, 
by conditions attached to appropriations, provide for a discharge of the functions of Government 
in a manner not authorized by the Constitution.”); Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 
462, 469–70 (1860) (explaining that the president would be “entirely justified in treating this 
condition (if it be a condition) [in an appropriations statute] as if the paper on which it is written 
were blank”). For additional examples, see infra Section I.B.2. 
 38. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 39. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3. 
 40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 297–98 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). In this 
passage, Madison, in fact, associated the purse not just with Congress, but, more specifically, with 
the House of Representatives, which he noted “cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the 
supplies requisite for the support of government.” Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All 
Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may 
propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”). 
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activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the 
overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government.41  
Unsurprisingly, the choice to vest appropriations control in Congress 
occasioned significant debate at neither the constitutional convention 
itself nor the subsequent state ratifying conventions.42 
And yet the very centrality of appropriations control to Anglo-
American constitutional thinking may have blinded the Framers to the 
difficulty of mapping these expectations onto the new constitutional 
system they were establishing.43 In England, with its unwritten 
constitution developed organically through ordinary legislation over 
time, parliamentary control of appropriations served as a means of 
leverage to degrade royal authority over time. Parliament, in other 
words, could alter the constitutional framework by extracting 
constitutional concessions from the Crown in exchange for grants of 
assistance—in particular grants of assistance for the expensive military 
adventures that kings persistently insisted on waging.44 To the extent 
the U.S. Constitution aims instead to fix in place a system of separated 
 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 40, at 297–98 (James Madison). 
 42. See, e.g., BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 29 (“There is no record of any debate 
about the Appropriations Clause . . . .”); Sidak, supra note 4, at 1171–73 (discussing the clause’s 
drafting history and concluding it “provides little insight”). 
 43. As Gerhard Casper observed in his study of appropriations practice in the early Republic, 
“[t]he unquestioned rule was that of legislative supremacy [over appropriations],” but “in the 
postrevolutionary American context [the rule was] not necessarily obvious.” GERHARD CASPER, 
SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 74 (1997). The delegates at the 
Constitutional Convention did debate (and eliminate) a proposal to require origination of all 
appropriations in the House of Representatives. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1171–72; cf. U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (final adopted version of the Origination Clause) (providing that “[a]ll Bills for 
raising Revenue,” rather than appropriations, “shall originate in the House of Representatives; 
but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills”). Although some 
delegates expressed concern that the House might abuse its origination power to extract 
substantive concessions from the Senate, the delegates seem not to have questioned Congress’s 
overall authority over appropriations, much less to have considered in depth the relationship 
between appropriations and constitutional executive authorities in general. See Sidak, supra note 
4, at 1172 (arguing that the debates provide no affirmative support for the view that the Framers 
meant “to give Congress in effect a veto over the Executive in its performance of any of its 
constitutionally assigned functions,” but acknowledging that “[t]his history from the 
Constitutional Convention provides little insight into the meaning of the appropriations clause”); 
see also BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 27–29 (discussing debates at the 
Constitutional Convention over Senate power to amend money bills and observing that “no one 
during the debates suggested prohibiting . . . riders” on appropriations bills altogether); GORDON 
S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 555–56 (new ed. 1998) (also 
discussing debates over origination of “money bills” at the Constitutional Convention). For general 
discussion of the Origination Clause and its history, including debates at the Constitutional 
Convention, see Rebecca M. Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 659, 666–72 (2014). 
 44. See BREWER, supra note 24 (linking the development of limited domestic government in 
England to parliamentary control over military resources); CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 45–52 
(describing this evolution). 
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powers, such leveraged adjustment of congressional and executive 
powers could itself defy the constitutional framework. In short, 
although the Framers evidently presumed that Congress’s 
appropriations power would function as a check on the executive—or at 
the very least as a means of stopping a would-be tyrant in his tracks—
they seem not to have had any clear understanding of how far Congress 
could go in curbing the executive.45 
In a telling indication of this blind spot, Alexander Hamilton in 
Federalist No. 73 discussed presidential compensation at length 
without ever seeming to consider the parallel problem of funding for the 
executive branch as a whole. As Hamilton observed, the Constitution 
specifically prohibits any increase or decrease in compensation during 
a president’s term.46 Observing that in general “a power over a man’s 
support is a power over his will” and indifference to financial 
inducements is a “stern virtue” that grows in “few soils,” Hamilton 
extolled this salary guarantee as a key protection for executive “vigor” 
and independence.47 “The legislature,” Hamilton wrote,  
with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could 
render him as obsequious to their will as they might think proper to make him. They 
might, in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesses, to surrender 
at discretion his judgment to their inclinations.48  
Yet for all his concern to prevent “intimidation or seduction of the 
Executive by the terrors or allurements of the pecuniary arrangements 
of the legislative body,”49 Hamilton seemed not to consider whether 
discretionary control over other executive branch officials’ salaries 
could have comparable effects on presidential independence. 
In fact, as discussed further below, the ink on the Constitution 
was barely dry before the scope of congressional appropriations power 
emerged as a point of contention. One member of Congress captured the 
essential nature of the problem. In England, Representative William 
Vans Murray observed on the House floor in 1796, “supplies and 
grievances have been for centuries a measure of compromise and the 
mode by which the Commons have accumulated powers and checks 
against a throne”; hence, “we see the powers of the Commons growing 
 
 45. This question may also largely disappear (or at least present itself in different forms) in 
modern parliamentary systems, which may often lack any prescribed constitutional separation 
between the legislature and executive. 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
 47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 40, at 370 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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by absorption from the prerogative of the Crown.”50 In the United 
States, in contrast, “we see in the powers of this House [of 
Representatives], not the spoils of contest, not the trophies of repeated 
victory over the other branches of the Government, but a specific 
quantum of trust placed in our hands to be exercised for the people 
agreeably to the Constitution.”51 
Though Murray’s specific position in this debate lost the day (as 
we shall see52), his broader point captures the essential puzzle the 
Framers left open. In our system, unlike Britain’s, “we find certain 
definite portions of power accurately meted out by the people in a 
written instrument to the respective branches of Government.”53 To the 
extent that is true, use of funding denials to cut back on legitimate 
prerogatives of other branches might well distort the constitutional 
scheme rather than give effect to it. 
2. Current High Stakes 
At any rate, presidents have claimed authority since at least 
1860 to disregard some funding constraints on their executive 
authorities.54 In one example, President Andrew Johnson questioned 
the constitutionality of appropriations riders requiring approval of all 
military orders by the Army’s top general (then Ulysses Grant).55 In 
another, President Woodrow Wilson objected, apparently on 
constitutional grounds, to an appropriations rider barring use of Justice 
Department funds for particular prosecutions.56 In modern times, 
Congress helped force an end to the Vietnam War by halting 
appropriations, but President Ford nonetheless ordered use of military 
 
 50. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 684, 699 (1796) (statement of Rep. William Vans Murray). For 
background on Murray, then a Federalist congressman from Maryland, see STANLEY ELKINS & 
ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800, at 675–
76 (1993). 
 51. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. at 699. 
 52. See infra Part II. 
 53. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. at 698. 
 54. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468–69 (1860); see STEVEN G. 
CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM 
WASHINGTON TO BUSH 158 (2008) (identifying rider at issue in this case as Congress’s first effort 
to limit presidential control over the executive branch through appropriations). 
 55. President Andrew Johnson, Message to the House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 1867), in 8 
A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3670 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1897) [hereinafter COMPILATION MPP]; see David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1023–
24 (2008) (discussing President Johnson’s “constitutional doubts” about this provision). 
 56. President Woodrow Wilson, Statement on Signing the Sundry Civil Bill (June 23, 1913), 
in 27 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 558 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1978) (calling the provision 
“unjustifiable in character and principle”). 
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force during the war’s messy conclusion in violation of these 
restrictions.57 During the Carter Administration, Congress attempted 
to halt an initiative to pardon Vietnam-era draft evaders by denying 
federal funding to implement it.58 In the 1980s, the so-called Boland 
Amendment barred any use of federal funds to support the Contras, an 
anti-Communist rebel force in Nicaragua. In the notorious Iran-Contra 
scandal, however, Reagan Administration officials developed ingenious 
means of circumventing this restriction.59 
Several examples from just the past few years illustrate how 
congressional and executive views on this issue have diverged—and 
how acute the resulting difficulties have become: 
 
 Guantanamo Prisoner Transfers: Congress obstructed 
President Obama’s stated desire to close the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility through funding 
restrictions. These restrictions precluded either 
transferring detainees to foreign custody without making 
certain prior determinations and providing substantial 
advance notice to Congress, or transferring them at all to 
the United States proper.60 Although President Obama, 
in compliance with the riders, brought no Guantanamo 
detainees to the United States and generally complied 
with the conditions for overseas transfers, he asserted 
repeatedly in signing statements that “[u]nder certain 
circumstances” these provisions “would violate 
 
 57. See infra Section IV.C.1. For discussion of appropriations measures relating to the 
Vietnam conflict, see BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 119–22, 154–57; Barron & 
Lederman, supra note 55, at 1064–70, 1071–74; and Louis Fisher, Presidential Independence & 
the Power of the Purse, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 107 (1997). 
 58. For a description of this conflict, see CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF 
“UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS: REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 111–12 (1998). 
 59. For general background on the Iran-Contra controversy, see, for example, BANKS & 
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 137–44; HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW 
PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION 366–73 (2015); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 240–45 (6th ed., rev. 2014); and HAROLD 
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA 
AFFAIR 11–37 (1990).  
 60. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, §§ 8110–11, 128 Stat. 
5, 131. Similar provisions appeared in annual defense authorization bills. See, e.g., Carl Levin & 
Howard P. Buck McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 
113-291, §§ 1032–33, 128 Stat. 3292, 3491–92 (2014). Although distinguishing between legal 
authorization and monetary appropriations is generally a key principle of appropriations law, see 
generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-464SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW ch. 2, at 1–4 (4th ed., 2016 rev.), annual defense authorization bills 
effectively make available military resources on an annual basis, much as defense appropriations 
bills do. They thus may raise analogous concerns to those addressed here. 
Price_Galley(Do Not Delete) 3/7/2018  9:38 AM 
2018] FUNDING RESTRICTIONS 375 
constitutional separation of powers principles.”61 In 
addition, as part of a secret deal to release a U.S. soldier 
held by the Taliban, the Administration transferred 
several prisoners overseas without providing the 
required advance notice, an action the Government 
Accountability Office decried as unlawful.62 Echoing 
President Obama, President Trump’s first signing 
statement indicated that restrictions on Guantanamo 
prisoner transfers could infringe upon his “constitutional 
authority as Commander in Chief.”63 
 
 Conduct of Diplomacy: Congress routinely bars use of 
funds, either across the board or for particular offices, for 
certain diplomatic purposes. Recurrent riders, for 
example, have conditioned State Department funding on 
the United States not sending official representatives to 
United Nations (“UN”) bodies chaired by certain state 
sponsors of terrorism.64 Another rider first enacted in 
2011 prohibited any funds for the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (“NASA”) or the White House 
Office of Science and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) from 
 
 61. Presidential Statement on Signing the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 945 (Dec. 
19, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/19/statement-president-
hr-3979 [https://perma.cc/CTK9-CMD7] [hereinafter Obama Statement on Signing 2015 NDAA]. 
In a key passage, Obama asserted:  
The executive branch must have the flexibility, with regard to those detainees who 
remain, to determine when and where to prosecute them, based on the facts and 
circumstances of each case and our national security interests, and when and where to 
transfer them consistent with our national security and our humane treatment policy. 
Under certain circumstances, the provisions concerning detainee transfers in both bills 
[the Fiscal Year 2015 defense authorization and appropriations statutes] would violate 
constitutional separation of powers principles. In the event that the restrictions on the 
transfer of detainees operate in a manner that violates constitutional separation of 
powers principles, my administration will implement them in a manner that avoids the 
constitutional conflict. 
Id.; see also, e.g., Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2016, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 843 (Nov. 25, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
the-press-office/2016/12/23/statement-president-signing-national-defense-authorization-act-fiscal 
[https://perma.cc/TD7Z-C5KQ] (reiterating similar objection). 
 62. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, B-326013, Department of Defense—Compliance with 
Statutory Notification Requirement (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665390.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3QSK-5WVR] [hereinafter GAO Letter on Department of Defense Compliance] 
(discussing transfer and deeming it unlawful). 
 63. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3. 
 64. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations 
Act, 33 Op. O.L.C. __ (2009) (ms. at 2–3) (collecting statutes). 
Price_Galley (Do Not Delete) 3/7/2018  9:38 AM 
376 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2:357 
being used for certain diplomatic activities with China,65 
even though the United States had long designated the 
head of OSTP as the U.S. point of contact for a scientific 
cooperation agreement.66 Presidents of both parties have 
objected to such limitations and at times disregarded 
them.67 
 
 White House Advisers: Congress attempted to influence 
President Obama’s agenda through restrictions on 
personnel within the White House itself. Beginning in 
2011, Congress forbid use of funds appropriated for the 
Executive Office of the President to pay salaries for 
several specified positions, most notably the “Assistant to 
the President for Energy and Climate Change,” 
colloquially known as the “Climate Change Czar.”68 
Although President Obama evidently complied with the 
provision’s literal terms by shifting covered personnel 
and functions to other White House positions,69 he 
claimed authority in a signing statement to disregard it. 
“Legislative efforts that significantly impede the 
President’s ability to exercise his supervisory and 
coordinating authorities or to obtain the views of the 
 
 65. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 531, 129 Stat. 2242, 2330 
(2015); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 532, 
128 Stat. 2130, 2216 (2014); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. 
L. No. 113-6, § 535, 127 Stat. 198, 277; Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, § 539, 125 Stat. 552, 639 (2011); Department of Defense and Full-Year 
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1340, 125 Stat. 38, 123. 
 66. Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy 
in Section 1340(a) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ (2011) (ms. at 1–2). 
 67. President Trump’s first signing statement reiterated this view. See Trump Statement on 
2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3 (objecting to provisions that “could, in certain 
circumstances, interfere with the exercise of my constitutional authorities to negotiate 
international agreements”). For executive branch opinions defending the practice of disregarding 
such congressional limitations, see, for example, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ (ms. at 36); Constitutionality of 
Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33 Op. O.L.C. __ (2009) (ms. at 
12); Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 52 (1990). For 
examples of actual executive defiance, see infra note 350. 
 68. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, § 622, 129 Stat. at 2468; Consolidated and 
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, § 622, 128 Stat. at 2377; Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 621, 128 Stat. 5, 228; Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 626, 125 Stat. 786, 927 (2011); Department of Defense and Full-
Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, § 2262, 125 Stat. at 198. 
 69. Robin Bravender, Budget Deal Axes “Czars” Already Gone, POLITICO (Apr. 12, 2011, 9:36 
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2011/04/budget-deal-axes-czars-already-gone-053001 (last 
updated Apr. 13, 2011, 9:52 AM) [https://perma.cc/T8UF-YAH6]. 
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appropriate senior advisers,” Obama asserted, “violate 
the separation of powers by undermining the President’s 
ability to exercise his constitutional responsibilities and 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”70 
Addressing a similar provision, President Trump’s first 
signing statement reiterated President Obama’s 
objection nearly verbatim.71 
 
 Marijuana Enforcement: Another recurrent rider has 
barred use of Justice Department funds “to prevent 
[certain listed states] from implementing their own laws 
that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or 
cultivation of medical marijuana.”72 Although this rider 
to some degree codified the Obama Administration’s own 
stated enforcement policy with respect to federal 
marijuana crimes,73 the Justice Department adopted a 
narrow interpretation of the rider.74 It also pursued 
prosecution or civil forfeiture in cases arguably within 
the rider’s terms.75 The Ninth Circuit recently rejected 
this interpretation and upheld judicial authority to 
enforce the rider’s terms against the government by 
barring particular prosecutions.76 President Trump 
 
 70. President Barack Obama, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense and Full-
Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 1 PUB. PAPERS 386 (Apr. 15, 2011). 
 71. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3. 
 72. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, § 542, 129 Stat. at 2332–33; see also, e.g., 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, § 538, 128 Stat. at 2310 (including 
a similar restriction); TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-53, 
§ 103, 129 Stat. 502, 506 (2015) (extending force of § 538 with respect to continuing 
appropriations). 
 73. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All U.S. Attorneys 1–2 (Aug. 
29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3CFH-WLXF]; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All 
U.S. Attorneys 2 (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.dfi.wa.gov/documents/banks/dept-of-justice-
memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/34XB-6D4R]. 
 74. See Memorandum from Patty Merkamp Stemler, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Fed. Prosecutors 1–2 (Feb. 27, 2015), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/273620932/Depart-of-Justice-Says-Medical-Marijuana-Law-Doesn-t-
Impact-Prosecutions [https://perma.cc/7RZR-EHRM] (narrowly interpreting appropriations rider 
to allow continued enforcement against private individuals or entities as opposed to state 
personnel). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Gentile, No. 1:12-CR-0360-DAD-BAM, 2016 WL 3549252, at 
*1–2 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2016) (prosecution charging defendant with marijuana conspiracy); 
United States v. Chavez, No. 2:15-CR-210-KJN, 2016 WL 916324, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016) 
(prosecution charging defendant with marijuana possession); United States v. Marin All. for Med. 
Marijuana, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (suit pursuing permanent injunction 
against marijuana business in California). 
 76. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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nevertheless indicated in his first signing statement that 
the provision could infringe upon his constitutional 
authority to enforce federal laws.77 
 
These examples illustrate how potent Congress’s control over 
appropriations may be as a means of controlling the executive branch. 
Yet by the same token the examples illustrate why an uncabined 
unconstitutional-conditions theory is worrisome in executive hands. 
Through historic practice, presidents have claimed authority to trump 
(as it were) funding constraints on their own action. But the 
Constitution’s provisions on executive power in Article II are 
notoriously ambiguous in key respects. If presidents may claim 
unfettered authority to disregard appropriations restrictions on those 
powers’ exercise, then through unchecked, self-serving interpretations 
they might recreate just the same sort of limitless prerogative that 
Representative Murray associated with the kings of old—yet without 
even an effective power of the purse to check it.78 
3. Limitations of Past Scholarship 
Developing a grounded account of funding constraints on the 
executive is thus imperative, yet the question has received insufficient 
attention outside Congress and the executive branch. In general, the 
problem of “unconstitutional conditions” on government funding is 
among the most difficult in constitutional law. In a constitutional 
system organized around negative liberties and other restraints on 
government power, the problem of resources—the money necessary to 
make those liberties and restraints effective—is a persistent blind spot 
in constitutional theory.79 The separation-of-powers question addressed 
here is no exception. 
 
 77. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3 (indicating that 
the President “will treat this provision consistently with my constitutional responsibility to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed”). 
 78. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 699–700 (1796). 
 79. For a recent argument that unrecognized unconstitutional-conditions problems are 
pervasive in constitutional law, see Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional 
Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and 
Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61 (2013). For a sampling of other key treatments, see, for example, 
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three 
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 41 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term—
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
4 (1988); Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 479 (2012); Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of 
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995); and Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). 
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Relevant judicial authority is sparse and contradictory. The 
Supreme Court has held both that appropriations restrictions may be 
unconstitutional on the same grounds as ordinary legislation80 and that 
funding denials may check the other branches in ways ordinary 
legislation cannot.81 As for scholarship, what little work addresses the 
question has been dominated by two conflicting articles formulated in 
the wake of Iran-Contra, each with opposite limitations.82 
On the one hand, Kate Stith argued in a landmark 1988 article 
that executive officials may never expend funds, nor indeed engage in 
any activity, without a prior supporting appropriation.83 On Stith’s 
account, “all monies received from whatever source by any part of the 
government are public funds”; no public funds may be expended without 
legislative authorization; and no government activity is possible 
without public funds.84 As Stith recognized, this framework would 
render the president entirely dependent on Congress, even when 
exercising textually assigned executive functions such as the pardon 
 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (observing, in decision 
invalidating appropriations rider as unconstitutional bill of attainder, that “[t]he fact that the 
punishment is inflicted through the instrumentality of an Act specifically cutting off the pay of 
certain named individuals found guilty of disloyalty, makes it no less galling or effective than if it 
had been done by an Act which designated the conduct as criminal”); United States v. Klein, 80 
U.S. 128, 147–48 (1871) (invalidating appropriations provision that “impair[ed]” the effect of a 
presidential pardon). 
 81. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 425 (1990) (“Any exercise of a 
power granted by the Constitution to one of the other branches of Government is limited by a valid 
reservation of congressional control over funds in the Treasury.”); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United 
States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) (“The [Appropriations Clause] . . . means simply that no money 
can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.”); Reeside 
v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1850) (“However much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, 
not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanctioned. Any other 
course would give to the fiscal officers a most dangerous discretion.”). 
 82. Apart from the two key Reagan-era articles highlighted here, a number of classic works 
have grappled briefly with appropriations controls over the president. See, e.g., CORWIN, supra 
note 11, at 149–61; LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 113–
15, 118–21 (2d ed. 1996); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWER: THE ORIGINS 70–74, 170–73 (1976). I draw from these scholars’ work throughout my 
analysis. 
 83. Stith, supra note 4. 
 84. Id. at 1345. Stith interpreted the Constitution to establish two interlocking principles, 
the “Principle of the Public Fisc” and the “Principle of Appropriations Control,” according to which 
all funds received by the federal government are public funds and no such funds may be expended 
without legislative authorization. Id. at 1345 (emphasis removed). Together, Stith’s two principles 
enforce a requirement that all federal government activity—that is, “all actions undertaken by and 
in the name of the United States government,” id. at 1348—may occur only with prior legislative 
authorization. Id. at 1345 (“Agencies and officials of the federal government may not spend monies 
from any source, private or public, without legislative permission to do so.”); id. at 1357 (“[T]here 
may be no spending in the name of the United States except pursuant to legislative 
appropriation.”). 
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power or the authority to negotiate treaties.85 Stith handled this 
difficulty by intuiting a congressional obligation to fund such executive 
responsibilities. “Congress itself,” she wrote, “would violate the 
Constitution if it refused to appropriate funds for the President to 
receive foreign ambassadors or to make treaties.”86 She further 
acknowledged that “[i]n the areas of foreign affairs and federal 
prosecution, it is generally conceded that Congress cannot closely 
circumscribe agency powers and the strategies of government policy, 
much less the particulars of government action.”87 Despite recognizing 
these limits, however, Stith’s framework left the executive powerless to 
enforce them. “Spending in the absence of appropriations,” she argued, 
“is ultra vires.”88 
Stith’s leading contemporary critic, Gregory Sidak, reached 
opposite conclusions.89 Implicitly defending the Reagan 
Administration’s Iran-Contra maneuvers against Stith’s charge of 
unconstitutionality, Sidak suggested that constitutional authority for 
executive action sufficed to establish an “appropriation by law” and 
permit expenditure of treasury funds.90 Accordingly, while Stith left the 
president at the mercy of all congressional funding constraints, Sidak 
advocated a wide-ranging “implied power to incur claims against the 
treasury to the extent minimally necessary to perform his duties and 
exercise his prerogatives under article II.”91 Sidak, moreover, left it 
largely up to the president to judge “minim[al] necess[ity],”92 and his 
analysis suggested that presidents could make even quite substantial 
 
 85. Id. at 1351–52. 
 86. Id. at 1351. 
 87. Id. at 1383. 
 88. Id. at 1351, 1362 n.89. Stith did indicate that “where an emergency exists, the President 
might decide that principles more fundamental than the Constitution’s appropriations 
requirement justify spending,” but she argued that “[t]he constitutional processes for resolving 
such situations . . . are political.” Id. at 1351–52. On the key question addressed here, Stith 
asserted: “Even where the President believes that Congress has transgressed the Constitution by 
failing to provide funds for a particular activity, the President has no constitutional authority to 
draw funds from the Treasury to finance the activity.” Id. at 1351. 
 89. Sidak, supra note 4. Though Sidak’s account was the most comprehensive, several other 
contemporaries defended the view of executive power underlying the Reagan Administration’s 
defiance of the Boland Amendments. See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, The Constitution and the Iran-
Contra Affair: Was Congress the Real Lawbreaker?, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 83 (1988) (arguing that 
separation-of-powers principles justified the Administration’s actions). In addition, some earlier 
scholarship anticipated these views by asserting broad presidential authority over foreign aid. See 
Don Wallace, Jr., The President’s Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers over Foreign Aid: Part I, 1970 
DUKE L.J. 293; Don Wallace, Jr., The President’s Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers over Foreign 
Aid: Part II, 1970 DUKE L.J. 453. For my discussion of this issue, see infra Section IV.E.1. 
 90. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1168–70, 1191, 1194–95. 
 91. Id. at 1194. 
 92. Id. at 1199, 1201. 
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military and law enforcement expenditures in defiance of statutory 
appropriations limits.93 Sidak also interpreted the phrase “by Law” in 
the Appropriations Clause to include executive authorization, when in 
fact the Constitution generally employs this phrase as a term of art for 
Acts of Congress.94 
More recently, some general accounts of separation of powers 
have briefly analyzed appropriations authority,95 and Josh Chafetz has 
highlighted the potential scope of Congress’s appropriations power.96 
Two leading scholars of foreign relations law have taken opposite views 
on conditional appropriations for conduct of diplomacy;97 an impressive 
book addressed fiscal practice in connection with the Cold War national 
security state;98 and several articles have addressed questions 
surrounding denial of appropriations for enforcing particular laws or 
regulations.99 Commentators have also analyzed many specific 
examples addressed here.100 Yet the scope of congressional authority to 
 
 93. See id. at 1188 (“[A] President who acts to discharge his article II duties when Congress 
has failed or refused to provide him appropriations for that purpose does not violate the 
appropriations clause.”); id. at 1197–99 (discussing national defense and law enforcement 
examples and concluding that the choice of spending level “must be a matter of political discretion 
left to the President in the first instance and non-reviewable by the Judiciary”). 
 94. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 167 (advancing this view and identifying 
other “flaws” in Sidak’s theory). The Supremacy Clause’s reference to “the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance [to the Constitution],” U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2, has been 
understood to include administrative action, but such action occurs pursuant to statutory 
authorization, not in defiance of it. For a general discussion of administrative action’s preemptive 
effect under the Supremacy Clause, see David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative 
Preemption, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 268–69 (2015). 
 95. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 59, at 240–45; HENKIN, supra note 82, at 113–15, 119–21; 
KOH, supra note 59, at 129–31; HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 77–83 (2005); David J. 
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief Power at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the 
Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 733–34, 738–40 (2008). 
 96. CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 45–78. 
 97. Compare MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 108–14, 
417 n.61 (2007) (arguing such conditions are generally permissible), with POWELL, supra note 8, 
at 141–44 (arguing they may violate separation of powers). 
 98. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 160–61 (discussing constitutionality of 
appropriations restrictions in the national security context). 
 99. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 34; Jacques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on the Use of 
Appropriations Riders by Congress to Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes, 19 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 457 (1992); MacDonald, supra note 35. Some other recent works have called attention to the 
importance of budgetary constraints in administrative law. See Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and 
the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1729–35 (2016) (discussing 
appropriations law and implementation of the Affordable Care Act); Eloise Pasachoff, The 
President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016) (addressing 
mechanisms of agency policy control through the White House budget process); Sohoni, supra note 
21 (analyzing risks associated with agency-initiated spending). 
 100. See, e.g., Celidon Pitt, Note, Fair Trade: The President’s Power to Recover Captured U.S. 
Servicemembers and the Recent Prisoner Exchange with the Taliban, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2837 
(2015) (addressing prisoner exchanges); Kevin Sholette, Note, The American Czars, 20 CORNELL 
J.L & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2010) (exploring increasing use of administrative “czars”); Marshall 
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condition executive appropriations has awaited systematic 
reexamination, even as the bipartisan executive practice of 
disregarding such funding constraints has gathered strength and our 
increasingly polarized and erratic politics have given the question new 
urgency. 
II. FRAMING THE SOLUTION: WHY FUNDING IS DISCRETIONARY 
A better account of when and whether funding constraints are 
permissible must recognize that even if Congress holds no affirmative 
duty to provide funds in the first place, separation-of-powers principles 
may limit Congress’s authority to provide funds with strings attached. 
For reasons addressed in Parts III and IV, the scope of any irreducible 
executive discretion over spending must vary by context. Some powers 
are resource-independent and thus matters of plenary presidential 
discretion, while others are resource-dependent, giving the president 
far narrower scope to defy statutory appropriations limits. Even 
resource-independent powers, moreover, are subject to important 
limiting principles that prior accounts have failed to articulate. 
Correctly framing the analysis, however, requires first 
eliminating one possible means of reconciling the appropriations power 
with executive authority: the theory (suggested by Stith) that Congress 
holds some affirmative duty to fund executive functions at adequate 
levels.101 While this view was debated early in the country’s history and 
has resurfaced from time to time since then, the great weight of 
historical practice contradicts it. As a matter of deeply embedded 
constitutional practice, then, the view that Congress holds some legal 
duty to fund the president’s priorities—let alone a judicially enforceable 
legal duty to do so—is off the table. The problem as it arises today is 
instead one of unconstitutional conditions: whether Congress’s power to 
provide no funds at all entails power to provide funding with strings—
and relatedly when, if ever, the president may take the money but cut 
the strings for separation-of-powers reasons. 
In the early Republic, leading figures in fact argued to the 
contrary that Congress held an affirmative obligation to fund executive 
initiatives (whether it approved of them or not). In particular, in 
 
Silverberg, The Separation of Powers and Control of the CIA’s Covert Operations, 68 TEX. L. REV. 
575 (1990) (discussing oversight of the CIA); L. Anthony Sutin, Check, Please: Constitutional 
Dimensions of Halting the Pay of Public Officials, 26 J. LEGIS. 221 (2000) (analyzing congressional 
appropriations power over compensation for executive branch officials); Adrian Vermeule, The 
Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 501 (2002) (analyzing 
separation-of-powers issues regarding compensation for public officials). 
 101. See Stith, supra note 4, at 1350–51. 
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debates over whether to appropriate funds to implement the 
controversial “Jay Treaty” with Great Britain negotiated by the 
Washington Administration, some members of Congress insisted that 
the House was duty-bound to back the agreement, while others argued 
that the House’s constitutional role in passing appropriations 
legislation gave it independent authority to question the treaty’s 
merits, even after the president and Senate approved it.102 As one 
example, Representative Murray (who was quoted earlier103) deduced 
an obligation to fund the treaty from the fixed character of executive 
authorities under our Constitution. Unlike in England, he observed, 
“[h]ere, an appropriation is less a grant of money than an act of duty, to 
which the Constitution, that is the will of the nation, obliges us.”104 In 
private correspondence, Alexander Hamilton likewise maintained that 
while the House might properly debate “the mode of raising and 
appropriating the money,” the House “cannot deliberate whether they 
will appropriate and pay the money” in the first place.105 Even decades 
later, leading Federalist attorney William Rawle asserted in his 
treatise that “[i]t is incumbent on congress to furnish” “all pecuniary 
supplies required to support the exercise of the treaty making power.”106 
The House, however, ultimately approved resolutions rejecting 
any such notion of constitutional duty. First, in the so-called Livingston 
Resolution, the House requested documents and correspondence from 
the executive branch regarding the treaty negotiations. Insofar as this 
demand for information presumed a right to exercise independent 
judgment over the merits of implementing the treaty, the resolution’s 
approval by a wide margin properly “suggest[s] that a substantial 
majority agreed that the House had discretion in implementing the 
 
 102. For general accounts of this controversy and resulting constitutional debates in Congress, 
see, for example, GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1789–1815, at 197–99 (2009); and DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–1801, at 211–17 (1997). 
 103. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 104. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 699 (1796) (statement of Rep. William Vans Murray). Other members 
of Congress pressed the same view. See, e.g., id. at 1017 (statement of Rep. Zephaniah Swift) 
(“Notwithstanding the power given to the Legislature to make all appropriations of money; yet, in 
all cases where the national faith is plighted, a contract is made, or a debt contracted, it becomes 
an absolute duty to make the necessary appropriation to carry it into effect . . . .”). 
 105. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to William Loughton Smith (Mar. 10, 1796), in 20 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 72 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974). President Washington’s refusal 
to provide documents to the House regarding treaty negotiations implied the same view, as he 
asserted no legitimate role for the House in considering the treaty’s merits. 
 106. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 73 
(William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2003) (2d ed. 1829). Rawle acknowledged that “there is no express 
direction to this effect” in the Constitution, but argued that “common sense” supported inferring 
this congressional duty. Id. at 74. 
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treaty.”107 What is more, after President Washington claimed a 
privilege not to produce the documents—and even though the House 
ultimately voted on the merits to implement the treaty—the House 
passed another resolution asserting: 
when a Treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution 
to the power of Congress, it must depend, for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a 
law or laws to be passed by Congress. And it is the Constitutional right and duty of the 
House of Representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or 
inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon, as, in 
their judgment, may be most conducive to the public good.108 
The House’s votes thus reflected the view, expressed forcefully 
by President Jefferson’s future Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin 
among others, that “the specific Legislative powers delegated to 
Congress were limitations on the undefined power of making Treaties 
vested in the President and Senate,” and “the general power of granting 
money, also vested in Congress, would at all events be used, if 
necessary, as a check upon, and as controlling the exercise of, the 
powers claimed by the President and Senate.”109 In correspondence with 
Hamilton, even the future Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall 
advocated “admit[ting] the discretionary power of the representative on 
the subject of appropriations,” notwithstanding the binding contractual 
character of the treaty itself.110 
This debate resurfaced during at least one other key juncture in 
American history. During the waning days of Reconstruction, President 
Rutherford Hayes argued in a series of veto messages that effecting 
substantive legal changes through appropriations bills violated the 
separation of powers.111 Hayes acknowledged that such riders had 
already become a “common practice” employed by “[a]ll parties when in 
 
 107. CURRIE, supra note 102, at 214. 
 108. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. at 771–72; see also id. at 781–84 (recording vote). 
 109. Id. at 466 (statement by Rep. Gallatin); see also CURRIE, supra note 102, at 215–16 
(endorsing this view). 
 110. Letter from John Marshall to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 25, 1796), in 20 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 137–38. 
 111. See, e.g., President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (Apr. 29, 1879), in 10 
COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4475, 4484 (arguing that including provisions in funding bill 
to repeal certain unrelated statutes was “a dangerous violation of the spirit and meaning of the 
Constitution”); President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (May 29, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION 
MPP, supra note 55, at 4488, 4489 (reiterating constitutional objection “to the practice of tacking 
general legislation to appropriation bills, especially when the object is to deprive a coordinate 
branch of the Government of its right to the free exercise of its own discretion and judgment 
touching such general legislation”); President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (May 4, 1880), 
in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4543, 4544 (objecting again to “the questionable and . . . 
the dangerous practice of tacking upon appropriation bills general and permanent legislation,” in 
part because this practice “invites attacks upon the independence and constitutional powers of the 
Executive by providing an easy and effective way of constraining Executive discretion”). 
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power.”112 He nevertheless decried the practice for giving the House of 
Representatives, which alone may originate revenue bills, undue 
authority “to withhold appropriations upon which the existence of the 
Government may depend unless the Senate and the President shall give 
their assent to any legislation which the House may see fit to attach to 
appropriation bills.”113 “To say,” Hayes wrote, “that a majority of either 
or both of the Houses of Congress may insist upon the approval of a bill 
under the penalty of stopping all of the operations of the Government 
for want of the necessary supplies is to deny to the Executive that share 
of the legislative power which is plainly conferred by” Article II’s veto 
provisions.114 Accordingly, in Hayes’s view, “[t]he enactment of this bill 
into a law will establish a precedent which will tend to destroy the equal 
independence of the several branches of the Government,” thus 
“plac[ing] not merely the Senate and the Executive, but the judiciary 
also, under the coercive dictation of the House.”115 
In decrying use of appropriations leverage to alter substantive 
policy, Hayes presumed some congressional obligation to fund executive 
and judicial operations at necessary levels in the first place. Yet even 
Hayes acknowledged Congress’s ultimate authority to deny funding if 
it wished. Some appropriations in fact lapsed on two occasions during 
his administration, as they nearly did during that of his predecessor, 
Ulysses Grant.116 Though both presidents urged Congress to provide 
needed funds without delay, both also acknowledged that Congress’s 
failure to provide funds could halt government operations.117 
 
 112. President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (Apr. 29, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, 
supra note 55, at 4475, 4480. 
 113. Id. at 4482. As discussed below in Section IV.D.2, Hayes also objected to provisions 
denying funds to enforce federal laws that remained on the books. 
 114. Id. at 4483. Hayes concludes this sentence by referring to the “share of the legislative 
power which is plainly conferred by the second section of the seventh article of the Constitution.” 
Since Article VII has no second section and addresses ratification rather than legislative authority, 
it seems likely he meant to refer to the veto provisions in the second clause of section seven of 
Article I. 
 115. Id. For general background on these debates, see ARI HOOGENBOOM, RUTHERFORD B. 
HAYES: WARRIOR AND PRESIDENT 392–413 (1995); and BROOKS D. SIMPSON, THE RECONSTRUCTION 
PRESIDENTS 220–23 (1998). 
 116. See CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 68 (discussing lapse in funding for federal marshals 
during Hayes Administration); HOOGENBOOM, supra note 115, at 352, 402 (discussing separate 
lapses in funding for the army and the marshals during the Hayes Administration); President 
Ulysses Grant, Special Message (June 17, 1876), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4322 
(urging Congress to avoid funding lapse); Act of June 30, 1876, ch. 157, 19 Stat. 65 (providing 
temporarily for government expenditures). 
 117. See infra Section IV.D.2; see also President Rutherford B. Hayes, Third Annual Message 
(Dec. 1, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4509, 4525 (noting that while some 
federal marshals had “continued the performance of their duties without compensation from the 
Government” following an appropriations lapse, in some instances “the proper execution of the 
process of the United States failed by reason of the absence of the requisite appropriation”); 
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One of Hayes’s and Grant’s key allies in Congress, future 
President James Garfield, expressly articulated this balance. Despite 
arguing that Congress had the “duty” to fund executive enforcement of 
statutes, he nevertheless acknowledged Congress’s “power” to deny 
such appropriations: 
Now you have the power to withhold appropriations, but have you the right? Your power 
and your duty put together constitute your right in the best sense of the word. Of course 
you are your own judges of duty. But we are all here, Mr. Chairman, under the solemn 
obligation of an oath. We are all sworn before the Searcher of all hearts that we will well 
and faithfully perform the duties of Representatives under the Constitution. And the 
Constitution makes it our duty to appropriate the necessary means to enforce the 
laws. . . . I hold that to appropriate the money required by the law is my duty, and my 
vote shall be for the appropriation under the laws as they are, and not coupled with acts 
which nullify or obstruct the laws.118 
Today, at any rate, whether characterized as a constitutional 
“right” or merely a “power,” presumed congressional discretion over 
funding underlies not only the Anti-Deficiency Act (“ADA”), but also 
routine congressional debates over funding levels for a variety of 
executive initiatives. Congress in fact passed the ADA (and tightened it 
over time) to eliminate the previously routine practice of “coercive 
deficiencies.”119 Before the ADA, executive agencies regularly overspent 
their appropriations so as to impose a moral obligation on Congress to 
make whole hapless constituents who acted in reliance on expected 
government remuneration.120 By criminalizing this practice, Congress 
firmly asserted its view that public expenditure requires advance 
legislative authorization, which Congress may or may not provide in its 
 
President Rutherford B. Hayes, Special Message (June 30, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra 
note 55, at 4474, 4475 (“Under the laws prohibiting public officers from involving the Government 
in contract liabilities beyond actual appropriations, it is apparent that the means at the disposal 
of the executive department for executing the laws through the regular ministerial officers will 
after to-day be left inadequate.”); President Rutherford B. Hayes, Special Session Message (Mar. 
19, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4472 (calling special session because of 
Congress’s failure to make appropriations); Grant, Special Message (June 17, 1879), in 10 
COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4322, 4323 (observing that without extension of 
appropriations, government departments would be “[p]recluded from expending money not 
appropriated” and “would have to suspend the service so far as the appropriations for it should 
have failed to be made”). 
 118. 9 CONG. REC. 1894–95 (1879). 
 119. For a general history of the ADA and Congress’s long battle with the problem of coercive 
deficiencies, see LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR., THE SPENDING POWER: A HISTORY OF THE EFFORTS OF 
CONGRESS TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES 144–47 (1943). Both the Comptroller General and the 
Justice Department have understood preventing this practice to be the ADA’s central purpose. See, 
e.g., Project Stormfury—Australia—Indemnification for Damages, 59 Comp. Gen. 369–72 (1980); 
Employment of Retired Army Officer as Superintendent of Indian School, 30 Op. Att’y Gen. 51 
(1913). 
 120. See WILMERDING, supra note 119, at 137–53. 
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discretion.121 For that matter, even before the ADA, most seem to have 
assumed that the coercion effected by coercive deficiencies was moral 
and political rather than legal—that Congress, in other words, could 
decline if it wished to appropriate funds that executive officials 
promised.122 
More generally, Congress today routinely declines to fund 
initiatives and agencies at levels presidents request, even in areas of 
arguable executive prerogative such as foreign affairs. As just one 
example, in keeping with the post–Jay Treaty Livingston Resolution, 
Congress in recent years has often declined to fund treaty commitments 
such as dues obligations to international organizations.123 Such 
shortfalls may cause presidents (and the nation at large) great 
embarrassment, but few seriously contend that Congress lacks 
authority to make this choice.124 
As appropriations battles during the Obama and Clinton 
Administrations grew more heated and lapses in appropriations more 
common, some faulted Congress for failing to “do its job” and fund the 
government.125 Such objections resonate with historic arguments by 
Hamilton, Rawle, and Hayes that Congress holds some constitutionally 
grounded obligation to exercise its appropriations power in a manner 
that respects other branches’ prerogatives. It might even be said that 
failing to fund the government for partisan gain violates a “convention” 
 
 121. For an illustration of the contemporary understanding, see Colonel Richard D. Rosen, 
Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the 
Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1988), which describes the need for a specific funding source for 
government operations. 
 122. See, e.g., Support of the Army, 15 Op. O.L.C. 209, 211 (1877) (noting that notionally 
voluntary contribution of supplies for the military would place the government “under the 
strongest moral obligation to use every proper and reasonable effort that the donors or lenders 
should be reimbursed by Congress”). 
 123. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 82, at 121 (discussing failure to fund U.S. obligations to the 
United Nations). 
 124. Among leading modern scholars, Louis Henkin, like Stith, embraced Hamilton’s view that 
Congress has a duty to fund some executive policies. Rather like Garfield, however, neither Stith 
nor Henkin appeared to believe a congressional failure to appropriate is justiciable or otherwise 
constitutionally enforceable. Id.; Stith, supra note 4, at 1351. More recently, as this Article was 
entering final edits, Gillian Metzger has argued that the president’s duty of faithful execution 
establishes an obligation on Congress’s part to provide sufficient resources for administrative 
functions, but she too indicates that this congressional duty “is unlikely to be judicially 
enforceable.” Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 87–90 (2017). For a response to Metzger based on the argument developed 
here, see Zachary Price, Against Cutting the President’s Purse Strings, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & 
COMMENT BLOG (Jan. 6, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/against-cutting-the-presidents-purse-
strings-by-zach-price/ [https://perma.cc/RS66-LKTE]. 
 125. Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W. Peters, Government Shuts Down in Budget Impasse, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/us/politics/congress-shutdown-
debate.html [http://perma.cc/H7R2-MJ3E] (reporting President Obama’s comment that “[y]ou 
don’t get to extract a ransom for doing your job”). 
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of government, in the sense (discussed in recent scholarship) of a 
practice followed out of a sense of obligation despite absence of any real 
legal imperative.126 Yet even if Congress by convention normally seeks 
to avert shutdowns, by the same token recent appropriations shortfalls 
demonstrate general acceptance of Congress’s ultimate discretionary 
control over appropriations.127 In Garfield’s formulation, denial of 
appropriations is thus a clear congressional power, even if not also a 
right. 
To sum up, then, as a formal constitutional matter, Congress 
could, if it wished, “reduce the president’s staff to one secretary for 
answering social correspondence, and . . . put the White House up at 
auction.”128 Likewise, with respect to the judiciary, “Congress could 
presumably eliminate the salaries of judicial clerks and secretaries or 
even (most cruelly of all) cut the Supreme Court’s air conditioning 
budget.”129 
This presumed overall discretion over funding provides essential 
context for debates over congressional authority to provide funding 
subject to conditions. In combination with the practice of annual 
appropriations, Congress’s ultimate discretion over funding gives 
Congress vital ongoing leverage over the executive branch. Yet it also 
explains the particular form in which separation-of-powers questions 
about Congress’s appropriations power arise: as disputes over whether 
Congress’s notionally greater power to deny funding altogether entails 
the supposedly lesser power to regulate in fine detail how funds it 
provides may be used. We can now turn, finally, to answering that 
question. 
 
 126. For discussion of “conventions” and their relevance to separation of powers, see David E. 
Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 27–35 (2014); and Adrian 
Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181–94 (2013). 
 127. For executive acknowledgment of this point, see, for example, Unconstitutional 
Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in Section 1340(a) of the 
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ 
(2011) (ms. at 10) (recognizing that “Congress may restrict the implementation of previously 
negotiated agreements”); Mutual Security Program—Cutoff of Funds from Office of Inspector 
General and Comptroller, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 507, 526 (1960) (observing that under the 
Appropriations Clause, “Congress could refuse to appropriate any funds at all to implement 
legislation, however essential the appropriation might be for the country’s welfare,” but “[t]he 
remedy in such a case would be political”). 
 128. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 15 (1974); see also CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 66 (endorsing Black’s 
view). 
 129. CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 66; see also Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 303, 331 (2007) (“Congress probably has the power to cut the federal courts’ budget for paying 
law clerks and secretaries.”); Vermeule, supra note 100, at 531 (observing that Congress could 
“curtail the judiciary’s physical facilities and fringe benefits as it pleases”). 
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III. RESOURCE-INDEPENDENT EXECUTIVE POWERS 
To what extent can Congress control the executive branch 
through restricted or conditional appropriations? Since at least 1860, 
executive branch lawyers have claimed some authority to disregard 
funding limits.130 But their reasoning has been loose, leaving the outer 
bounds of this claimed authority undefined. 
This Part explores and (partially) defends the executive branch 
view with respect to key executive authorities identified here as 
resource-independent. Certain constitutional executive authorities—
including most importantly the powers to veto legislation, grant 
clemency, appoint and remove officers, and issue lawful commands to 
the military—exist either as checks on other branches or as means of 
supervisory control over the executive branch that the president leads. 
These same powers, moreover, are at least theoretically costless: 
presidents in principle could exercise them personally without 
assistance, keeping no counsel and using only their own salary or other 
personal resources. Accordingly, as a matter of basic constitutional 
structure, presidents are not dependent on congressional resources to 
exercise these powers, and in consequence neither are they properly 
beholden to congressional judgments about how those powers should be 
exercised. 
Accepting this structural logic nevertheless does not require 
giving it expansive scope. In particular, contrary to some presidents’ 
claims, presidential authority to disregard some direct funding 
conditions does not necessarily entail authority to call on the 
government’s full resources for advice and assistance, nor does it mean 
that executive branch interpretations of ambiguous executive 
authorities should always prevail. Here, after first defining the category 
of resource-independent powers and addressing the structural 
invalidity of direct restraints and conditions on such powers, I turn to 
questions regarding selective support and Article II’s ambiguity. 
A. Defining the Category 
The key examples of executive powers I classify as resource-
independent are the veto, clemency, appointment, removal, and 
supervisory military command. Other examples include the authority 
to demand written opinions from department heads, the power to 
 
 130. See Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468–69 (1860) (indicating that 
“Congress could not, if it would, take away from the President, or in anywise diminish the 
authority conferred upon him by the Constitution” and that an appropriations condition 
attempting to do so would therefore be “void” and “have no effect whatever”). 
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convene or adjourn Congress in some circumstances, and the authority 
to recommend legislation. (For a rough taxonomy of executive powers 
that anticipates further analysis in Part IV, see Figure 1 below.) At 
least three characteristics generally define these powers as resource-
independent. 
The first, and most important, characteristic is that these 
powers—in theory, at least—are costless. That is to say, the resource-
independent powers are powers that the president, in principle, could 
exercise personally, using only his salary and perhaps access to a 
computer and office supplies. In a celebrated essay on the presidential 
veto, Charles Black asked, “To what state could Congress, without 
violating the Constitution, reduce the President?”131 Black answered:  
I arrived at a picture of a man living in a modest apartment, with perhaps one secretary 
to answer the mail; that is where one appropriation bill could put him, at the beginning 
of a new term. I saw this man as negotiating closely with the Senate, and from a position 
of weakness, on every appointment, and as conducting diplomatic relations with those 
countries where Congress would pay for an embassy. But he was still vetoing bills.132  
Black’s observations capture the veto’s fundamental 
independence from public resources provided for its support. Yet a 
humbled president such as Black imagined would be doing other things 
too. From his desk, with no more than pen and paper, or perhaps laptop 
and cell phone, he could issue pardons and commutations, send 
nominees to the Senate (however weak the prospects of confirmation), 
sign commissions for appointees, fire executive officers who displeased 
him, and even issue otherwise lawful orders to military officers in the 
field. For that matter, such a president could demand opinions from 
cabinet secretaries, peruse the responses, order Congress adjourned or 
convened, and try her hand at drafting proposed legislation. As a 
practical matter, then, these are powers Congress cannot take away by 
stripping appropriations—for the simple reason that their exercise 
requires no appropriations. 
This insight makes sense of Alexander Hamilton’s expectation 
in the Federalist that salary protection alone would guarantee the 
president’s institutional independence. In the minimal formal sense 
reflected by these powers’ costlessness, Hamilton was correct. Of 
course, under modern conditions, how well or even competently the 
president could exercise these powers without advice and assistance is 
a serious question. What is more, Hamilton’s account overlooks the 
president’s political vulnerability to funding denials that obstruct 
 
 131. Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 89 
(1976). 
 132. Id. 
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asserted presidential priorities, whether or not the denials directly 
impact the president’s constitutional functions. For both these reasons, 
these powers’ costlessness is likely to be fictional in practice—a problem 
to which I will return shortly. Nevertheless, it is at least formally true 
that these powers require no public support beyond the president’s 
salary, and this characteristic distinguishes them fundamentally from 
other authorities, such as war powers and law enforcement, that the 
president cannot even theoretically perform on his own. 
A second, related feature of resource-independent powers is that 
the president need not rely entirely on public appropriations to obtain 
advice and assistance in exercising them. Presidents have long claimed 
authority to seek counsel from anyone they choose, whether within the 
government or outside of it.133 Congress’s authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to structure the government may well 
permit statutory restrictions on any formal private staff to assist the 
president with official functions.134 The Constitution’s Appointments 
Clause, moreover, would preclude assignment to private parties of 
ongoing actual authority to make decisions or take actions in the 
government’s name.135 Within those bounds, however, the separation of 
powers likely supports some presidential authority to seek and obtain 
private guidance. Indeed, even apart from any such Article II authority, 
citizens’ First Amendment right to petition the government should 
enable them to offer the president their views on proper discharge of 
those authorities he may exercise personally. 
 
 133. See, e.g., Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3 
(asserting presidential “prerogative to obtain advice that will assist him in carrying out his 
constitutional responsibilities”); EDWARD S. CORWIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS 74 (Richard Loss ed., 1976) (discussing examples from Presidents Theodore 
Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover); see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 
(1989) (noting “formidable constitutional difficulties” that would arise from limiting the president’s 
access to outside advice on nominations); id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (indicating that 
applying disclosure requirements to outside group providing advice on judicial nominees would 
constitute “a direct and real interference with the President’s exclusive responsibility to nominate 
federal judges”); In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“In making decisions 
on personnel and policy, and in formulating legislative proposals, the President must be free to 
seek confidential information from many sources, both inside the government and outside.”). 
 134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Applying this logic, OLC recently explained that under 
statutes governing White House appointments:  
A President wanting a relative’s advice on governmental matters . . . has a choice: to 
seek that advice on an unofficial, ad hoc basis without conferring the status and 
imposing the responsibilities that accompany formal White House positions; or to 
appoint his relative to the White House under title 3 and subject him to substantial 
restrictions against conflicts of interest. 
Application of the Anti-Nepotism Statute to a Presidential Appointment in the White House 
Office, 41 O.L.C. __ (2017) (ms. at 14). 
 135. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (interpreting the Appointments Clause to 
cover “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”). 
Price_Galley (Do Not Delete) 3/7/2018  9:38 AM 
392 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2:357 
A final important feature of the powers I classify as resource-
independent relates to their structural function within the 
constitutional scheme. Although a completely tidy account of these 
powers’ purposes may well be impossible (and would go beyond the 
scope of this Article), the powers identified above as resource-
independent generally may be understood either as checks on the 
legislative branch or as guarantees of presidential control over the 
executive branch. As examples of checks, the president’s veto and 
clemency powers seem intended at least in part to counterbalance 
Congress’s authority to enact new laws and establish new federal 
crimes. Allowing Congress to eliminate or control these authorities 
would thus elide essential limits on Congress’s own authority, 
rendering the president subservient to Congress in exercising powers 
designed to check Congress itself. 
Other resource-independent powers instead guarantee a 
specified degree of presidential control over subordinate executive 
officials. The president may demand opinions in writing from executive 
officers, serves as “Commander in Chief” of the military, and (subject to 
Senate advice and consent) appoints ambassadors and other officers of 
the United States, including not only executive officials but also judges. 
To the extent the Constitution mandates these features of government 
organization, Congress’s own legislative authority cannot validly 
override them. They are conditions the Constitution imposes on any 
executive apparatus Congress creates. 
While it may be only a happy coincidence that resource-
independent powers serve such checking and control purposes, it is 
nonetheless striking that all the powers identified above as resource-
independent advance one or the other of these goals to some degree. In 
addition to the president’s veto and pardon powers, the power to 
convene and adjourn Congress (within parameters prescribed in Article 
II) is in some sense a check on Congress’s ability to do as it wishes. With 
respect to executive officers, the president’s appointment power 
provides a key means of supervisory control over the executive branch. 
With respect to judges and other nonexecutive officers, it might better 
be considered a check on Congress, but in any event it constitutes a 
clear, textually assigned prerogative of the president under Article II. 
To the extent Article II gives the president an implied constitutional 
authority to remove executive officers, this power, too, constitutes a 
means of supervisory control over the executive branch. The one outlier 
may be the authority to recommend legislation, which does not directly 
check any power of Congress or enable supervisory control. But even 
this power provides a check of sorts on Congress’s authority to set its 
own agenda (and indeed seems to have been included in the 
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Constitution to preclude arguments that such impositions on Congress 
are improper136). 
Because these powers may be exercised personally by the 
president, because he is not dependent on public resources for their 
exercise, and because they exist to check Congress itself or limit the 
executive branch’s institutional design, legislative efforts to control 
these authorities through appropriations restrictions present a problem 
of unconstitutional conditions. Much like legislation requiring waiver of 
free speech rights as a condition of public assistance, or federal 
legislation requiring state legislation as a condition of federal support, 
conditional support for resource-independent executive powers raises 
the question whether Congress’s power to provide no resources at all 
entails the power to provide resources with strings attached. The proper 
answer to this question, however, depends on the nature of the funding 
condition and its impact on executive authority. 
 
FIGURE 1: TAXONOMY OF EXECUTIVE POWERS 
 
Resource-Independent 
 
Resource-Dependent 
Checking Powers Supervisory Powers 
Veto Appointment 
Pardon Removal 
Convene/Adjourn Demand Opinions 
Recommend Laws Military Command 
     (superintendence) 
Foreign Relations Powers  
Recognition of foreign sovereigns 
Reception of foreign diplomats 
 
Clear Examples 
Military Command (use 
    of force) 
Law Enforcement 
 
 
Contested Example 
Conduct of Diplomacy 
    - making treaties 
    - negotiating generally 
 
B. Direct Restrictions 
We can begin with the easiest case: funding conditions or 
restraints that directly limit the president’s exercise of resource-
independent powers are per se invalid and may properly be disregarded 
by the executive branch (and courts). 
 
 136. Application of the Recommendations Clause to Section 802 of the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 40 Op. O.L.C. __ (2016) (ms. at 4–5) 
(discussing the Clause’s drafting history). 
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1. Direct Restrictions’ Structural Invalidity 
This category of direct restrictions includes two types of laws: (1) 
riders placed in appropriations bills that limit executive constitutional 
authorities, and (2) provisions conditioning the availability of 
appropriations on particular executive action. Both types of provisions 
effectively condition the availability of funds on acceptance of statutory 
constraints on the president’s constitutional authority. Such provisions 
have been rare historically with respect to resource-independent 
powers—itself, perhaps, an indication of their invalidity. But there are 
at least a few examples. During the troubled administration of 
President Andrew Johnson, for instance, Congress passed an 
appropriations rider requiring that all military commands be issued 
through “the General of the Army” (who was Ulysses Grant) and that 
this General could not be removed or assigned to other duties “without 
previous approval of the Senate”—limitations President Johnson (like 
many scholars since then) considered clearly unconstitutional.137 More 
recently, during President Carter’s administration, Congress blocked 
funding to effectuate certain pardons for Vietnam-era selective-service 
violators.138 And in a recurrent provision, made permanent in 2007, 
Congress has conditioned funding for recess appointees’ salaries on the 
president not selecting an appointee who was previously nominated for 
the position but rejected by the Senate.139 
 
 137. Army Appropriations Act, ch. 170, § 2, 14 Stat. 485, 486–87 (1867); Barron & Lederman, 
supra note 55, at 984–86. Although most scholars appear to agree with President Johnson that 
these provisions were unconstitutional, see, e.g., Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 986–88, 
substantial authority supports allowing Congress to vest particular responsibilities in particular 
offices, at least in the civil context. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The 
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 705 (2007) (discussing this principle 
with respect to administrative law). Holding aside the limitations on presidential removal 
authority, it is not entirely clear to me why Congress’s general authority over offices could not 
justify requiring issuance of all military commands through the army’s top general (whoever that 
happened to be at a given time). 
 138. MAY, supra note 58, at 111–12.  
 139. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. D, tit. VII, § 709, 121 
Stat. 1844, 2021 (2007), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. pt. III.D., ch. 55 note; see also President George 
W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, 
the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act 2006, 41 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1800 (Nov. 30, 2005) (“The executive branch shall construe [a similar 
provision in an earlier bill] in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to 
make recess appointments.”). Insofar as this provision conditions executive funding on the 
president not selecting an otherwise-eligible individual for a recess appointment, it directly 
infringes the president’s recess appointment power. This provision, which directly targets the 
choice of appointee, might be distinguished from more general salary statutes through which 
Congress has asserted its views on the Recess Appointment Clause’s proper overall scope. See 
generally Michael B. Rappaport, Why Non-Originalism Does Not Justify Departing from the 
Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 925–30, 
944–49, 956–57 (2015) (discussing such statutes and their history).  
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Why are such restrictions and conditions unconstitutional? For 
the simple reason that honoring them would create a governmental 
structure different from the one the Constitution prescribes. As noted 
earlier, to the extent the Constitution requires direct presidential 
command of the military, or presidential authority to issue pardons 
with certain effects, giving effect to funding conditions that bring about 
different results cannot be consistent with the Constitution. The 
starkest example would involve the veto: Congress surely could not 
grant executive funding on condition that the president not exercise the 
veto, for this funding condition would eliminate a central, prescribed 
constraint on Congress’s legislative power itself. To be sure, Congress 
(or particular congressional leaders) may be able to extract and enforce 
informal political bargains with these same effects. I will return to that 
issue below. But as a formal legal matter, direct funding conditions of 
this type cannot be binding, because it would defy the basic logic of 
separation of powers—the very reasons for separating executive and 
legislative authority—if Congress could abrogate these limits on its own 
authority as a condition of funding executive operations. 
A judicial analogy may help illustrate this point. Whatever else 
it entails, the “judicial power” vested in the Supreme Court by Article 
III seems at a minimum to include authority to decide discrete cases 
within the Court’s jurisdiction according to the Justices’ best view of the 
law.140 In principle, this power, like resource-independent executive 
authorities, is personal and costless; just as presidents could issue 
pardons, nominations, or military commands without help from 
Congress, judges in theory could decide cases using only the personal 
salary guaranteed to them by the Constitution. But precisely because 
the Constitution defines the Justices’ office as entailing this resource-
independent authority, conditioning other judicial resources—funds 
for, say, law clerks, court buildings, and staff—on the Justices ruling or 
not ruling in a particular way should equally offend separation of 
powers. Insofar as such conditions actually influence the Justices, they 
jeopardize the very institutional autonomy that the Constitution aims 
to provide by separating judicial from legislative power. On the other 
hand, even if the conditions fail to actually influence the Court’s 
decisions, the conditions nonetheless place the Justices in a Catch 22 
that degrades their institutional independence: either the Justices rule 
as Congress desired and compromise their own perceived autonomy and 
 
 140. See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 n.17 (2016) (“Congress could 
not enact a statute directing that, in ‘Smith v. Jones,’ ‘Smith wins.’ ”); Robertson v. Seattle 
Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 439 (1992) (analyzing whether a statute violated Article III because 
it “failed to supply new law, but directed results under old law”). 
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legitimacy, or they rule against Congress’s wishes and compromise 
their own branch’s funding. 
Precisely the same logic applies to resource-independent 
presidential powers. Like the judicial power to decide cases according 
to judges’ best view of the law, constitutional powers that the president 
may exercise personally, without need for appropriated resources and 
as a check or constraint on Congress’s own authority, are powers that 
call for independent personal judgment. Allowing Congress to restrict 
or condition funding with respect to these powers would thus 
compromise the very institutional autonomy the Constitution aims to 
provide by vesting those powers in the president in the first place. For 
that reason, moreover, loss of funding cannot be justified as simply a 
cost Congress may impose on exercising the president’s power in a 
particular way. As in the judicial example, putting a president to this 
choice would itself compromise the autonomy of her office by forcing her 
to choose between degrading her own perceived independence and 
compromising the capacity of her own branch of government. 
Accordingly, presidential autonomy of judgment in exercising resource-
independent powers is, no less than judicial autonomy of judgment with 
respect to legal cases, a condition the Constitution imposes on any funds 
Congress provides, not a power Congress may control through funding 
conditions of its own. 
This view, at any rate, has long been asserted by the executive 
branch itself in explaining its objections to certain funding constraints. 
In 1860, for example, in the very first executive branch legal opinion 
addressing such conditions, Attorney General Jeremiah Black 
concluded that Congress could not condition military funding on a 
requirement that particular duties be performed by a particular 
military officer.141 Whether or not the opinion’s view of the Commander-
in-Chief power was correct,142 Black employed structural separation-of-
powers logic to explain the condition’s incompatibility with Article II. 
As his opinion explained, because “Congress could not, if it would, take 
away from the President, or in anywise diminish the authority 
conferred upon him by the Constitution,” an appropriations condition 
attempting to do so would be “void” and “have no effect whatever.”143 
Attorney General William Mitchell employed the same 
structural logic in a 1933 opinion. “Congress,” he wrote,  
 
 141. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468–69 (1860). 
 142. Again, it is not clear to me that Congress lacks authority to vest particular duties in 
particular military officers. See supra note 137. 
 143. 9 Op. Att’y Gen. at 468–69. 
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holds the purse strings, and it may grant or withhold appropriations as it chooses, and 
when making an appropriation may direct the purposes to which the appropriation shall 
be devoted and impose conditions in respect to its use, provided always that the conditions 
do not require operation of the Government in a way forbidden by the Constitution.144  
Mitchell went on: 
Congress may not, by conditions attached to appropriations, provide for a discharge of the 
functions of Government in a manner not authorized by the Constitution. If such practice 
were permissible, Congress could subvert the Constitution. It might make appropriations 
on condition that the executive department abrogate its functions.145 
Mitchell thus asserted that a legislative veto provision in 
proposed funding legislation would be “void” if enacted.146 By Mitchell’s 
logic, if the Constitution precludes vesting such authority in a House of 
Congress, then it likewise prevents Congress from achieving that result 
through conditional appropriations. Whatever bargains Congress may 
force on the executive branch through appropriations, it cannot compel 
the executive branch to give up its own constitutionally prescribed 
power to check Congress or control government operations. Such 
authorities are not the president’s to bargain away even if he wishes, so 
even if a president signs legislation imposing such limits, the conditions 
cannot be binding. 
By this logic, furthermore, it should again make no difference 
whether the conditions are in fact effective—that is, whether the sums 
at stake are sufficient to actually coerce the president’s judgment. It is 
 
 144. Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61 
(1933) (emphasis added); see also Mutual Security Program—Cutoff of Funds from Office of 
Inspector General and Comptroller, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 507, 526 (1960) (“[I]t seems . . . plain that 
Congress may not use its power over appropriations to attain indirectly an object which it could 
not have accomplished directly.”). 
 145. 37 Op. Att’y Gen. at 61; see also, e.g., Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy in Section 1340(a) of the Department of Defense and Full-
Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ (2011) (ms. at 6) (“Congress may 
not . . . ‘use the appropriations power to control a Presidential power that is beyond its direct 
control.’ ”); Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 
33 Op. O.L.C. __ (2009) (ms. at 10) (indicating that Congress may not accomplish unconstitutional 
ends with the spending power); Presidential Certification Regarding the Provision of Documents 
to the House of Representatives Under the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995, 20 Op. O.L.C. 
253, 266 (1996) (“Broad as the spending power of the legislative branch undoubtedly is, it is clear 
that Congress may not deploy it to accomplish unconstitutional ends. Thus, . . . Congress may not 
use the spending power to infringe on the President’s constitutional authority.”); Authority for the 
Continuance of Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse in Appropriations, 5 Op. O.L.C. 
1, 5–6 (1981) (“Manifestly, Congress could not deprive the President of [the pardon] power by 
purporting to deny him the minimum obligational authority sufficient to carry this power into 
effect.”); Authority of Congressional Committees to Disapprove Action of Executive Branch, 41 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 230, 233 (1955) (“[Congress] may . . . impose conditions with respect to the use of [an] 
appropriation, provided always that the conditions do not require operation of the Government in 
a way forbidden by the Constitution.”). 
 146. 37 Op. Att’y Gen. at 66. Half a century later, the Supreme Court deemed legislative veto 
provisions invalid in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–58 (1983). 
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true that in some other contexts, most notably federal conditions on 
funding grants to states, the Supreme Court has required such a 
showing before deeming the condition invalid.147 But such analogies are 
inapposite here. Conditioning even a dollar of funding on some 
prescribed exercise of a resource-independent executive authority 
violates separation of powers, because Congress lacks authority to 
create an executive apparatus in which such funding conditions are 
operative. The violation, in other words, is a matter of structure rather 
than effect. To employ a helpful distinction Mitchell Berman has drawn, 
the condition here is coercive in the sense of being wrongful rather than 
overbearing: the point is not that we may “excuse the coercee [here the 
president] for doing the thing the coercer [Congress] demanded,” but 
rather that we may “levy blame upon the coercer” for acting on an 
unconstitutional design.148 In short, because direct funding conditions 
on resource-independent executive powers make the presidency into a 
different office from the one the Constitution defines, they are 
inconsistent with separation of powers and may be disregarded without 
consideration of their actual likely effect in practice. 
Key Supreme Court decisions reinforce this view. In United 
States v. Lovett, the Court held that Congress could not impose an 
unconstitutional bill of attainder by means of an appropriations statute, 
any more than it could do so through ordinary legislation.149 The statute 
in question denied appropriations for named federal employees’ 
salaries, thus effectively barring them from future federal 
employment—an action the Court viewed as punishment without trial 
in violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause.150 As the Court explained, 
“[t]he fact that the punishment is inflicted through the instrumentality 
of an Act specifically cutting the pay of certain named individuals found 
guilty of disloyalty, makes it no less galling or effective than if it had 
been done by an Act which designated the conduct as criminal.”151 
Likewise, in the important (if famously opaque) Reconstruction-
era decision United States v. Klein, the Court disregarded a condition 
on appropriations for certain judgments because the Court understood 
the condition to deny effect to presidential pardons.152 As the Court 
 
 147. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577–78 (2012) (“Congress 
may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies. 
But when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ the legislation runs contrary to our system of 
federalism.”). 
 148. Berman, supra note 79, at 41. 
 149. 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 316. 
 152. 80 U.S. 128, 147–48 (1871). 
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explained, “it is clear that the legislature cannot change the effect of 
such a pardon any more than the executive can change a law. Yet this 
is attempted by the provision under consideration.”153 Whatever else it 
means, Klein thus indicates that an unconstitutional limitation on the 
pardon power is no less invalid by virtue of being imposed as a funding 
constraint. 
Even some key individual rights decisions follow the same logic. 
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court held that Congress could 
not condition funding for indigent legal services on the funded lawyers’ 
refusal to advance certain legal arguments.154 In the Court’s view, the 
condition infringed both the First Amendment and separation of powers 
by imposing a “serious and fundamental restriction on advocacy of 
attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary.”155 In terms of the 
structural logic developed here, the condition in Velazquez attempted to 
create attorneys who were not attorneys (because they could not fully 
represent their clients’ interests), and courts that were not courts 
(because their decisionmaking was artificially impaired by limitations 
on arguments presented to them).156 As such, the condition violated 
structural limits on Congress’s appropriations power, much as the 
conditions in Lovett and Klein did in the separation-of-powers context. 
Federalism coercion cases do not contradict these principles 
because they address a fundamentally different problem. The Supreme 
Court in fact said as much in Metropolitan Washington Airports 
Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. (“MWAA”), 
a 1991 decision addressing whether Congress could conditionally 
exercise its authority to dispose of federal property so as to create an 
entity that defied separation-of-powers requirements.157 As the Court 
explained there, the federalism decisions reflect the premise “that, 
absent coercion, a sovereign State has both the incentive and the ability 
to protect its own rights and powers, and therefore may cede such rights 
 
 153. Id. at 148. 
 154. 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001). 
 155. Id. at 544. 
 156. Id. at 544–46. Velazquez is notoriously hard to square with Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 
(1991), which upheld funding constraints limiting government-funded doctors’ advice about 
abortions. See id. at 193 (“The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively 
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at 
the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another 
way.”). Whether or not the cases are ultimately reconcilable, Velazquez appears more relevant here 
insofar as the Court there understood legal services not merely as a form of private speech activity, 
but rather as a constitutional function with implications for the judiciary’s performance of its own 
constitutional role. See 531 U.S. at 546 (“The restriction imposed by the statute here threatens 
severe impairment of the judicial function.”). 
 157. 501 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1991). 
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and powers.”158 In contrast, separation-of-powers limits of the sort 
addressed here—powers designed to check or limit Congress’s own 
authority—aim “to protect not the states but ‘the whole people from 
improvident laws.’ ”159 
These observations highlight a key difference between 
separation of powers and federalism. Separation-of-powers limits, 
MWAA appears to suggest, involve an affirmative allocation of power 
within the federal government, such that allowing Congress to override 
the allocation through funding constraints would give Congress power 
to alter the prescribed constitutional structure. Spending-related 
federalism cases instead focus on preserving a meaningful residuum of 
state authority beyond the limited enumerated powers delegated to 
Congress. Given that federal and state authority often overlap, 
moreover, allowing states to accept noncoercive conditional federal 
funding grants may well advance rather than inhibit federalism 
values—particularly if the likely alternative is a direct federal spending 
program that cuts out state authority altogether. For all these reasons, 
federalism cases inevitably involve questions of degree—judging how 
far is too far—rather than any hard structural limit on federal power. 
Of course, one might quibble with the Court’s coercion inquiry 
in the federalism context, and it is certainly possible that some 
federalism limits have the same hard-edged character as the resource-
independent presidential authorities I address here. (It seems doubtful, 
for example, that Congress could condition federal funding to any 
degree on state authorities that themselves check or control federal 
authority, most notably state authority to select federal presidential 
electors160 or send two Senators to Congress.161) Whatever the correct 
federalism analysis, the key point here is that direct funding 
constraints on other branches’ resource-independent authorities violate 
the constitutional separation of powers. Congress could not condition 
judicial funding on resolution of particular cases in a particular 
manner; such direct legislative manipulation of judicial decisionmaking 
would violate both due process and separation of powers.162 By the same 
token, Congress cannot impose direct funding conditions on executive 
constitutional powers that do not require congressional resources for 
their exercise and that the Constitution assigns to the president as a 
constraint on Congress itself. As the executive branch has long 
 
 158. Id. at 271. 
 159. Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).  
 160. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 161. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII. 
 162. Cf. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 n.17 (2016) (“Congress could not 
enact a statute directing that, in ‘Smith v. Jones,’ ‘Smith wins.’ ”). 
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maintained, such funding conditions violate the basic structural logic of 
separation of powers and are per se invalid. 
2. Why Explicit Legislation Differs from Informal Bargains 
While this formal structural logic suffices to support executive 
disregard for direct constraints on resource-independent powers, some 
additional functional considerations reinforce this conclusion. 
Unconstitutional conditions problems always present the puzzle 
why the power to provide no funds at all fails to include the power to 
provide funds with strings attached. Though sometimes framed as a 
question about whether the greater power to deny funds includes the 
lesser power to provide funds conditionally, here, at least, this framing 
seems flawed: manipulating a coequal branch with appropriations 
conditions may well be the greater power, as compared to providing no 
funds at all (and bearing the political costs of doing so). 
At any rate, the puzzle in this context takes a particular form. 
Given Congress’s discretionary control over appropriations, Congress 
(or particular congressional leaders) may assert considerable leverage 
over presidents by threatening spending to which they are politically 
committed. Modern presidents are in fact highly vulnerable to this form 
of leverage. In the public mind and the judgment of history, presidential 
success or failure today turns primarily on achievement of a policy 
agenda.163 Yet congressional funding decisions may powerfully shape 
presidential capacity to deliver on policy promises. A cash-strapped 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) may have little capacity to 
address climate change; nor could a barebones enforcement operation 
deliver a promised immigration dragnet or narcotics crackdown. 
Competitive, politically motivated presidents are thus vulnerable to 
congressional funding decisions that impact their ability to deliver 
promises, secure preferred policies, and achieve desired legacy 
objectives.164 Even worse, insofar as the president’s priorities are not 
Congress’s own, congressional leaders may themselves incur no 
political cost for failing to support the president’s agenda. As a result of 
these dynamics, presidents might well choose not to veto particular 
legislation, to appoint (or not appoint) a particular department head, or 
 
 163. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 915, 956–57 (2005) (“[M]odern presidents face a set of constituency-driven political incentives 
that require activist governance. . . . With Congress largely absent from the scene and media 
coverage fixated on presidential personality, the public’s opinion of the President, in turn, is closely 
tied to the perceived successes and failures of government generally.”). 
 164. Moe & Howell, supra note 27, at 136 (“Broadly speaking, . . . it is fair to say that most 
presidents have put great emphasis on their legacies and, in particular, on being regarded in the 
eyes of history as strong and effective leaders.”). 
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to grant (or deny) a particular clemency request as part of an informal 
political bargain to secure funding for other presidential priorities. 
Even if that is true, however, there are important functional 
reasons to treat enacted legislative conditions differently from such 
informal political bargains. For one thing, such explicit conditions are 
amenable to legal analysis and remediation in a way that informal 
political bargains are not. Much as a court would do in a comparable 
case, the executive branch can assess the condition’s validity on its face 
and then perform a severance analysis to determine whether Congress 
would still have chosen to provide the funds had it known the condition 
would be disregarded. Remedying the violation thus requires no 
commandeering of unappropriated funds—a far graver violation of 
Congress’s appropriations power.165 The president need only judge that 
he may spend money Congress has appropriated without regard to the 
invalid condition. 
In addition, in the case of an explicit funding condition, as 
opposed to an implicit political bargain, Congress’s unconstitutional 
objective of controlling executive judgments is plain on the face of the 
statute. No inference from legislative history, no weighing of competing 
and overlapping legislative goals, is required; the legislation speaks for 
itself. As David Pozen has observed, courts have often been reluctant to 
define operative separation-of-powers doctrines in terms of subjective 
motivation, even if charges of constitutional “bad faith” are a pervasive 
feature of the Constitution’s political enforcement.166 But here the 
legislation is sufficiently plain that Congress’s bad intent, such as it is, 
is objectively ascertainable from the face of the law.167 
At any rate, and more importantly, allowing presidents to 
disregard conditions on resource-independent powers ultimately places 
the political burden of undermining executive independence where it 
belongs—on Congress, the branch seeking to usurp a rival branch’s 
powers. Were presidents bound by all funding conditions, they could 
defend their independence of judgment only by vetoing all 
appropriations bills with conditions targeting their constitutional 
authorities. But a veto likely heightens the risk that the public will 
blame the president rather than Congress for any hardship resulting 
 
 165. Cf. Dorf, supra note 129 (discussing issues surrounding judicially mandated spending). 
 166. Pozen, supra note 126, at 886–87. I have argued that looking beyond the face of a policy 
to presidential statements is generally improper in evaluating an administrative policy’s legality. 
See Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571, 1615 
(2016). 
 167. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 523, 543 (2016) (discussing possibility that “a statute exhibits an unconstitutional intent or 
purpose on its face”). 
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from a shutdown—a risk the president may be unwilling to take if 
nothing beyond an abstract presidential prerogative is at stake. 
The modern practice of omnibus, kitchen-sink appropriations 
compounds this problem.168 Even if the president’s constitutional 
position is sound, vetoing multibillion-dollar legislation tangibly 
affecting millions of Americans to preserve an abstract executive 
authority would require a “stern virtue” indeed—or perhaps an 
obtuseness wholly inappropriate to the presidency.169 Of course, the 
president alternatively could accept the legislation but nonetheless 
trigger a denial of funds by exercising his authority in the proscribed 
manner. But then the same problem of clouded accountability would 
reappear in different guise. Triggering the funding condition would risk 
centering blame on the president rather than Congress for any 
resulting funding cutoff. The president, after all, could have preserved 
the funds, and thus forestalled any resulting hardship to the public, 
simply by exercising the constitutional authority as Congress desired. 
Allowing the president to disregard funding conditions shifts 
these political costs (such as they are) back onto Congress. If the 
president may rightfully disregard conditions on resource-independent 
powers, then Congress can control those powers only by engaging in 
political bargaining with the president. In other words, to extract a 
commitment to exercise such powers in some particular way, or for that 
matter to retaliate against a particular exercise of them, congressional 
leaders must threaten to withhold funding for important executive 
priorities altogether (whether or not Congress shares those priorities), 
even at the risk of prompting a presidential veto and a resulting 
government shutdown. Making good on such threats may then require 
Congress, rather than the president, to bear responsibility for any 
resulting hardship to the public. Accordingly, notwithstanding 
Congress’s ultimate discretion over executive-branch funding, 
compelling Congress to exercise that authority in a generalized rather 
than targeted fashion may leverage the political costs of funding denials 
to protect, rather than undermine, the president’s independence of 
judgment with respect to resource-independent executive authorities. 
In sum, for functional as well as formal reasons, the now-
entrenched executive practice of disregarding direct funding conditions 
on resource-independent powers is sound. Of course, this analysis 
presumes good faith: if presidents disregard funding conditions based 
on self-serving and unsupportable constitutional positions, then the 
 
 168. For data and analysis on the rise of omnibus legislating, see GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A 
RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001). 
 169. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 40 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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practice could become extraordinarily dangerous—a problem discussed 
below in Section III.D. Before turning to that question, however, we 
should first address distinct problems raised by Congress’s adoption of 
indirect restrictions—restrictions that do not directly target executive 
authorities, but instead seek to influence their exercise by supporting 
them selectively. 
C. Indirect Restrictions 
Funding restraints that target executive authorities indirectly 
rather than directly require a distinct and considerably more difficult 
analysis. The recent proviso denying funds for a White House “Climate 
Change Czar” (among other positions) is a key example in this 
category.170 Through this condition, Congress imposed no direct 
constraint on the president’s exercise of any constitutional or statutory 
authority. Yet the provision was not pointless. By selectively denying 
funds for this position (and certain others), Congress presumably aimed 
to create friction with respect to presidential supervision of certain 
areas of executive policy that would not exist with respect to other 
areas. Another more common type of provision in this category 
interferes with the president’s authority to recommend to Congress 
“such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”171 
Appropriations legislation has often conditioned resources for 
particular agencies on the agency preparing (or not preparing) 
legislative recommendations with particular features.172 Presumably, 
again, Congress’s goal in doing so is to shape the proposals the 
administration as a whole ultimately presents to Congress. 
The executive branch has claimed authority to disregard such 
indirect funding restraints on executive authority, no less than direct 
ones.173 Executive statements and legal opinions, however, have often 
 
 170. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 171. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Though framed as an obligation (the president “shall from time 
to time . . . recommend to [Congress’s] Consideration such Measures”), the executive branch has 
interpreted the Recommendations Clause to provide affirmative authority to recommend 
legislation (and indeed to recommend only legislation the president supports). See Application of 
the Recommendations Clause to Section 802 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, 40 Op. O.L.C. __ (2016) (ms. at 3). 
 172. See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289, § 8010(b), 
120 Stat. 1257, 1274 (2006); Agriculture, Rural Development, Food & Drug Administration, & 
Related Agencies Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-387, § 730, 114 Stat. 1549, 1581 (2000); Department 
of Agriculture & Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1967, Pub. L. No. 89-556, tit. I, 80 Stat. 
689, 690 (1966). 
 173. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Statement, supra note 70, at 386–87; President 
George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 1733 (Sept. 29, 2006); President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the 
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failed to grapple with key differences between direct and indirect 
funding restraints: the executive branch has simply presumed that 
restraints on support and advice from within the executive branch are 
no different from restraints on the president himself.174 Yet the two 
types of laws are not equivalent. Direct restraints on executive 
authority present the question whether Congress may control the 
president’s own action through its appropriations power. Provisions like 
the Climate Change Czar rider and legislation-drafting bans present 
the distinct question whether Congress may indirectly shape the 
exercise of resource-independent powers through selective or 
conditional support for those powers’ exercise. Even if Congress (as I 
have argued) cannot directly condition funds on the president not 
supervising executive officers with particular goals, or not 
recommending certain legislation, Congress might nonetheless hold 
authority to influence those powers’ exercise by funding advice and 
support with respect to some goals but not others—for a climate change 
czar, say, but not an energy-independence adviser, or for recommending 
legislation to cut taxes but not increase them. 
Given Congress’s general authority to structure the executive 
branch, any constitutional limit on such indirect restraints must be 
exceedingly narrow. While direct restraints (as argued earlier) violate 
the Constitution’s basic structural requirements, indirect restraints 
instead involve balancing rival centers of power—the president’s choice 
over how to exercise his own powers, on the one hand, and Congress’s 
choice over whether to empower the president or reduce him to Charles 
Black’s enfeebled apartment-dweller, on the other. 
Here, then, in contrast to the direct conditions addressed earlier, 
the Supreme Court’s federalism cases do provide a rough analogy: the 
analysis necessarily turns not on straightforward application of 
structural principles, but instead on judging when legislative action 
goes too far in manipulating executive judgments. Here, however, in 
contrast to the unsatisfactory “gun to the head” coercion standard 
articulated in federalism cases,175 structural principles informed by 
past practice support a somewhat harder-edged antimanipulation 
principle for policing when Congress has gone too far in seeking 
 
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2001, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2359, 2361 (Oct. 28, 2000); President Lyndon B. Johnson, 
Statement by the President Upon Signing the Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies 
Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 980, 981 (Sept. 8, 1966). 
 174. See Application of the Recommendations Clause, 40 Op. O.L.C. __ (ms. at 6) (discussing 
examples without drawing this distinction).  
 175. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577–78 (2012). 
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influence over resource-independent executive powers.176 I elaborate 
this point here by first explaining how indirect conditions may shape 
executive conduct and then addressing, in turn, limitations on close 
White House advisers and limitations on other executive branch 
personnel. 
1. Why Indirect Conditions Have Bite 
A first step in coming to grips with indirect conditions is to 
consider more carefully why and how selective support for executive 
functions could influence presidential decisionmaking. This question 
brings us back to American constitutionalism’s general inattention to 
resources. Much as individual liberties in principle exist independent of 
resources available for their exercise, so too are the powers I have 
identified as resource-independent theoretically costless—they could be 
exercised personally by the president without any resources beyond the 
president’s own salary. The resource-independence, moreover, helps 
define their character as built-in features of the office that Congress 
cannot abrogate. Nevertheless, just as individual resources may 
powerfully shape expressive opportunities, so too, under modern 
conditions, at least, Congress’s control over executive resources may 
give it considerable leverage over even resource-independent powers. 
To take the simplest example, the president in principle could 
read each bill Congress passes and decide on his own whether to sign it 
or return it to Congress. In that formal sense, as noted earlier, even 
Charles Black’s hamstrung president would retain his full veto power. 
In reality, however, given the manifold demands on a modern 
president’s time, just reading the hundred- or thousand-page bills that 
Congress routinely passes is probably beyond even the most capable 
president’s capacity. Furthermore, even if the president did read every 
bill personally, he would likely have trouble making much sense of them 
without expert guidance on the legal and policy context in which the 
new law would operate. In practice, forming an intelligent judgment 
 
 176. In the federalism context, courts have further required that any condition be “germane” 
to the purposes for which spending is provided. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 
(1987). No such requirement is appropriate in the separation-of-powers context. On the one hand, 
for reasons addressed earlier, direct conditions on resource-independent authorities will always be 
invalid, even if the funding is germane. On the other hand, Congress is free to impose even 
nongermane conditions on the resource-dependent powers discussed below: if the only way to stop 
a war or halt an oppressive law enforcement campaign is to shut down the government entirely 
(including unrelated agencies), Congress’s authority to exercise such leverage is a necessary 
consequence of its near-total discretion over military and law enforcement resources. As to the 
category of conditions discussed here—indirect conditions on resource-independent powers—the 
conditions at issue will always be germane because their potentially coercive impact relates to 
their impact on the precise executive authorities at issue. 
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about the political and policy implications of new legislation requires 
access to trusted advice and support. 
The veto is hardly unique in this respect. These same problems 
apply equally to other executive powers. Surely, as Justice White once 
observed, Congress could not defeat the pardon power by denying the 
president pen and paper for its exercise.177 The per se invalidity of direct 
funding restraints assures that result. But the president requires more 
than pen and paper to wield his clemency powers effectively—he 
requires help and support from trusted advisers who can vet 
applications and identify worthy individuals. The same is true for 
supervisory control over the executive branch by virtue of presidential 
removal authority, or issuance of lawful military orders as Commander 
in Chief.178 All these examples thus raise the question, presented 
squarely by the climate change and legislation-drafting riders, of what 
right the president holds to demand assistance from either White House 
staff or other executive branch personnel in performing resource-
independent functions. 
2. Constraints on White House Personnel 
Notwithstanding their potential significance, any presidential 
authority to disregard indirect funding restraints must be narrow. After 
all, even apart from its appropriations power, Congress generally holds 
authority to create particular offices and vest them with particular 
powers (though key positions are then presumptively subject to Senate 
advice and consent under the Appointments Clause).179 Congress also 
may enact “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”180 
Given these authorities, most congressional limits on White 
House personnel will likely be proper, as will congressional decisions to 
set aggregate funding levels for particular broadly defined functions. To 
draw another judicial analogy, just as Congress could provide funds for 
 
 177. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 435 (1990) (White, J., concurring) 
(questioning whether “Congress could impair the President’s pardon power by denying him 
appropriations for pen and paper”). 
 178. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The President himself must 
make decisions relying substantially, if not entirely, on the information and analysis supplied by 
advisers.”). 
 179. See Strauss, supra note 137, at 696–97 (arguing that the president often only has 
authority “to oversee the agencies’ decision processes,” not to directly exercise those agencies’ 
authorities). 
 180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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one, four, or fifteen law clerks to support each judge, Congress might 
provide a substantial budget for internal White House advisers or no 
budget at all. Likewise, much as it might offer judges greater support 
for death penalty cases or complex litigation than for run-of-the-mill 
civil suits, Congress could provide more lavish funding for the White 
House National Security Staff than for White House communications 
personnel, or for pardon vetting as opposed to social visits. 
For that matter, virtually any affirmative provision of support, 
however narrowly focused, would likely be valid. By way of illustration, 
suppose that Congress, instead of banning any specific climate change 
position for President Obama, provided specific funding for a climate 
change adviser to whisper sea-level statistics in President Trump’s ear. 
Congress presumably could not force the President to hear advice he 
does not wish to receive, but, by the same token, making extra resources 
available for advice on particular subjects should not prevent the 
President from consulting with others or making up his own mind based 
on different advice.181 As further examples, suppose that Congress 
provided resources earmarked for vetting pardon applications for 
nonviolent drug offenders, or specifically to assist in drafting tax-cut 
legislation. To the extent these funding priorities aligned with the 
president’s, they would serve only to enhance his resource-independent 
powers to pardon and recommend legislation. To the extent the 
president’s priorities were different, the president could still make up 
his mind independently, spurning this staff’s advice and leaving them 
to scribble ineffectually in their offices or hobnob by the water cooler. 
Precisely because resource-independent powers are resource-
independent, and thus capable of performance by the president on his 
own using whatever guidance he can find, affording him advice and 
support he does not desire should never be considered 
unconstitutionally constraining. 
Funding restraints on White House personnel could conceivably 
cross a constitutional line only if they have the opposite effect—the 
effect not of enhancing some presidential capacities relative to others, 
but instead of materially obstructing the president from making a 
judgment he would otherwise choose to make. What sort of law might 
have such manipulative effect? The only realistic example would likely 
be an appropriation that provided general funding for close personal 
advisers but nonetheless precluded their use to achieve specific narrow 
outcomes desired by the president. Suppose, for example, that Congress 
provided White House appropriations that denied any use of immediate 
presidential staff to approve certain types of cases for clemency, 
 
 181. See supra Section III.A. 
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recommend legislation with certain goals, or coordinate administrative 
actions advancing some specific policy (such as climate change 
mitigation). Such limitations could materially obstruct the president’s 
preferred course of action, and might well also obscure whether the 
president or Congress was responsible for the decision in question. 
Another case analogy may be helpful. In Legal Services Corp. v. 
Velazquez, recall, the Supreme Court struck down on First Amendment 
grounds a provision barring publicly funded counsel from advancing 
certain legal arguments.182 Much as that restriction amounted to 
funding lawyers who were not true lawyers (and by extension courts 
that were not true courts),183 imposing narrow exclusions on general 
support for presidential functions could amount to providing advisers 
who are not really advisers. Just as the client in Velazquez might still 
go elsewhere for help with the restricted arguments, the president could 
still go elsewhere for help with the restricted activities. But both 
conditions are manipulative in the sense that they cut off the most 
natural source of help, given Congress’s baseline decision to fund 
lawyers or advisers in the first place.184 Placing such targeted obstacles 
in the way of specific presidential goals could thus offend separation of 
powers—much as it could offend judicial independence, to offer yet 
another analogy, to provide general funding for judicial law clerks but 
bar them from helping with opinions narrowing or overturning Roe v. 
Wade or Citizens United (or whatever case Congress wished to 
entrench).185 
Congress, to my knowledge, has never attempted a restriction 
on White House funding that transgressed this particular boundary, 
though it arguably came close in the climate change rider. In his signing 
statement on the climate change provision, President Obama objected 
 
 182. 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Cf. id. at 546: 
It is no answer to say the restriction on speech is harmless because . . . [the government-
funded] attorneys can withdraw. This misses the point. The statute is an attempt to 
draw lines around the . . . program to exclude from litigation those arguments and 
theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province 
of the courts to consider. 
 185. Cf. Dorf, supra note 129, at 331 (“Congress probably has the power to cut the federal 
courts’ budget for paying law clerks and secretaries, but a serious constitutional question (whether 
or not justiciable) would be raised were Congress to cut such funding in retaliation for an 
unpopular judicial decision.”). The boundary between affirmative support and negative restraint 
may of course be difficult to draw at the margins. Earmarking support for numerous functions 
might amount in the aggregate to providing general support with narrow exceptions. The 
distinction nonetheless seems helpful if we presume, as seems likely, that Congress will continue 
to provide general authority for presidents to place trusted close advisers on the public payroll. 
See 3 U.S.C. § 105 (2012). 
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to the provision insofar as it would “significantly impede the President’s 
ability to exercise his supervisory and coordinating authorities or to 
obtain the views of the appropriate senior advisers.” Such impediments, 
President Obama asserted, would “violate the separation of powers by 
undermining the President’s ability to exercise his constitutional 
responsibilities and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”186 
President Obama nevertheless complied with the provision,187 and he 
was correct to do so. Far from materially obstructing the president’s 
exercise of supervisory powers over the executive branch, the rider left 
the president free to employ other advisers to accomplish the same 
goals. The president, moreover, appeared to have no trouble at all 
pursuing desired objectives. After all, President Obama’s EPA 
promulgated ambitious regulations aimed at curbing climate change, 
and the President himself claimed political credit for doing so.188 
In any future fights over similar provisions, executive branch 
lawyers, courts, and commentators should look to Obama’s actual 
practice—his deeds rather than words—in assessing the legality of 
defiance. As President Obama implicitly recognized, separation of 
powers gives presidents no license to disregard funding limits that 
create at most some additional administrative friction in coordinating 
executive policies that the president nonetheless retains ample means 
to pursue. 
3. Constraints on Other Executive Branch Personnel 
A last question to consider here involves access to personnel 
located outside the White House in particular executive agencies. Can 
presidents repurpose such personnel to assist with their resource-
independent functions? In other words, could the president treat the 
entire administrative apparatus of the government as available for 
assistance with such tasks, without regard to purposes for which those 
funds were originally provided? As we shall see, the question is 
important in part because presidents have claimed precisely this 
 
 186. President Barack Obama, Statement, supra note 70, at 387. President Trump later 
objected to the same provision (carried forward in an omnibus continuing resolution) in similar 
terms, though it seems unlikely he would have wanted to employ the proscribed positions in any 
event. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3. 
 187. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 188. See Adam Firestone, Don’t Throw Dirt on Its Grave Just yet: The Clean Power Plan, GEO. 
ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE (Feb. 15, 2017), https://gelr.org/2017/02/15/dont-throw-dirt-on-its-grave-
just-yet-the-clean-power-plan/ [https://perma.cc/46QU-CR5G] (discussing the Obama 
Administration’s Clean Power Plan). 
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authority with respect to conduct of diplomacy.189 Yet presidents have 
claimed the same authority to employ personnel as they see fit in other 
areas too; the Recommendations Clause objections mentioned earlier 
are one common example.190 
On this issue, the Constitution in fact provides some specific 
guidance. Under Article II’s Opinions Clause, the president “may 
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the 
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices.”191 This provision, like other resource-independent 
powers addressed earlier, properly constitutes a structural feature of 
separation of powers that Congress cannot override through conditional 
appropriations. Just as Congress cannot condition executive funding on 
abrogation of the veto or appointment power, so too can it not bar use 
of appropriated funds to provide advice to the president in accordance 
with the Opinions Clause. Any such condition would “require operation 
of the Government in a way forbidden by the Constitution,”192 
something Congress cannot do under the structural logic of separation 
of powers developed earlier.193 
Nevertheless, the Opinions Clause does not fully resolve the 
issue. In effect, protecting access to advice from department heads only 
replicates at a lower level of the bureaucracy the same question of staff 
support that arises with respect to White House personnel. Even if it 
cannot deny the president the personal guidance of department heads 
on matters relating to their duties, Congress might nonetheless deny 
those heads any support from their own staff. But can it do so even if 
the staff are effectively assisting the president with a veto decision, 
pardon request, or legislative recommendation? 
Once again, given Congress’s substantial authority to structure 
the executive branch and assign particular duties to particular offices, 
any constitutional limit on such funding restraints must be exceedingly 
narrow. Nevertheless, the antimanipulation principle identified above 
with respect to White House advisers might suggest a related limit 
here. Despite Congress’s broad authority to limit use of resources by 
particular government offices, Congress might nonetheless infringe 
 
 189. Presidents have sought such advice from government personnel in other areas, too. One 
important historical example is President Franklin Roosevelt’s formation of an informal “Negro 
Cabinet” of inferior officers within the government who could advise him on race relations. REUEL 
SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW, AND THE COLLAPSE OF POSTWAR LIBERALISM 37 
(2015). Presidents today routinely form interagency working groups by executive order. 
 190. See supra notes 172–173 and accompanying text. 
 191. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 192. Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61 
(1933) (emphasis added) (objecting to congressional committee veto). 
 193. See supra Section III.B. 
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upon presidential authority if funding constraints barred the president 
from seeking even de minimis assistance from officials within the 
executive bureaucracy who are best positioned, by virtue of their other 
responsibilities, to provide advice on a particular narrow matter. 
Denying any use of Justice Department resources to advise the 
president on pardon requests, for example, might impermissibly impair 
the president’s resource-independent pardon authority if it meant the 
president could not seek guidance from prosecutors best positioned to 
provide perspective on a particular applicant’s case. It might also, once 
again, cloud public accountability with respect to whether Congress or 
the president bears primary responsibility for the president’s ultimate 
action (or inaction). 
Here, furthermore, analogous principles regarding appointment 
of officers could help demarcate the bounds of proper presidential 
defiance of funding constraints. In the Appointments Clause context, 
long-standing doctrine holds that while Congress may add duties to an 
existing office, any such additional duties must be germane to the 
office’s existing functions and cannot fundamentally alter the office’s 
character.194 Under this interpretation, adding nongermane or 
exceptionally significant duties violates the Appointment Clause 
because it deprives the president or his department heads of their 
constitutional authority to appoint individuals performing such duties. 
Instead, by adding the duties to the existing office, Congress in effect 
appoints the individual who performs them. 
A parallel doctrine should limit presidential addition of duties to 
existing offices. Insofar as presidents hold preclusive authority to 
exercise particular resource-independent powers and gain advice 
regarding their performance, they should likewise hold preclusive 
authority to assign responsibility for advice regarding those powers to 
subordinate personnel within the executive branch. But this 
presidential assignment power must be limited, just as Congress’s 
power of office-alteration is limited. If Congress cannot fundamentally 
alter the character of offices without infringing on presidential 
appointment powers, then by the same token the president cannot 
fundamentally alter the character of official responsibilities without 
 
 194. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 301 (1893) (holding that no new 
appointment is required when a statute confers “additional duties, germane to the offices already 
held by [the officers]”); see also Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 196 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“ ‘[G]ermaneness’ is relevant whenever Congress gives power to 
confer new duties to anyone other than the few potential recipients of the appointment power 
specified in the Appointments Clause—i.e., the President, the Courts of Law, and Heads of 
Departments.”); The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 
Op. O.L.C. 124, 157–59 (1996) (elaborating on the Shoemaker germaneness analysis). 
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infringing on Congress’s power to define offices and structure the 
executive branch. Presidents, then, may seek guidance regarding their 
resource-independent functions from subordinate executive branch 
personnel, but only insofar as the assistance the president requests is 
either de minimis or germane to the office’s existing functions and, 
further, does not fundamentally alter the office or impair its functions. 
This understanding could make sense of the executive branch’s 
otherwise-perplexing Recommendations Clause objections. Presidents, 
as noted, have routinely raised Recommendations Clause objections to 
provisions restricting particular agencies’ formulation of legislative 
proposals.195 Such objections are mistaken insofar as they equate 
agency resources with the president’s own authorities. Yet the 
executive view might nonetheless be justified insofar as the restrictions 
in question effectively deprived the president of access to the personnel 
best positioned, by virtue of their other responsibilities, to advise the 
president about legislative recommendations on some particular topic. 
On this theory, for example, a provision forbidding use of any EPA 
resources to help formulate legislative proposals to strengthen EPA-
enforced environmental laws, or still worse to help formulate EPA’s own 
budget recommendations, might impermissibly obstruct the president’s 
authority to recommend such legislation as he considers appropriate. 
The problem with such appropriations restrictions is not that they 
directly impair any resource-independent authority of the president, 
but rather that they could materially alter the president’s own 
independent judgment about what legislation (if any) to recommend. 
So understood, executive objections to such provisions need not 
imply that presidents hold preclusive authority to call on the entire 
capacity of the executive branch to assist them with whatever 
presidential functions they deem appropriate. Given Congress’s broad 
authority to structure the executive branch and allocate resources 
within it, any such view would be untenable. 
D. The Problem of Article II’s Ambiguity 
Presidents, then, may ignore direct funding constraints on their 
resource-independent powers, and they may further disregard some 
selective funding arrangements that risk manipulating their judgments 
and clouding proper accountability for particular exercises of resource-
independent presidential powers. In elaborating this framework so far, 
however, my analysis has begged an important question: How do we 
 
 195. See supra note 173.  
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determine whether the president’s claimed power is valid—and can we 
trust the executive branch to make such determinations credibly? 
While the executive authorities I have emphasized so far (the 
veto, appointment, and clemency) are relatively unambiguous in at 
least their core applications, Article II in general is notoriously unclear. 
To list just a few important examples: the Constitution fails to address 
explicitly the scope of presidential removal authority over executive 
officers; it leaves the precise boundary between the president’s 
authority as Commander in Chief and Congress’s power to “declare 
war” to political contestation; and it assigns certain diplomatic 
authorities to the president without specifying the full extent of 
presidential authority over foreign policy. These ambiguities open the 
door for even conscientious presidents to adopt self-serving, expansive 
views of their own powers—views that may then support disregarding 
funding constraints imposed by Congress to control those powers. 
Indeed, scholars and judges have worried that, given the president’s 
superior power of initiative and Congress’s collective-action problems 
in responding, such expansive presidential positions may tend to 
prevail in practice over competing interpretations.196 
Resolving all disputes about the content of Article II powers 
would go well beyond this Article’s scope; my aim here is only to provide 
a framework for assessing when otherwise valid claims of executive 
authority may justify disregarding funding constraints.197 Ultimately, 
no system of separated powers can survive if the executive branch—the 
branch of government with guns and handcuffs—fails to value legal 
compliance and incurs no political cost for adopting legally indefensible 
positions. Nevertheless, in this particular context, at least three 
constraints should help discipline overbroad assertions of executive 
authority as a basis for disregarding funding constraints. 
First, as emphasized at the outset, Congress holds ultimate 
discretion over whether to provide funds at all for executive functions 
and priorities. This ultimate control over public resources gives 
 
 196. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2605 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In 
any controversy between the political branches over a separation-of-powers question, staking out 
a position and defending it over time is far easier for the Executive Branch than for the Legislative 
Branch.”); Moe & Howell, supra note 27, at 145 (discussing structural incentives for presidents to 
“behave imperialistically”). For an argument that congressional silence in the face of executive 
action should carry little weight in constitutional interpretation, see Alan B. Morrison, The Sounds 
of Silence: The Irrelevance of Congressional Inaction in Separation of Powers Litigation, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2013). 
 197. For some noteworthy recent attempts to sort out the proper bounds of executive power in 
general, see, for example, KRENT, supra note 95; SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL 
FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015); and McConnell, 
supra note 12. 
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Congress powerful leverage to discipline executive action—if Congress 
chooses to exercise it. To be sure, allowing presidents to disregard 
funding constraints heightens the political burden on Congress in 
resisting executive action. Indeed, as I argued earlier, shifting political 
costs in this manner helps protect separation of powers when executive 
claims are valid.198 Yet history suggests Congress nonetheless has the 
wherewithal to resist when the executive branch oversteps proper 
bounds. In several examples addressed already—including the recent 
Climate Change Czar rider and the requirement that President 
Johnson’s orders go through General Grant—presidents ultimately 
complied with appropriations restrictions despite voicing constitutional 
objections.199 I will highlight other such examples below. At the same 
time, moreover, the vice of overbroad assertion may run the other way 
too. At least when the executive branch has given clear indication of its 
intent to disregard a funding limitation on constitutional grounds, 
Congress’s choice nonetheless to enact the provision cannot always be 
taken at face value. It could amount to mere grandstanding in support 
of positions it knows would be unpopular if implemented, but for which 
it knows the president will spare it accountability. 
Given this risk of overclaiming on both sides, assessments of 
practice in this context should generally focus on outcomes—what the 
government ultimately did—rather than self-serving initial assertions 
by either branch.200 With that focus, however, historic examples suggest 
that Congress’s power of the purse can be effective in shaping executive 
behavior, notwithstanding the executive branch’s superior institutional 
capacity to articulate and defend broad views of its power.201 
In addition to Congress, courts may provide a second key 
constraint on executive action. Appropriations restrictions on executive 
 
 198. See supra Section III.B.2. 
 199. For Obama’s compliance on climate change, see supra Section I.B.2. On Johnson’s 
compliance with the army appropriations rider, see MAY, supra note 58, at 91. 
 200. Curtis Bradley has recently discussed how “differing justifications for [relying on practice 
in constitutional interpretation] yield potentially different answers” to whether “the only relevant 
consideration is [governmental institutions’] actual behavior.” Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 
U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 70 (2017). Bradley argues that a justification rooted in “Burkean 
consequentialism” could support this view, while other possible justifications may not. Id. at 70–
72. While full consideration of this important point goes beyond the scope of this Article, Burkean 
aversion to disruption of entrenched practical understandings is likely the most compelling 
justification for reliance on practice here. In any event, my point is simply that focusing on 
outcomes rather than assertions may discipline reliance on practice in contexts, like those 
considered here, where the two political branches hold divergent asserted views and Congress’s 
leverage over appropriations may enable it to impose its preferences, despite contrary executive 
assertions. 
 201. For discussion of some examples, see HOWELL, supra note 27, at 120–26; and Kristina 
Daugirdas, Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 518 
(2013). 
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authority may sometimes present nonjusticiable controversies. But that 
will not always be true. In Lovett, for example, government employees 
deprived of their salaries could sue to challenge the funding constraint 
imposing this deprivation.202 Similarly, in a recent decision, United 
States v. McIntosh, the Ninth Circuit held that individual defendants 
could invoke current appropriations limits on marijuana enforcement 
as a defense to federal prosecution.203 Rejecting arguments that the 
appropriations rider’s meaning and implications were nonjusticiable, 
the court held: “When Congress has enacted a legislative restriction like 
[this rider] that expressly prohibits [the Justice Department] from 
spending funds on certain actions, federal criminal defendants may 
seek to enjoin the expenditure of those funds.”204 
As McIntosh illustrates, legislative appropriations restrictions 
may sometimes enable courts to enforce otherwise nonjusticiable limits 
on executive power. For institutional reasons, courts have been 
reluctant to police some limits on executive authority. War powers is 
the paradigm case. Whatever limits the Constitution places on 
presidential use of military force, courts have often treated those limits 
as nonjusticiable “political questions” or held that litigants lacked 
standing to enforce them.205 I have argued that analogous institutional 
considerations explain courts’ general reluctance to intrude on 
executive enforcement policies.206 Lacking principled guideposts for 
assessing executive conduct, and fearful of assuming responsibility for 
weighty matters of personal or national security, courts have largely 
left enforcement of limits on these authorities to the political process. 
McIntosh demonstrates, however, that articulating specific 
funding constraints in appropriations legislation may resolve this 
institutional difficulty and enable a broader judicial role. Under the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, defendants in future enforcement suits 
should likewise hold standing to enforce congressional limits on 
 
 202. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1950). 
 203. 833 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 204. Id. at 1172–73. 
 205. See, e.g., Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[A] 
question is ‘political’ and thus nonjusticiable when its adjudication would inject the courts into a 
controversy which is best suited for resolution by the political branches.”); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. 
Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“It is not the role of judges to second-
guess, with the benefit of hindsight, another branch’s determination that the interests of the 
United States call for military action.”); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46–52 (D.D.C. 
2010) (“Because decision-making in the realm of military and foreign affairs is textually committed 
to the political branches, and because courts are functionally ill-equipped to make the[se] types of 
complex policy judgments . . . the Court finds that the political question doctrine bars resolution 
of this case.”). 
 206. Price, supra note 166.  
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available enforcement resources.207 By the same token, individual 
service personnel, if not also other parties, might seek to enjoin 
spending in pursuit of military objectives or activities that Congress has 
specifically banned.208 For that matter, courts might litigate defiance of 
congressional funding limits in the context of a future prosecution for 
violating the Anti-Deficiency Act.209 In all these contexts, courts would 
not confront general questions about ultimate limits on executive 
power. Instead, they could consider the more focused and manageable 
question whether the executive branch defied specific limits for which 
Congress, rather than the courts, would ultimately be politically 
accountable. 
These examples bring us to a final important constraint. The 
analysis developed so far applies only to resource-independent 
powers—powers that could in theory be exercised personally by the 
president. Those powers may be consequential, particularly when 
magnified by the support of advisers and assistants within the White 
House and beyond. Yet they do not entail direct application of the 
government’s coercive and destructive capacities. It is one thing for a 
president to claim authority to appoint a particular White House 
adviser or grant a particular pardon despite statutory funding 
constraints on doing so. It would be quite another thing for a president 
to order military strikes or arrests in violation of specific limits on 
available public resources. These forms of executive action, to which I 
now turn, require an entirely different analysis, one that should 
preclude almost any assertion of authority to defy appropriations limits. 
IV. RESOURCE-DEPENDENT EXECUTIVE POWERS 
Moving beyond powers I have identified so far as resource-
independent, we arrive finally at the big-ticket items in the executive 
toolkit: war powers, law enforcement, and foreign policy. Funding 
conditions are most common, and most consequential, in these areas, 
and by the same token any executive practice of disregarding such 
conditions is most worrisome. Yet how the power of the purse relates to 
 
 207. 833 F.3d at 1179. 
 208. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring) 
(addressing the possibility that “military personnel might be able to challenge a President’s 
arguably unlawful use of force”); id. at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring) (disputing the assertion that war’s 
legality would be nonjusticiable if raised by party with standing); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 
1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (entertaining challenge to authorization for Vietnam War by service personnel 
but dismissing suit as political question). 
 209. See Applicability of the Antideficiency Act to a Violation of a Condition or Internal Cap 
Within an Appropriation, 25 Op. O.L.C. 33, 54 (2001) (canvassing judicial case law and concluding 
that the ADA forbids exceeding any specified funding limitation in agency appropriations). 
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these executive authorities has remained undertheorized. The 
groundwork laid so far exposes why these executive authorities require 
a distinct analysis. 
A. Defining the Category 
While resource-independent powers, rather like judicial 
decisionmaking, entail an exercise of judgment that is at least 
theoretically costless, the same is not true of war powers, law 
enforcement, or diplomacy. In principle, the president could ride out on 
horseback, machine gun or handcuffs in hand, to defend the nation or 
enforce its laws. He might use his own cell phone or private jet to engage 
in personal diplomacy. But such efforts would not get far. Effective 
warmaking requires weapons and armies; law enforcement requires 
police and prosecutors; and diplomacy requires, well, diplomats. These 
are powers, then, where congressional control over resources should 
have real bite, as a simple matter of text and structure. 
What is more, as compared to resource-independent powers like 
the veto, clemency, and appointments, the normative case for an 
appropriations constraint on executive action here is far stronger. 
Whereas powers addressed earlier serve functionally to check 
congressional authority or guarantee institutional control over the 
executive branch, establishing a separate branch with authority to 
pursue legal violations, deploy military force, and engage in diplomatic 
negotiation might serve principally to enable more effective 
achievement of congressional policy objectives, and not to impose an 
independent constraint on Congress’s own powers. At any rate, unlike 
resource-independent powers, which involve an isolated exercise of 
personal judgment by the president, these powers involve outward 
projection of affirmative government power. As such, these powers 
themselves may require some external congressional check, 
particularly under modern conditions of pervasive delegation and 
substantial standing government capacity.210 After all, these 
authorities determine who is killed or maimed by the U.S. military, 
which suspects are arrested and imprisoned by the U.S. government, 
and what positions the United States takes in diplomatic exchanges. 
Even apart from textual and structural reasons to recognize greater 
congressional appropriations control, such important matters of 
national destiny should require congressional as well as executive buy-
in. 
 
 210. See supra Section I.A. 
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Here, then, a different framework is required. The question 
ultimately is what irreducible degree of discretion the Constitution 
guarantees the executive in deploying resources provided by Congress. 
With respect to war powers and law enforcement, this irreducible 
discretion should be exiguous. Insofar as enabling adaptation of general 
policies to particular circumstances is a key functional reason for 
separating legislative and executive power, presuming some irreducible 
executive authority to address unforeseen exigencies with available 
resources may be a natural entailment of separation of powers. On the 
other hand, however, the normative and historical case for preserving 
a congressional check on executive use of these powers—the means of 
governmental coercion and destruction—is exceptionally powerful. 
Accordingly, congressional authority to curtail executive discretion 
with respect to use of military force and law enforcement through 
funding conditions should be near total. 
To continue elaborating unconstitutional-conditions analogies, 
the executive role with respect to these powers more closely resembles 
government speech than either an impermissible condition on private 
freedom or a coercive condition on federal funding for states.211 Like an 
employee speaking for the government, the core executive function with 
respect to war powers and law enforcement is to carry out Congress’s 
program using resources Congress has provided. As a result, when 
constrained by statutory funding directives, presidents will generally 
have no sound basis to complain either about burdens on their rightful 
powers or coercion of some independent judgment guaranteed to them 
by the Constitution. 
Diplomacy then presents a difficult intermediate case. 
Presidents have effectively treated diplomacy as a personal, resource-
independent authority, and they have some basis for doing so: 
particularly in our era of cell phones, video conferencing, and rapid air 
travel, presidents can and do communicate directly with foreign leaders 
on behalf of the United States. Yet this personal capacity is even more 
illusory than in the case of resource-independent authorities like the 
appointment power and veto. Effectively representing the United 
States around the world and negotiating agreements to protect our 
interests requires resources and staff, and with such resource-
dependence should come some congressional control over how such 
resources are deployed. Some intermediate framework is therefore 
necessary. Drawing off my earlier analysis of selective support for 
 
 211. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 
(2015) (“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining 
the content of what it says.”). 
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resource-independent powers, I attempt here to sketch possible limits 
on presidential discretion over diplomatic resources, as well as some 
hard boundaries to what forms of foreign policy action should fall within 
the president’s presumed power over diplomacy in the first place. (For 
a chart summarizing these conclusions, see Figure 2 below.) 
The analysis below begins by addressing some historic examples 
often invoked to support broad executive power of initiative today. 
These examples, I argue, reflect an outdated approach to the fiscal 
constitution that Congress has validly abolished. With this underbrush 
cleared, the analysis proceeds to address war powers, law enforcement, 
and diplomacy in turn. 
 
FIGURE 2: TAXONOMY OF FUNDING RESTRICTIONS 
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B. Congressional Repudiation of Presidential Heroism 
At a high level of abstraction, presuming discretion in the 
exercise of coercive or destructive governmental capacities reflects a 
basic functional distinction between legislative and executive power: as 
the branch of government that never sleeps, the executive often must 
address evolving or unforeseen circumstances using tools provided in 
advance by general legislation. With respect to funding questions, this 
distinction has led to recurrent debates throughout American history 
about the degree of flexibility executive officials should presume in 
applying the strict letter of appropriations laws. Alexander Hamilton 
argued in 1795, for example, that “[t]he business of administration 
requires accommodation to so great a variety of circumstances, that a 
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rigid construction would in countless instances arrest the wheels of 
Government.”212 In contrast, President Jefferson and his Treasury 
Secretary Albert Gallatin advocated tighter legislative control.213 Even 
Gallatin acknowledged, however, that “it is impossible for the 
Legislature to foresee, in all its details, the necessary application of 
moneys, and a reasonable discretion should be allowed to the proper 
executive department.”214 Although a statute now requires specific 
construction of appropriations statutes,215 recent debates over the 
Guantanamo prisoner swap,216 or for that matter spending for subsidies 
under the Affordable Care Act,217 show that this basic problem of 
administrative flexibility and statutory construction remains very 
much with us. 
As concerns the particular focus of this Article, however, the key 
historical examples involve presidential actions undertaken without 
any supporting appropriation. In fact, such towering figures as 
Presidents Washington and Lincoln undertook significant military or 
law enforcement operations without any appropriation to support their 
activity. But while these examples formed a centerpiece of Sidak’s 
argument for broad executive spending authority,218 they in fact carry 
no such implication. On the contrary, in key examples, both presidents 
sought (and received) after-the-fact congressional ratification, thus at 
least implicitly acknowledging Congress’s ultimate control over 
resources for such executive functions. Since their tenure, moreover, 
Congress has tightened legislative controls on such anticipatory 
expenditures, while at the same time greatly expanding the 
 
 212. Alexander Hamilton, Explanation (Nov. 11, 1795), in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 405. 
 213. Gallatin complained in 1796 about the degree of flexibility Hamilton exercised in shifting 
funds between different accounts. He wrote: “It deprives the Legislature from any control, not only 
over the distribution of the moneys amongst the several heads of service, but even over the total 
sum to be expended.” ALBERT GALLATIN, A SKETCH OF THE FINANCES OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1796), reprinted in 3 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 69, 116–17 (Henry Adams ed., 
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1879). President Jefferson’s annual message to Congress in 
December 1801 advocated “appropriating specific sums to every specific purpose susceptible of 
definition,” and “disallowing all applications of money varying from the appropriation in object, or 
transcending it in amount; by reducing the undefined field of contingencies, and thereby 
circumscribing discretionary powers over money.” President Thomas Jefferson, First Annual 
Message (Dec. 8, 1801), in 1 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 314, 317. 
 214. GALLATIN, supra note 213, at 117. For a perceptive account of debates over appropriations 
flexibility in the early Republic, see CASPER, supra note 43, at 70–96. 
 215. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (2012) (“A law may be construed to make an appropriation out of the 
Treasury or to authorize making a contract for the payment of money in excess of an appropriation 
only if the law specifically states that an appropriation is made or that such a contract may be 
made.”). 
 216. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 217. See Bagley, supra note 99, at 1729–35. 
 218. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1177–83, 1189–92. 
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government’s standing bureaucratic and military capacity. Under such 
conditions, presidents have no basis for presuming the degree of 
spending discretion claimed by Washington and Lincoln, much less for 
defying specific express funding restrictions imposed by Congress. 
President Washington expended funds in arguable violation of 
appropriations limits to suppress the so-called Whiskey Rebellion, a tax 
revolt in western Pennsylvania that the Washington Administration 
perceived as a major challenge to federal authority.219 Washington 
called forth a large militia force to restore law and order, yet at the time 
Congress was not in session and no militia appropriation was available; 
the Administration instead provisionally diverted funds for the regular 
military.220 After successfully suppressing the rebellion, Washington 
sought congressional ratification of his action,221 which Congress gladly 
provided.222 
Gallatin, elected to Congress from a district at the rebellion’s 
epicenter, nevertheless excoriated the Administration’s defiance of 
appropriations limits. “It might be a defect in the law authorizing the 
expense not to have provided the means,” Gallatin wrote in 1796, “but 
that defect should have been remedied by the only competent authority, 
by convening Congress.”223 Siding with Washington over Gallatin, 
Sidak argued that Washington’s example supports executive authority 
to expend funds for law enforcement or national defense without 
specific congressional approval.224 But that view is unpersuasive. Even 
Hamilton, President Washington’s Treasury Secretary at the time, 
acknowledged that “before money can legally issue from the Treasury 
for any purpose, there must be a law authorising an expenditure and 
designating the object and the fund.”225 Hamilton simply argued that 
executive officials should treat funding limits flexibly in addressing 
 
 219. For a general account of this event, see THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: 
FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986). For my own analysis of President 
Washington’s action as an instance of law enforcement authority, see Zachary S. Price, 
Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 736–39 (2014). 
 220. See CASPER, supra note 43, at 87; Abraham D. Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign 
Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 16 (1976). 
 221. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 787, 792 (1794) (reprinting message from President Washington 
indicating that an “estimate of the necessary appropriations, including expenditures into which 
we have been driven by the insurrection, will be submitted to Congress”). 
 222. CURRIE, supra note 102, at 189. 
 223. GALLATIN, supra note 213, at 118. For background on Gallatin and his 1796 report on 
federal finances, see NICHOLAS DUNGAN, GALLATIN: AMERICA’S SWISS FOUNDING FATHER 58–62 
(2010). 
 224. See Sidak, supra note 4, at 1179–80 (arguing that the Washington Administration 
“claimed, in an expansive manner, that the President had the authority to spend public funds even 
when Congress had not clearly appropriated money for that purpose beforehand”). 
 225. Hamilton, supra note 212.  
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unforeseen circumstances.226 What is more, by seeking congressional 
ratification and after-the-fact appropriation, Washington implicitly 
acknowledged Congress’s ultimate authority over public resources. 
Far from suggesting wide-ranging inherent executive authority 
over resources, Washington’s example thus reflects what Gerhard 
Casper called “fiscal heroism”—“mak[ing] the sacrifice of risking one’s 
career so that one may act ‘responsibly.’ ”227 Washington, moreover, was 
hardly the only early president to adopt this posture. Even Thomas 
Jefferson, despite generally seeking to implement Gallatin’s vision of 
strict legislative control, followed Washington’s example on at least one 
occasion. In 1807, following a British attack on the U.S. naval vessel 
Chesapeake, Jefferson authorized military expenditures in excess of 
appropriations, for fear that “await[ing] a previous and special sanction 
by law would have lost occasions which might not be retrieved.”228 “I 
trust,” Jefferson implored, “that the Legislature, feeling the same 
anxiety for the safety of our country . . . will approve, when done, what 
they would have seen so important to be done if then assembled.”229 In 
the name of national security, Jefferson thus took action on his own 
initiative to expand the Republic’s arsenal. But like Washington, he 
implicitly acknowledged the illegality of his action by seeking after-the-
fact congressional ratification.230 
Lincoln’s example largely fits the same pattern. Facing an 
extensive rebellion with Congress out of session, Lincoln authorized 
treasury expenditures for military preparations without any supporting 
appropriation.231 But Lincoln disavowed any notion that his actions 
could support executive spending authority under other circumstances. 
Lincoln at times advanced a defense of necessity for his actions, arguing 
that the necessity of saving the Constitution as a whole justified 
violating isolated provisions of it.232 At times he implied that his 
 
 226. See supra text accompanying note 212. 
 227. CASPER, supra note 43, at 93–95. Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., the leading historian of pre–
World War II funding disputes, similarly argued that early executive officials presumed an 
obligation occasionally to “boldly . . . set aside the requirements of the Legislature, trusting to the 
good sense of Congress, when all the facts of the case should have been explained, to acquit them 
of all blame.” WILMERDING, supra note 119, at 4. 
 228. President Thomas Jefferson, Seventh Annual Message (Oct. 27, 1807), in 1 COMPILATION 
MPP, supra note 55, at 413, 416. 
 229. Id. 
 230. For discussion of this example and its ironies, see CASPER, supra note 43, at 93–96; see 
also BRUFF, supra note 59, at 75 (discussing Jefferson’s expenditures and Congress’s subsequent 
assent); SOFAER, supra note 82, at 172–73 (same). 
 231. BRUFF, supra note 59, at 132. 
 232. See President Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 7 
COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 3221, 3226 (“[I]t cannot be believed the framers of the 
instrument intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could be 
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authority might expand under the circumstances to enable him to meet 
the rebellion effectively.233 But as to the appropriations violation, at 
least, Lincoln also sought to cure his violation by throwing himself on 
the mercy of Congress.234 Congress obliged.235 
Lincoln did also authorize certain other expenditures that he did 
not disclose promptly to Congress. These secret expenditures involved 
outfitting certain naval vessels, transporting certain troops and 
munitions, and forwarding some $2 million in Treasury funds to 
specified individuals for urgent military requisitions.236 Lincoln 
revealed his role in authorizing these expenditures only after Congress 
censured his former Secretary of War for participating in them. Even 
then, however, as David Barron and Marty Lederman have 
emphasized, Lincoln claimed no preclusive executive authority for his 
action.237 On the contrary, as with his other unauthorized expenditures, 
Lincoln confessed the expenditures’ illegality, pointed to the exigency of 
the circumstances as justification, and took personal responsibility for 
his conduct.238 
These key historic examples, then, need not imply wide-ranging 
executive authority to meet every perceived emergency without 
congressional support. On the contrary, they may well suggest only a 
default executive power of initiative—an authority to address 
unforeseen circumstances, absent specific congressional approval or 
disapproval, subject to ultimate congressional ratification or censure. 
From that point of view, moreover, these high-profile cases are 
only particular manifestations of a more mundane problem Congress 
confronted throughout the nineteenth-century: the so-called “coercive 
deficiency.” Even when barred by law from doing so, executive officials 
of all sorts often outran their appropriations. They entered contracts or 
 
called together; the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by 
the rebellion.”). 
 233. President Abraham Lincoln, Special Message to Congress (May 26, 1862), in 8 
COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 3278, 3279: 
There was no time to convene [Congress]. It became necessary for me to choose whether, 
using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I 
should let the Government fall at once into ruin or whether, availing myself of the 
broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an 
effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the present age and for posterity. 
 234. See BRUFF, supra note 59, at 132 (noting Lincoln was “counting on later congressional 
ratification” and “following the precedent of Jefferson’s reaction to the attack on the Chesapeake”). 
 235. Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326 (“[A]pprov[ing] and in all respects legaliz[ing] 
and ma[king] valid [Lincoln’s prior actions], to the same intent and with the same effect as if they 
had been issued and done under the previous express authority of the Congress . . . .”). 
 236. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1002. 
 237. Id. at 1003. 
 238. Id. 
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other obligations in the expectation that Congress would choose to 
make good on the promise rather than stiff a constituent or harm U.S. 
credit.239 Congressional appropriators railed against this practice. As 
early as 1806, Representative John Randolph complained: “You have 
fixed limits [in the appropriation], but the expenditure exceeds the 
appropriations; and those who disburse the money, are like the saucy 
boy who knows that his grandfather will gratify him, and over-runs the 
sum allowed him at pleasure.”240 
Yet Congress ultimately brought the coercive deficiency to heel. 
In a series of escalating statutes, between 1820 and 1905, Congress 
imposed increasingly strict limits on unappropriated expenditures. The 
coup de grace came in the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1905, which made 
expenditure in excess or violation of appropriations limits not only 
illegal but also in some cases criminal.241 Today, then, actions like 
Lincoln’s or Jefferson’s would transgress not only Congress’s 
constitutional authority over appropriations, but also more specific 
statutory prohibitions through which Congress has sought to buttress 
that authority. Executive officials cannot simply act in anticipation of 
congressional approval. They must risk criminal sanctions (from a 
future administration if not the current one) in defying appropriations 
limits—except insofar as those limits are themselves 
unconstitutional.242 
At the same time, a second change further heightens the stakes 
for appropriations control. As compared to Jefferson’s day or even 
Lincoln’s, the federal government today holds vastly increased 
bureaucratic and military capacity. As discussed further below, this 
feature of modern government (coupled with standing ADA exceptions 
for measures to protect lives and property243) would greatly weaken any 
claim that emergency circumstances required expenditure outside of 
prescribed limits.244 This practical context undermines any claim that 
 
 239. WILMERDING, supra note 119 (recounting the long history of Congress’s struggle with this 
practice). 
 240. 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 1063 (1806). 
 241. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1214, 1257–58. For discussion of the 1905 Act’s 
effect, see WILMERDING, supra note 119, at 144–53. 
 242. Applicability of the Antideficiency Act to a Violation of a Condition or Internal Cap Within 
an Appropriation, 25 Op. O.L.C. 33, 35 (2001). 
 243. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). 
 244. See infra Section IV.D.2. In his monumental study of historical appropriations practice, 
Wilmerding sought to distinguish ordinary coercive deficiencies from the sort of bold military 
expenditures undertaken by Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln for reasons of national security. 
In Wilmerding’s view, although Congress eventually established through legislation the principle 
that “executive departments are under an absolute obligation to observe the laws making specific 
appropriations of money,” this principle necessarily excludes cases of genuine military or law 
enforcement necessity. WILMERDING, supra note 119, at 19. Wilmerding wrote: “The high officers 
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the level of interpretive discretion envisioned by Hamilton, as opposed 
to Gallatin, should prevail with respect to modern appropriations 
statutes.245 On the contrary, the scale of modern government makes 
appropriations control all the more important. To the extent presidents 
may ignore appropriations limits, they retain authority to employ a vast 
standing apparatus for warmaking, law enforcement, or diplomacy. The 
boundary between executive authority and appropriations control may 
therefore be more important today than it has ever before been. 
In sum, the modern context limits the relevance of historic 
examples invoked by Sidak and other proponents of broad executive 
power. In the ADA, Congress has shrunk executive power over 
resources down to its constitutional minimum, even as it has greatly 
expanded the overall capacity of the federal government. This context, 
once again, explains why current battles over executive powers of 
resource allocation today take the form that they do, as fights over the 
constitutional validity of appropriations restrictions. Yet it also 
necessitates more careful consideration of the precise nature and extent 
of each such form of executive authority—of what irreducible degree of 
discretion the Constitution should be understood to preserve. 
C. War Powers 
The first key resource-dependent executive authority is war 
powers. Although modern presidents have claimed substantial power of 
initiative with respect to use of military force, the proper scope of 
executive discretion to defy specific appropriations limits is properly 
quite narrow. Using just her own guaranteed salary, a president might 
perhaps ride out, pistol in hand, to personally confront the nation’s 
enemies. More realistically, presidents might retain some narrow 
residual authority to address genuinely unforeseen exigencies without 
regard to congressional funding limits. But presidents should not 
 
of the government, and a fortiori the President, have a right, indeed a duty, to do what they 
conceive to be indispensably necessary for the public good, provided always that they submit their 
action to Congress to sanction the proceeding.” Id. In light of developments since he wrote in 1943, 
Wilmerding’s distinction is unpersuasive. Subsequent developments—including improvements in 
communication and transportation as well as the development of a permanent federal law 
enforcement apparatus and national security state—greatly weaken any continuing authority to 
take significant military or law enforcement action without a supporting appropriation based on 
executive officials’ perception of “indispensable necessity.” Id. The irreducible minimum of 
discretion with respect to appropriations limits should be far narrower today, and require a far 
more severe exigency, than Wilmerding’s analysis suggested. 
 245. Cf. Bagley, supra note 99, at 1735 (discussing dangers of “embolden[ing] the next 
President to further slip the reins of legislative control” through loose interpretation of 
appropriations statutes). 
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otherwise presume general authority to deploy military forces in 
defiance of appropriations restrictions. 
1. Text, Structure, and History 
Why is congressional control so strong in this area? To begin 
with, maintaining legislative control over war finance—preventing 
union of “purse and sword,” in the classic phrasing of the time—was a 
particular concern of the Framers.246 Nor did the Framers leave it to 
doubt that only public resources could be employed for military 
adventures. The very terms of the relevant Article II provision, the 
Commander in Chief Clause, presume presidential dependence on 
externally provided resources: the president cannot serve as 
“Commander in Chief” unless there is something to command, and the 
Constitution leaves no doubt about which branch provides those 
military resources. 
With respect to military expenditure, indeed, the Constitution 
buttresses the Appropriations Clause’s general rule of funding control 
by specifically assigning to Congress authority over raising armies and 
establishing navies. It also specifically bars permanent military 
funding by limiting army appropriations to two years. What is more, 
although privateers—private ships equipped to raid enemy vessels—
formed an essential component of U.S. naval defense in the early 
Republic, the Constitution specifically grants Congress, not the 
president, authority to license such private violence on the 
government’s behalf.247 Overall, then, the Constitution’s plain terms 
betray considerable anxiety to ensure that the people’s representatives 
in Congress retain sole control over the military resources available to 
the president as Commander in Chief. 
Background historical practice, furthermore, supports 
legislative authority to impose quite detailed restrictions on 
appropriated funds. Even before the Revolution, colonial legislatures 
routinely imposed extraordinarily detailed restrictions on funding for 
 
 246. For discussion of this concern’s salience in debates over ratification, see AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 115–16 (2005), which discusses the Framers’ goal 
of maintaining legislative checks on use of military force; and BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra 
note 24, at 29–32. 
 247. Only Congress can grant the “letters of marque and reprisal” that license privateers. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8. For discussion of privateering’s importance in the early Republic, see NICHOLAS 
R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 
1780–1940, at 318–20 (2013); Nicholas Parrillo, The De-Privatization of American Warfare: How 
the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth 
Century, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 15–22 (2007). 
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military activities.248 As William Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen 
summarize, “[t]he colonial assemblies effectively usurped the 
governors’ military powers by specifying the purposes for which 
military appropriations could be spent, including the number, 
distribution, organization, pay, place and period of service, and supply 
of the officers and men to be raised.”249 In the early Republic, Congress 
carried this practice forward by frequently imposing “quite niggling 
restrictions on the organization, action, and composition of the armed 
forces.”250 
It is true, as these examples themselves illustrate, that the 
Framers’ intuitive model of military funding was likely quite different 
from our own. Given the widespread fear of standing armies and 
general aversion to providing for them, many Framers likely envisioned 
the president coming to Congress, as English Kings and colonial 
governors had done, to affirmatively request support from the people 
for some planned military adventure. To the extent that is true, the 
expectation broke down early on. In fact, even the arch-antimonarchist 
President Jefferson apparently authorized military action against the 
Barbary “pirates” without express legislative approval to do so.251 In 
combination with examples set by Washington and Adams, this early 
practice strongly supports an understanding that the executive function 
in foreign affairs entails some authority to exercise independent 
judgment regarding use of force in response to evolving international 
circumstances, at least insofar as Congress has imposed no specific 
restriction on doing so and appears likely to ratify the contemplated 
 
 248. GREENE, supra note 28, at 189 (“[I]n granting military supplies [colonial assemblies] 
prescribed in detail the purposes for which [the supplies] were to be expended, dictating the course 
of military operations and the disposition of troops.”); see also PERCY S. FLIPPIN, THE ROYAL 
GOVERNMENT IN VIRGINIA 211 (1966) (discussing the House of Burgesses’s control over military 
expenditures in colonial Virginia); GREENE, supra note 25, at 297 (discussing how legislatures in 
the southern colonies “not only appropriated all military funds specifically but also subjected them 
to certain limitations by determining the number of men to be employed, their rate of pay, and 
their place and period of service”). Colonial legislatures were following the example of England’s 
Parliament, which likewise asserted detailed control over military expenditures. See BREWER, 
supra note 24, at 43–44; PAUL EINZIG, THE CONTROL OF THE PURSE: PROGRESS AND DECLINE OF 
PARLIAMENT’S FINANCIAL CONTROL 141–48 (1959). 
 249. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 21. 
 250. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 958. 
 251. Following a military engagement between the U.S. schooner Enterprise and a Tripolitan 
vessel, President Jefferson claimed the U.S. ship had acted only defensively and sought legislative 
authorization for offensive action. In fact, however, the Administration’s earlier orders had 
contemplated offensive action. For discussion of this incident, see, for example, CASPER, supra note 
43, at 107–11; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–
1829, at 123–29 (2001); Montgomery N. Kosma, Our First Real War, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 169 (1999). 
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action.252 At any rate, since World War II if not before, presidents have 
routinely presumed such authority, and Congress has by and large 
acquiesced.253 
The key point here, however, is that presuming front-end 
initiative absent specific restraints precludes neither back-end 
congressional authority to terminate an operation by denying funds, nor 
even front-end authority to deny resources for possible initiatives 
looming on the horizon. In a world of annual appropriations, presumed 
presidential initiative, and extensive permanent military capacity, the 
proper analogue to the spending initiative claimed by Lincoln, 
Washington, and other early presidents is at most an authority to 
address genuinely unexpected developments that Congress could not 
reasonably have anticipated at the time it imposed particular funding 
restraints. The Constitution may protect presidential discretion to 
defend national interests when a dangerous world presents novel 
exigencies; it does not permit defiance of congressional restrictions 
imposed with full awareness of relevant circumstances.254 
Significant, if not entirely uniform, practice reinforces this view. 
President Truman asserted authority to disregard funding restrictions 
on placing U.S. forces in specified regions, yet he ultimately had no 
occasion to act on this view because Congress failed to enact such 
constraints.255 During the Vietnam War, President Nixon bombed 
Cambodia in the face of congressional restrictions on expanding the 
conflict, but his action apparently complied with the strict letter of then-
imposed appropriations limits.256 Later, Congress helped end the 
Vietnam War in part through appropriations restrictions.257 
More recently, President George H.W. Bush reasserted 
Truman’s view that presidents hold preclusive authority to determine 
 
 252. The argument for this understanding of early practice is in POWELL, supra note 8, at 92–
93. 
 253. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the 
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 461–68 (2012) (assessing competing interpretations 
of war powers practice). For empirical examination of congressional influence over executive 
military action, see WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: 
CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (2007). 
 254. Cf. Julian Davis Mortenson, A Theory of Republican Prerogative, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 
50 (2014) (defining extremely narrow circumstances in which an extralegal “republican 
prerogative” could be consistent with our constitutional tradition). 
 255. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1060–62. 
 256. Id. at 1067–70. 
 257. Id.; see also DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND 
CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS 343–44 (2016) (arguing funding cutoffs relating to Vietnam conflict 
“showed just how much control Congress exerted”). 
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force levels at overseas locations.258 Bush, for example, objected to 
provisions in annual defense authorization acts barring use of funds to 
maintain troop deployments above specified levels in Japan or 
European NATO countries.259 The Bush Administration appears 
nevertheless to have complied substantially, if not completely, with 
these and other similar limitations in subsequent years.260 President 
 
 258. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1086–88 (discussing Bush’s assertion of “a 
remarkably strong notion of a substantive Commander in Chief preclusive power” in a series of 
signing statements regarding troop deployments). 
 259. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1991, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1766, 1767 (Nov. 5, 1990) (asserting that provisions limiting 
force levels “might be construed to impinge on the President’s authority as Commander in Chief 
and as the head of the executive branch” and that “I shall construe these provisions as necessary 
to fulfill my constitutional responsibilities”); see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, §§ 406, 1455(b), 104 Stat. 1485 (1990) (barring use of authorized 
funds to exceed specified force levels in Japan and European NATO countries). 
 260. For example, one such provision barred use of authorized funds “to support an end 
strength level of members of the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to permanent duty 
ashore in European member nations of NATO at any level exceeding a permanent ceiling of 
261,855.” Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 1002, as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 406, 104 Stat. at 1546. 
The statute, however, allowed the president to maintain a permanent force level of up to 311,855 
“if the President determine[d] that the national security interests of the United States require 
such authorization” and the president so notified Congress. Id. § 406(b). The same statute 
precluded use of authorized funds “to support an end strength level of all personnel of the Armed 
Forces of the United States stationed in Japan at any level in excess of 50,000.” Id. § 1455(a). 
 As of September 30, 1991, the Department of Defense reported maintaining 44,566 active duty 
personnel in Japan, well under the statutory limit. Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by 
Regional Area and by Country (309A), DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR. (Sept. 30, 1991), 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp [https://perma.cc/857N-U75V]. The 
Department reported that 264,903 active duty personnel were based in NATO countries as of that 
date, a number exceeding the statutory ceiling though not the limit allowed with a waiver. If 
Greenland and Iceland are not counted as “European member nations of NATO,” however, this 
total drops below the statutory limit to 261,531. Beginning in fiscal year 1995, the statutory ceiling 
in fact expressly excluded troops based in Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores, although of course 
this change could suggest the provision was previously understood to include those locations. 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 1303(b), 108 Stat. 
2663, 2890–91 (1994); see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-701, at 762 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (characterizing 
this exclusion as “intended to assist the Command in managing its personnel level to the 
appropriate fiscal year 1996 level”). In any event, the reported number of active duty forces in all 
NATO countries dropped precipitously to 187,378 (well under the statutory limit) the following 
fiscal year. Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (309A), DEF. 
MANPOWER DATA CTR. (Sept. 30, 1992), https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/857N-U75V]. In later years, the Defense Department appears to have complied 
with prescribed limits even as Congress lowered the ceiling to “approximately 100,000” in 
European NATO-member states. 22 U.S.C. § 1928 note (2012) (Improvements to NATO 
Conventional Capability). 
 President Bush also objected to a provision barring transfer of forces from a base in Spain to a 
particular location in Italy, but nonetheless complied by transferring the units in question to a 
different air base in Italy. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 
Pub. L. No 102-190, § 2851, 105 Stat. 1290, 1558 (1991); Statement on Signing the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1769 
(Dec. 5, 1991); MARK L. GILLEM, AMERICA TOWN: BUILDING THE OUTPOSTS OF EMPIRE 174–80 
(2007). 
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Clinton, in contrast, made no objection to several statutes limiting use 
of military force abroad.261 While he did object on constitutional grounds 
to a statute barring use of funds for a military deployment in Haiti after 
a specified date,262 Clinton himself had already decided to end this 
deployment.263 In addition, in the Kosovo conflict, President Clinton 
exceeded the standing sixty-day time limit for military engagements in 
the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”),264 but ironically he did so with the 
support of congressional appropriations rather than in defiance of 
them.265 The Obama Administration likewise adopted a strained 
reading of the WPR to justify prolonged use of force in Libya,266 and the 
President later (rather debatably) interpreted prior authorizations for 
military force to permit military action against the Islamic State in the 
Levant.267 Again, however, Congress never attempted to deny funds for 
these operations. 
In short, across the sweep of U.S. history, presidents appear to 
have substantially complied with appropriations limits on use or 
deployment of military forces, even in cases where they initially raised 
objections to legislative restrictions. In fact, in their encyclopedic survey 
of presidential responses to legislative restrictions on military force 
through 2008, David Barron and Marty Lederman identify only one 
clear violation of a specific appropriations restriction. In 1975, during 
the Vietnam War’s untidy conclusion, President Ford authorized use of 
U.S. forces to aid in rescuing certain U.S. nationals and foreign allies in 
Vietnam and Cambodia, notwithstanding strict statutory prohibitions 
on use of appropriated funds to involve U.S. forces in “combat activities” 
 
 261. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1089–90 (discussing examples). 
 262. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 35 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1927, 1928–29 (Oct. 5, 1999) (indicating that the President would 
“interpret this provision consistent with my constitutional responsibilities as President and 
Commander in Chief”); see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-65, § 1232(a), 113 Stat. 512, 788 (1999). 
 263. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1094. 
 264. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2012). 
 265. OLC justified the President’s action on this theory. See Authorization for Continuing 
Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O.L.C. 327 (2000). For a much older instance of analogous reasoning 
(albeit long before the WPR’s enactment), see Existence of War with the Seminoles, 3 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 307, 307 (1838): 
Several appropriations for the same object have been made by law, so that, although no 
formal declaration of war has been made, (probably because deemed unnecessary,) the 
war, on our part, has been waged by authority of the legislative department, to whom 
the power of making war has been given by the constitution. 
 266. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 
14 (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State). 
 267. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 285–87 (D.D.C. 2016) (discussing legal 
justifications for operation). 
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or “hostilities” in Southeast Asia.268 This example, however, arguably 
involved precisely the sort of narrow unforeseen exigency that could 
justify limited use of military force notwithstanding a funding ban. By 
all accounts, Ford needed to act quickly to save lives of U.S. personnel 
and key foreign allies,269 and it seems doubtful that Congress would 
have barred such action altogether had it anticipated it. Indeed, Ford 
himself had convened a special session of Congress to amend the 
restrictions at issue, and while Congress was still searching for precise 
language when he acted unilaterally, it appeared receptive to his 
general objectives.270 
2. Governing Principles and Contemporary Applications  
a. Negative Restraints 
Where, then, do these structural principles, informed by past 
practice, leave us today? With respect to negative restraints—
prohibitions on deploying military forces in particular places or for 
particular purposes—Congress retains near-plenary authority to 
control use of military force through time-limited appropriations 
restrictions. As text, structure, and original understanding suggest, and 
as subsequent practice largely confirms, Congress may specifically 
preclude use of military force in specified contexts or for specified 
purposes, even if in the absence of such restrictions the president would 
hold broader presumptive power of initiative to address perceived 
military threats. By the same token, Congress may also bar deployment 
or basing of troops in particular locations, whether within the United 
States or overseas, as indeed it has done repeatedly across American 
history.271 
 
 268. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1072–73. 
 269. President Ford claimed, based on legislative history, that applicable funding restrictions 
did not apply to rescues of U.S. nationals. Id. at 1073. Some authority, moreover, supports 
preclusive presidential authority to protect U.S. lives and property. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872); Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186); 
see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive 
Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
689, 712–23 (2016). No such justification was available, however, for use of military resources to 
rescue non-Americans. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1073. 
 270. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1073. 
 271. See supra Section IV.C.1; see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1048–51, 1062–
63, 1063 n.497 (discussing pre–World War II restrictions on foreign deployment of draftees and 
reservists and later restrictions on closure of military facilities). For historic executive branch 
opinions supporting this view, see Appropriations—Marine Corp—Service on Battle Ships, etc., 27 
Op. Att’y Gen. 259, 260 (1909): 
Inasmuch as Congress has power to create or not to create, as it shall deem expedient, 
a marine corps, it has power to create a marine corps, make appropriation for its pay, 
Price_Galley(Do Not Delete) 3/7/2018  9:38 AM 
2018] FUNDING RESTRICTIONS 433 
During the Obama Administration, the most significant 
appropriations questions in this category involved military detentions. 
Congress, as noted, thwarted President Obama’s stated goal of closing 
the Guantanamo Bay detention facility by barring use of military funds 
to transfer prisoners out of U.S. custody without making prescribed 
advance certifications to Congress. In keeping with the framework 
developed here, the Administration generally abided by these 
restrictions, despite the President’s assertion in signing statements 
that “[u]nder certain circumstances” the rider “would violate 
constitutional separation of powers principles.”272 
A controversial exception involved releasing five prisoners in 
exchange for a U.S. soldier held by the Taliban in Afghanistan.273 In 
this instance, the Administration ignored the certification requirement 
for overseas exchanges, offering only a strained (and to many observers 
unpersuasive) statutory argument for doing so.274 Under the 
constitutional framework advanced here, this action might have been 
justified if it involved a genuine need for urgent action that Congress 
could not reasonably have anticipated when it enacted the prohibition. 
That argument was implausible, however, given Congress’s evident 
awareness that Guantanamo detainees could be traded for foreign 
prisoners. Nor could the Administration plausibly claim any avoidance 
rationale or other constitutional basis for construing such limitations 
narrowly: given the extent of congressional authority over military 
resources, even quite specific constraints entail no valid infringement 
of executive authority that may justify avoidance.275 At any rate, even 
if Obama’s Guantanamo transfer was valid, this isolated example 
should not suggest any broad executive authority to defy appropriations 
limits on use of military resources. 
Congress’s authority to impose negative restraints on military 
resources advances the central normative purpose for congressional 
control over appropriations: it gives Congress, the branch with the most 
 
but provide that such appropriation shall not be available unless the marine corps be 
employed in some designated way[.]; 
Brevets’ Pay and Rations, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 223, 232 (1829) (characterizing the “right to designate 
posts or stations among which the army should be distributed[ ] as a necessary incident to” the 
president’s Commander-in-Chief power, but acknowledging that Congress could “supersede[ ]” this 
default authority by “assum[ing] the power”). 
 272. Obama Statement on Signing 2015 NDAA, supra note 61. 
 273. For critical discussion of this incident, see GAO Letter on Department of Defense 
Compliance, supra note 62. 
 274. For an account of the arguments, see Pitt, supra note 100, at 2875–77. 
 275. For thoughtful exploration of when implausible statutory arguments may be preferable 
in rule of law terms to preclusive constitutional arguments, see Peter M. Shane, The Presidential 
Statutory Stretch and the Rule of Law, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1231, 1249 (2016). 
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distributed representation of the nation at large, ultimate say over the 
purposes to which the nation’s blood and treasure are put. What is 
more, by requiring ongoing agreement between the president and 
Congress to sustain military action—or military deployments likely to 
lead to military action—such congressional control over resources 
ensures that broader deliberation and societal consensus support any 
military action that could put the nation’s safety or position in the world 
at risk. Isolated violations of this principle, such as through Ford’s 
action in Vietnam or Obama’s Guantanamo transfer, should obscure 
neither its centrality to separation of powers nor its deep entrenchment 
in the broader pattern of historic practice. 
b. Affirmative Requirements 
Affirmative funding requirements—mandated expenditures, 
deployments, or military actions—present more difficult questions. 
With respect to mere expenditures (for specified troop levels or 
weapons systems, for example), Article II again provides no sound 
justification for defying congressional mandates. Such spending 
requirements are laws, like any other appropriations measure, that the 
president must faithfully execute. Even if the Commander in Chief 
Clause requires presidential superintendence over weapons’ or troops’ 
use once in place, it provides no authority to adjust the level of resources 
provided to the military at the outset; that authority instead lies at the 
core of Congress’s resource-allocation authority under the 
Appropriations Clause. 
Historically, it is true, presidents did claim limited authority to 
“impound” funds for weapons or troops they later judged 
unnecessary.276 President Jefferson, for example, returned 
appropriated funds to the Treasury when he determined that naval 
vessels Congress had authorized were no longer needed. When 
President Nixon employed this authority aggressively to cut funding for 
domestic programs, however, Congress responded by passing the 
Impoundment Control Act.277 That law now limits executive authority 
to cancel either military or domestic spending mandated by Congress.278 
Nixon’s own Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, 
future Chief Justice William Rehnquist, correctly rejected arguments 
that Article II gave the president inherent wide-ranging impoundment 
 
 276. For discussion of historic impoundment, see Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1062–
63, 1063 nn.495–97. 
 277. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 
297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 621–91 (1974)). 
 278. 2 U.S.C. §§ 683, 684, 687 (2012). 
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authority.279 Around the same time, the Supreme Court held that 
mandated expenditures could bind executive officials.280 Historic 
examples of impoundment should thus be understood to reflect a 
repudiated historical gloss on appropriations statutes, not a preclusive 
executive prerogative with enduring effect.281 
This same logic should equally support congressional authority 
to mandate particular force dispositions through time-barred 
appropriations mandates, even if it could not otherwise impose such 
requirements as a matter of ordinary legislation. Such mandates, too, 
would be laws the president must faithfully execute, and in general they 
would operate at the level of overall strategy (a natural legislative 
function) rather than battlefield tactics (the natural executive function 
in military affairs). As we have seen, congressional control over 
resources generally enables legislative allocation of limited resources to 
particular priorities: by controlling appropriations levels Congress 
assures that scarce public resources are deployed according to a 
hierarchy of goals approved on an ongoing basis by the people’s 
representatives. From this point of view, mandated troop deployment is 
simply a particularly strong assertion of priorities, one the president 
may properly be required to accept as a condition of obtaining military 
 
 279. See Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally 
Impacted Schools, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 303, 310 (1969) (calling it “extremely difficult to formulate 
a constitutional theory to justify a refusal by the President to comply with a congressional directive 
to spend”). Rehnquist did indicate that the “situation would be . . . very different” if “a 
congressional directive to spend were to interfere with the President’s authority in an area 
confided by the Constitution to his substantive direction and control, such as his authority as 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and his authority over foreign affairs . . . .” Id. at 310–
11. Rehnquist did not elaborate in the opinion on what sorts of spending mandates would create 
such interference. In later testimony, Rehnquist acknowledged that Congress could prohibit 
basing troops in a particular hemisphere but argued that narrow tactical decisions, such as 
whether to attack a certain hill or (rather oddly) whether all soldiers in a regiment should wear 
“blue uniforms” must remain matters of presidential discretion. See Executive Impoundment of 
Appropriated Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 243–53 (1971). For discussion of Rehnquist’s testimony, see Barron & 
Lederman, supra note 55, at 1067–70. 
 280. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975). 
 281. Roy Brownell II has argued that practice supports a continuing constitutional authority 
of military impoundment, but he identifies only a handful of ambiguous examples (from the Carter 
and George H.W. Bush Administrations) of significant military impoundments in arguable 
violation of the Impoundment Control Act’s terms. See Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional 
Status of the President’s Impoundment of National Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 
53–55 (2001); see also BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 83–85 (discussing one example). 
Other surveys have found substantial compliance with the statute. See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note 
22, at 65; Alan L. Feld, The Shrunken Power of the Purse, 89 B.U. L. REV. 487, 495 (2009); Charles 
Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President Step Up a War?, 71 LA. L. REV. 391, 445–46 (2011); Wm. 
Bradford Middlekauff, Note, Twisting the President’s Arm: The Impoundment Control Act as a Tool 
for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure, 100 YALE L.J. 209, 218–19, 218 nn.52–
53 (1990). 
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resources for other potential purposes.282 As a matter of practice, 
furthermore, although mandated overseas deployment would appear 
novel,283 past presidents’ apparent acceptance of negative deployment 
constraints supports Congress’s authority to direct general disposition 
of forces.284 What is more, despite occasional constitutional objections, 
past presidents appear to have acquiesced in domestic basing 
requirements.285 
As a normative matter, to be sure, Congress here would not be 
acting as a check but rather as a spur to action. Even so, the usual 
impediments to legislative action would still ensure that adequate 
deliberation and consensus underlies the policy. The president, after 
all, would retain his usual veto over misguided legislation, and a 
presidential obligation to abide by the condition should guarantee 
appropriate seriousness on the part of legislators debating it. To be 
concrete, then, were the current Congress to mandate consensual 
deployment of troops in specified NATO countries or other allied 
nations, whether to reinforce treaty commitments or to serve as 
tripwires assuring a robust U.S. response to any invasion, the president 
would hold no sound constitutional justification for disregarding the 
funding condition and failing to locate troops as Congress directed.286 
Mandating actual use of military force, in contrast, would likely 
go too far. Here, the problem is not so much that the legislation would 
violate limits on congressional appropriations power, but rather that 
the president’s own resource-independent power of military command 
likely entails some irreducible authority over whether to launch 
particular tactical strikes. Even this limit, however, is likely more 
apparent than real, as Congress could readily force a reluctant 
president’s hand through other actions within its unambiguous powers. 
Congress, for example, could declare war, or enact legislation otherwise 
 
 282. See supra Section I.A. 
 283. But cf. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, 
§ 8151(b)(2)(B)(ii), 107 Stat. 1418, 1476–77 (1993) (directing that U.S. forces “should remain 
deployed in or around Somalia until such time as all American service personnel missing in action 
in Somalia are accounted for, and all American service personnel held prisoner in Somalia are 
released”). 
 284. See supra Section IV.C.1. 
 285. See, e.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 465 (1994) (discussing statutory constraints on 
domestic base closures); Statement by the President upon Signing the Military Construction 
Authorization Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1008, 1008 (Sept. 12, 1966) (signing bill containing waiting 
period for base closures while observing that “my responsibilities as President and Commander in 
Chief will require me to seek prompt revision of the restriction if future circumstances prove it to 
be inimical to the national interest”); CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 54, at 341 (describing 
President Johnson’s compliance with mandates to keep certain military facilities open).  
 286. Deployment without the host country’s consent could present questions of international 
law that might override Congress’s mandate. 
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placing the nation on a war footing. Such action might well place the 
president in a position where failing to act militarily would 
irresponsibly endanger the nation’s interests.287 The very possibility 
that Congress could thus effectively force the nation into war reinforces 
the inference that, in general, mandating deployments as conditions on 
time-limited appropriations may properly fall within Congress’s 
authority.288 
In the post-War period, if not before, Congress has largely 
preferred to leave the choice of military objectives to the executive 
branch, while presidents have been happy to take this responsibility on 
themselves. Yet this status quo is not constitutionally required; it 
instead reflects longstanding congressional acquiescence to presidential 
initiatives and a resulting de facto delegation of presidential discretion. 
As the guardian of public resources, with ultimate power over the purse, 
Congress holds final responsibility for choosing to enable presidential 
adventurism rather than restricting it. Should Congress come to fear or 
distrust how presidents will use the power it has conferred, it retains 
power to claw back this discretion by imposing specific limits and 
conditions on military resources it places at presidential disposal. 
D. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement is another area of near-plenary congressional 
control through appropriations limits. Here, too, the president’s 
personal resources will get him nowhere. Even were he to go door to 
door himself making arrests or show up in court to personally conduct 
a prosecution, the president could hardly take the smallest bite out of 
crime. The president’s authority over law enforcement is thus 
profoundly resource-dependent. Just as with war powers, moreover, 
compelling textual, structural, historical, and normative considerations 
preclude resort to private resources for this purpose, and the president’s 
dependence on public resources again properly entails subservience to 
any limits or conditions placed on those resources. At least outside of 
an extreme exigency unlikely to arise under modern conditions, 
presidents hold no constitutional authority to direct enforcement of 
federal laws in defiance of specific legislative constraints on public 
resources available for that purpose. 
 
 287. Indeed, the president might well hold a constitutional obligation to effectively prosecute 
a congressionally declared war. PRAKASH, supra note 197, at 160–61. 
 288. See also Tiefer, supra note 281, at 416–17 (arguing that Congress may mandate general 
military programs, but not specific military incursions, through appropriations riders). 
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1. The Structural Case for Appropriations Control 
Once again, the constitutional structure, by its plain terms, 
dictates this conclusion. To be sure, the Constitution obligates the 
president to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”289 But 
just as the Commander in Chief Clause comes into play only if Congress 
provides some military to command, the Take Care Clause’s indirect 
formulation—requiring the president to ensure faithful execution, not 
to execute the law himself—presumes presidential dependence on 
enforcement resources otherwise made available by Congress. 
What is more, appropriations limits are themselves laws the 
president must execute. As such, funding constraints on law 
enforcement must bind the president, even if those constraints limit 
enforcement of underlying substantive prohibitions. After all, even 
apart from its control over appropriations, Congress holds authority to 
create offices, vest them with particular authorities and functions, and 
enact laws necessary and proper to carrying out those offices’ functions. 
Congress may thus render particular federal laws subject to exclusive 
official enforcement, or indeed exclusive enforcement by particular 
officers, and it has done so in some instances since the beginning of the 
Republic.290 In fact, on some accounts, Congress has no choice about the 
matter, at least with respect to criminal prosecutions, because due 
process requires public prosecution.291 Just as establishing an office 
subject to Senate confirmation carries the inevitable consequence that 
future Senates will have some control over appointments, limiting 
enforcement of particular laws to public officials carries the inevitable 
consequence that Congress will have continuing control, through future 
appropriations levels, over how those laws are enforced. 
Apart from text, structure, and history, normative 
considerations reinforce these conclusions. Law enforcement is the 
governmental power to arrest, imprison, deport, and execute 
individuals based on asserted legal violations. Given this power’s grave 
implications, its exercise should be subject to robust ongoing control by 
the people’s representatives (as well as judicial due process 
constraints), and not just quadrennial electoral accountability through 
presidential elections. Indeed, the liberty-protective function of 
 
 289. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 290. For discussion of historical enforcement arrangements, see Price, supra note 219, at 718–
21, 725–27, 743–45. 
 291. See, e.g., Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 278 (2010) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Our entire criminal justice system is premised on the 
notion that a criminal prosecution pits the government against the governed, not one private 
citizen against another.”). 
Price_Galley(Do Not Delete) 3/7/2018  9:38 AM 
2018] FUNDING RESTRICTIONS 439 
separation powers is at its apex in this context: requiring distinct 
legislative, executive, and judicial actions (or at least judicial review) 
before any punishment may be imposed ensures that multiple veto 
gates stand between the individual and punitive loss of freedom.292 The 
president’s veto, however, weakens Congress’s ability to exercise its 
step in the process through substantive legislation: given sharp 
partisan divides in Congress, presidents bent on enforcement may 
generally count on copartisans in Congress to block any override of their 
vetoes. This dynamic is all the more troubling today, moreover, due to 
long-standing accretion of sporadically enforced laws, such as our 
current harsh and retributive immigration code, that likely fail to 
conform to current majority preferences. Such laws may persist over 
time in part because the very absence of enforcement interrupts 
political pressure on Congress to repeal them.293 By the same token, 
however, such laws may enable presidents to pursue enforcement 
measures that likely do not enjoy support in either Congress or the 
public at large.294 
The appropriations process affords a vital means of interrupting 
these troubling dynamics. By rendering the president dependent on 
funding choices that Congress makes year after year, one year at a time, 
congressional control over appropriations ensures that the president’s 
enforcement choices are subject to some ongoing constraint. Much as 
the president could veto new substantive legislation of which he 
disapproves, Congress may effectively veto enforcement efforts of which 
it disapproves by refusing to appropriate any funds to support them. 
Appropriations control over enforcement thus maintains a productive 
tension between the two political branches over on-the-ground 
application of federal laws. 
In short, while some have argued that riders barring 
enforcement of particular laws “prevent[ ] the President from fulfilling 
his or her constitutionally mandated duty to take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed,”295 this view is wrong both formally and 
 
 292. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 1014 (2006) (observing that separation of powers “requires not only that the executive and 
legislative branches agree to criminalize conduct but also includes the judiciary as a key check on 
the political branches”). 
 293. For my own discussion of these dynamics, see Price, supra note 219, at 745–48. 
 294. Bill Stuntz famously characterized these political dynamics in criminal law as 
“pathological.” William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505 (2001). 
 295. LeBoeuf, supra note 99, at 475. 
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functionally.296 It overlooks, first of all, that appropriations limits are 
themselves part of the law that presidents must execute. In functional 
terms, furthermore, this view would remove the most important 
ongoing constraint on executive authority to unilaterally determine 
existing federal law’s on-the-ground impact. As David Barron and Todd 
Rakoff have observed, “[t]he modern world is thick with federal 
statutes,”297 and in practice accreted prohibitions and delegations may 
add up to immense executive authority over how the law applies in 
practice.298 In such an environment, if not also in others we might 
imagine, the ultimate purposes of separation of powers—protecting 
liberty and ensuring responsive government—are best served by 
maintaining a congressional check on executive policy through 
legislative control over law enforcement resources. 
2. Lessons from History 
In fact, even apart from modern conditions, the deep structure 
of separation-of-powers practice powerfully confirms this 
understanding. Even were it not textually compelled, congressional 
control over law enforcement resources is now every bit as entrenched 
in our lived constitutional structure as is the bedrock presumption of 
congressional funding discretion discussed earlier.299 
At some points in the past, it is true, presidents asserted a 
preclusive authority to enforce laws without regard to appropriations 
constraints. In 1851, for example, President Millard Fillmore asserted 
that statutory limits on use of the militia “probably” could not prevent 
its use to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act, because the president’s “duty 
to see the laws faithfully executed is general and positive.”300 Likewise, 
in 1879, as part of the same battle with Congress addressed earlier,301 
President Rutherford Hayes vetoed legislation that would have left 
certain disputed election laws in place while rendering them a “dead 
letter” during the fiscal year by preventing any expenditure for their 
 
 296. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 34, at 472–73 (characterizing this theory as “based on the 
remarkable and unfounded proposition that article II provides the Executive plenary power to 
shape the implementation of substantive legislative authorizations”). 
 297. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 294 
(2013). 
 298. See Moe & Howell, supra note 27, at 143 (“[I]t is crucial to recognize that the president is 
greatly empowered by the sheer proliferation of statutes over time.”). 
 299. See supra Part II. 
 300. President Millard Fillmore, Message to the Senate (Feb. 19, 1851), in 6 COMPILATION 
MPP, supra note 55, at 2637, 2641. Fillmore’s statement appeared in the context of a request to 
relax statutory restrictions on the militia. Congress did not oblige. See Barron & Lederman, supra 
note 55, at 990–91 (discussing congressional response). 
 301. See supra Part II. 
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enforcement.302 Approving this bill, Hayes asserted, would have 
required him to “participate[ ] in the curtailment of his means of seeing 
that the law is faithfully executed, while the obligation of the law and 
of his constitutional duty remain[ed] unimpaired.”303 In Hayes’s view, 
“[t]here are two lawful ways to overturn legislative enactments. One is 
their repeal; the other is the decision of a competent tribunal against 
their validity.”304 Hayes felt compelled to veto the bill at issue because 
its “effect . . . is to deprive the executive department of the means to 
execute laws which are not repealed, which have not been declared 
invalid, and which it is therefore the duty of the executive and of every 
other department of Government to obey and to enforce.”305 
These assertions may well reflect a stronger notion of executive 
enforcement obligation than is commonplace today. As Hayes’s 
statement reflects, the present-day assumption of heavily discretionary 
enforcement, calibrated in accordance with available resources, may be 
best understood as a function of legislative developments over time, and 
not as a function of underlying separation-of-powers imperatives.306 
Indeed, I have argued that even today presidents retain an important 
structural obligation to enforce federal laws even when they disagree 
with the policy those laws reflect.307 Yet enforcement obligation does 
not imply resource-independence. Because appropriations limits are 
themselves laws the president must execute, funding constraints 
necessarily limit the scale, intensity, and focus of law enforcement 
efforts. Even in the nineteenth century, key authorities recognized this 
principle. As an 1843 Attorney General opinion observed, 
notwithstanding the president’s constitutional obligation to ensure 
faithful execution of the laws, “Congress may . . . indirectly limit the 
exercise of this power by refusing appropriations to sustain it, and thus 
paralyze a function which it is not competent to destroy.”308 
 
 302. President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (June 23, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, 
supra note 55, at 4488, 4495. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 4496. 
 305. Id. 
 306. For my elaboration of this historical argument, see Price, supra note 219, at 716–48. 
 307. Id. at 748–68. 
 308. Executive Power of Appointment, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 248, 248 (1843). In this opinion, the 
Attorney General concluded that the president could appoint agents or commissioners to 
investigate legal violations but could not pay them without an appropriation. Id. at 248–49; see 
also, e.g., Power of the President in Executing the Laws, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 519 (1860) (“If . . . 
an act of Congress declares that a certain thing shall be done by a particular officer, it cannot be 
done by a different officer. The agency which the law furnishes for its own execution must be used 
to the exclusion of all others.”); Transfer of Specific Appropriations of House of Representatives to 
Contingent Fund, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 442, 443 (1839) (“[N]o assumption of power could be more 
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As further evidence of this view, it is striking that President 
Hayes, despite asserting independent enforcement responsibility, 
ultimately accepted Congress’s general authority to calibrate 
enforcement capacity through funding levels. When Congress failed to 
appropriate funds following his veto, Hayes complained that “the means 
at the disposal of the executive department for executing the laws 
through the regular ministerial officers will after to-day be left 
inadequate.”309 Likewise, although Hayes observed that “[t]he 
suspension of these necessary functions in the orderly administration 
of the first duties of government is inconsistent with the public 
interests, and at any moment may prove inconsistent with public 
safety,” he nonetheless acknowledged the “necessity of making 
immediate appropriations” to remedy these dangers.310 In short, despite 
repeatedly vetoing legislation that he felt violated his own 
constitutional enforcement obligations, Hayes accepted that a shortfall 
in appropriations could impair actual discharge of that obligation.311 
 
dangerous than that of expending more money upon an object than Congress had appropriated for 
it . . . .”). 
 309. President Rutherford B. Hayes, Special Message (June 30, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION 
MPP, supra note 55, at 4474, 4475. 
 310. Id. Reflecting the same assumptions, Hayes had earlier called on Congress “to make 
adequate appropriations to enable the executive department to enforce the laws.” President 
Rutherford B. Hayes, Second Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1878), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 
55, at 4444, 4446. In the same message, calling attention to timber theft on public lands, he urged 
that “[t]he Department of Interior should . . . be enabled by sufficient appropriations to enforce the 
laws in that respect.” Id. at 4456. In an earlier appropriations battle with Congress, President 
Ulysses Grant similarly recognized that a lapse in appropriations would cause federal 
departments to “suspend” their functions. President Ulysses Grant, Special Message (June 17, 
1876), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4322–23. 
 When Congress adjourned in March 1877 without appropriating army funds for the fiscal year 
beginning after June 30, Attorney General Charles Devens understood governing statutes to 
permit continued contracting for necessary supplies. He nevertheless deemed it impermissible to 
expend treasury funds to pay such contractual obligations, and he further advised against 
obtaining “voluntary contributions” to make up the shortfall. “The transaction,” he observed, 
“would be subject to criticism as an attempt to do indirectly that which Congress should have 
provided for by positive appropriation. . . . In the absence of such appropriations, I do not think 
that funds should be sought elsewhere.” Support of the Army, 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 209, 211 (1877). 
 311. See HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND 
POLITICS IN THE POST–CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865–1901, at 158 (2001) (characterizing congressional 
Democrats’ actions in 1879 as “forcing [Hayes] either to veto appropriations bills or bow to their 
will”). Hayes did note later that, despite a lapse in appropriations for federal marshals, some had 
“continued the performance of their duties without compensation from the Government, taking 
upon themselves the necessary incidental outlays, as well as rendering their own services.” 
President Rutherford B. Hayes, Third Annual Message (Dec. 1, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, 
supra note 55, at 4509, 4525. Hayes indicated, however, that in some cases “the proper execution 
of the process of the United States failed by reason of the absence of the requisite appropriation.” 
Id. Hayes also emphasized that the Attorney General had advised the marshals that “they would 
necessarily have to rely for their compensation upon the prospect of future legislation by 
Congress,” and he urged Congress to make “sufficient” appropriations for election-related 
enforcement activities by the marshals in the coming year. Id. at 4525–26. 
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Indeed, resource shortfalls addled civil rights enforcement throughout 
Reconstruction. As Brooks Simpson observes, “[t]he Justice 
Department did not possess sufficient personnel or budgetary resources 
to prosecute the law effectively, and many military officers cared little 
to serve as federal police.”312 
In any event, as Nicholas Parrillo has recently documented, the 
advent of salaried compensation in the late nineteenth century 
accelerated development of heavily discretionary forms of official 
enforcement. Assertions of preclusive executive enforcement authority 
have surfaced occasionally since then. Nevertheless, with one 
ambiguous exception,313 I am aware of no significant example in which 
any president defied an enforcement funding restriction on this 
theory.314 Today, Congress routinely charges executive agencies with 
 
 312. SIMPSON, supra note 115, at 182. Simpson concludes that Hayes’s successful defense of 
executive prerogatives through his vetoes was ultimately pyrrhic for this reason. He writes, “It 
was unclear how Hayes’s stand on the riders issue had done anything to halt the erosion of black 
rights or of southern Republicanism, but at least he had resisted efforts to wipe off the books laws 
intended to protect black rights.” Id. at 226. For further background on this interbranch conflict 
and a more favorable assessment of Hayes, see HOOGENBOOM, supra note 115, at 392–413, 537–
38. 
 313. Based on the dubious assumption that “[d]ecisions on deployment and redeployment of 
law enforcement officers in the execution of the laws are a part of the executive power vested in 
the President by Article II of the Constitution,” President George W. Bush objected in two signing 
statements to appropriations provisions requiring relocation of the “tactical [border enforcement] 
checkpoints” in the Tucson area “at least once every seven days.” Statement on Signing the 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1563, 1563 (Oct. 18, 
2005); Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, 3 
PUB. PAPERS 2575, 2575–76 (Oct. 18, 2004). GAO later found that the Administration failed to 
fully comply with these provisions, though border officials did often “shut down [immovable 
checkpoints] for a ‘short period in an endeavor to satisfy the [statutory] provision.’ ” U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, B-308603, Presidential Signing Statements Accompanying Fiscal Year 2006 
Appropriations Acts 35 (June 18, 2007). This instance of defiance (if it can even be characterized 
as such) seems not only doubtful on the merits but also irrelevant to the broader question here of 
congressional authority over substantive law enforcement. The rider to which Bush objected in 
this example did not involve any restriction on enforcement of substantive prohibitions, but 
instead a picayune and apparently impracticable micromanagement of enforcement tactics. 
 314. Presidents and executive branch lawyers have periodically resurrected the 
Hayes/Fillmore view, but in examples I have identified they did not act on their assertions. 
President Woodrow Wilson, for example, objected in 1913 to an appropriations rider that barred 
use of a particular Justice Department fund to prosecute labor unions, workers, or farmers, yet 
Wilson noted that the proviso limited only the use of this particular fund and not other available 
resources. President Woodrow Wilson, Statement on Signing the Sundry Civil Bill (June 23, 1913), 
in 27 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 56, at 558. Although the Justice Department 
did pursue several such cases in 1914, Christopher May found “no evidence that the Wilson 
administration spent any of the restricted funds for this purpose.” MAY, supra note 58, at 88. 
 In his 1957 opinion regarding enforcement of desegregation decrees in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
Attorney General Herbert Brownell observed in passing, without support or analysis, that “there 
are . . . grave doubts as to the authority of the Congress to limit the constitutional powers of the 
President to enforce the laws and preserve the peace under circumstances which he deems 
appropriate.” President’s Power to Use Federal Troops to Suppress Resistance to Enforcement of 
Federal Court Orders—Little Rock, Arkansas, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 313, 331 (1957). Brownell 
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implementing broad mandates with limited budgets, making extensive 
enforcement discretion a practical necessity. Key Supreme Court 
decisions have thus linked enforcement discretion to resource 
allocation, without even questioning whether Congress holds authority 
to moderate enforcement by limiting resources.315 In effect, an 
expectation of discretion is today baked into the substantive structure 
of the laws; Congress legislates against a background expectation of 
discretion calibrated by resource constraints. However undesirable 
 
emphasized that this “consideration was not reached because of the express congressional 
authority for the action taken” by the federal government in Little Rock. Id. 
 President Lyndon Johnson objected (though apparently on policy rather than constitutional 
grounds) to an appropriations provision barring enforcement of certain export controls, yet his 
administration nevertheless complied with the provision. See Statement by the President 
Expressing Disapproval of Appropriations Act Provision Relating to Export Control of Hides, 
Skins, and Leather, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1351, 1351 (Nov. 8, 1966); CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 54, at 
340–41. 
 President Carter complained in a 1977 signing statement that an appropriations rider barring 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare from seeking certain busing remedies for civil 
rights violations “may raise new and vexing constitutional questions.” Labor-HEW Continuing 
Appropriations Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2087, 2088 (Dec. 9, 1977). Carter’s statement, however, did not 
specify whether those questions related to faithful execution or equal protection (or something 
else), id., and in any event his administration not only abided by the restriction but also 
successfully defended it in court. See Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221, 1227–29, 1228 n.42 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980); MAY, supra note 58, at 91. 
 In a 1989 opinion, OLC relied in part on the president’s Take Care Clause duty to justify 
interpreting certain statutory restrictions on military law enforcement as applicable only in 
domestic contexts. The Office explained: 
On foreign soil or the high seas—unlike in the domestic situation—military personnel 
may constitute the only means at the executive branch’s command to execute the laws. 
Giving extraterritorial effect to the Posse Comitatus Act thus could, in many 
circumstances, deprive the executive branch of any effective means to fulfill this 
constitutional duty. 
Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act, 13 Op. O.L.C. 321, 334 (1989). The Office, 
however, ultimately concluded only that any such statutory argument would raise “serious 
questions of constitutionality,” and it based its interpretation primarily on other considerations 
and acknowledged that “valid statutory constraints” could limit means available for law 
enforcement. Id. at 332–34. 
 Several years earlier, President Reagan objected in a signing statement to an appropriations 
provision that, by denying funds to pursue antitrust enforcement against municipalities, 
“attempted to prevent the Federal Trade Commission from carrying out the constitutional duty of 
executing the substantive antitrust laws.” Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, 
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1985, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1210, 1210–11 (Aug. 30, 1984). Yet during the fiscal year covered by this rider, the Commission 
dropped two such complaints it had earlier filed (albeit for the stated reason that the defendant 
municipalities had resolved the issue) and it reported pursuing no other complaints within the 
meaning of the rider. 1985 FTC ANN. REP. 71 (indicating that two complaints filed against 
municipal defendants during fiscal year 1984 were withdrawn in fiscal year 1985 after both 
defendants enacted legal changes that resolved the Commission’s concerns). 
 315. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding that “an agency decision 
not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors,” including not only 
“whether a violation has occurred” but also “whether agency resources are best spent on this 
violation or another”). 
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such legal structures may be as a normative matter—and I have 
elsewhere criticized them316—this background understanding, 
entrenched in long-standing practice, undercuts any claimed executive 
duty to faithfully execute the laws beyond congressional appropriations 
for doing so. 
A president might be on stronger ground if enforcement were 
necessary to defend basic operations of the government against 
threatened calamity. As we have seen, both Washington and Lincoln 
undertook law enforcement operations to address such perceived 
exigencies without any specific appropriation to support doing so. Much 
as with war powers, however, Congress’s subsequent establishment of 
a permanent enforcement bureaucracy weakens any such claim of 
inherent presidential authority to act outside of it today, let alone to 
defy specific appropriations restrictions on particular activities. 
Washington and Lincoln faced perceived law enforcement exigencies 
without available means to confront them. As we have seen, however, 
even they claimed no authority to command resources independently of 
Congress; on the contrary, they acknowledged the illegality of their 
action by seeking congressional forgiveness and ratification. Today, the 
Anti-Deficiency Act generally criminalizes anticipatory spending while 
expressly allowing obligation of funds to protect lives and property.317 
This statutory exemption, combined with the scale of the standing 
enforcement bureaucracy, makes it highly unlikely that a president 
could claim a genuine exigency of the sort that prompted Washington 
and Lincoln to muster increased enforcement resources on their own 
initiative. 
3. Governing Principles and Contemporary Applications 
a. Negative Restraints 
How far, then, could Congress go in dictating executive 
enforcement priorities? Based on the principles elaborated so far, 
almost any negative constraint on enforcement resources should bind 
executive officials. By cutting off funding for particular enforcement 
options—whether with respect to entire statutes or regulations or with 
respect to more narrowly defined categories of offenders—Congress 
exercises the authority guaranteed by the Appropriations Clause to 
 
 316. Price, supra note 219, at 746. 
 317. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). The Justice Department has construed this exception broadly to 
include such law enforcement activities as legal investigations by the FBI and safety inspections 
by administrative agencies. See, e.g., Maintaining Essential Services in the District of Columbia 
in the Event Appropriations Cease, 12 Op. O.L.C. 290, 292–93 (1988). 
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impose ongoing constraints on application of existing substantive laws 
to particular violators. Importantly, such an appropriations cutoff does 
not change the underlying substantive law itself, so violators may 
generally remain subject to potential future enforcement.318 Even so, 
congressional authority to deny funds in this fashion provides a crucial 
check on executive activities, one that is all the more important given 
the power of initiative that presidents have acquired through the 
ongoing accretion of delegated authorities and substantive statutory 
prohibitions. 
Indeed, Congress’s control over enforcement resources might 
even entail power to restrict executive actions that it could not control 
through general legislation. Evan Zoldan, for instance, has argued that 
congressional legislation must carry some degree of generality.319 
Congress, on this view, might hold legislative authority only to enact 
general prospective prohibitions, which the executive branch then 
enforces against particular violators based on its own independent 
judgment of who is guilty or innocent. To the extent that is true, 
Congress might well lack power to adopt general prohibitions while 
exempting particular named or specified individuals. On the account 
developed here, however, Congress nevertheless retains authority to 
cut off annual appropriations to support particular prosecutions or 
enforcement actions based on its own time-bound judgment that no 
such enforcement is warranted. Congress thus could deny funds, say, to 
investigate or prosecute a former presidential candidate for specific 
suspected violations, or to pursue other narrow categories of offenders 
if it so chose. If the appropriations power is an independent check on 
executive enforcement capacity, above and beyond the limits imposed 
by congressional authority to define offenses in the first place, then this 
check might properly extend even to such fine-grained judgments about 
what ongoing enforcement actions should be barred. 
b. Affirmative Requirements 
As with war powers, affirmative funding conditions—mandated 
enforcement priorities or prosecutions—present more difficult 
questions. I have argued elsewhere that while Congress generally may 
restrict prosecutorial discretion, the executive branch holds an 
irreducible constitutional authority to decline prosecution in particular 
cases when the executive branch concludes that enforcement is 
 
 318. Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 1014 (2017). 
 319. Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 689–90 (2014). 
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factually unjustified.320 To the extent that understanding of Article II 
is correct, the appropriations power provides no way around it. On the 
contrary, just as, in Lovett, imposing punishment through legislation 
was an invalid bill of attainder though accomplished through an 
appropriations rider,321 so too here a case-specific prosecution mandate 
should violate separation of powers even if imposed as a condition on 
executive funding. Such a mandate would effectively collapse the 
executive function into the legislative, removing a key liberty-protective 
constraint on government action. It would be distinguishable, 
moreover, from a narrowly targeted funding denial precisely because it 
eliminates a constitutionally required constraint on prosecution, rather 
than simply restraining a previously conferred executive enforcement 
power. 
More general enforcement mandates, in contrast, should bind 
executive officials. When an appropriations statute mandates that 
particular classes of violations be prioritized (as indeed statutes have 
done on occasion), or that a particular sum be expended investigating 
and prosecuting a particular type of violation, Congress has simply 
exercised its authority under the Appropriations Clause to determine 
general resource-allocation priorities and establish appropriate levels 
of public support for different government activities. Congress in fact 
routinely performs this function by setting overall budget levels for 
different agencies with responsibility for enforcing different statutes: it 
may fund, for example, the Food and Drug Administration more 
lavishly than the Environmental Protection Agency, or the Labor 
Department’s Wage and Hour Division more generously than its Mine 
Safety and Health Administration. 
To be sure, insofar as it mandates enforcement activity instead 
of curtailing it, such legislation does not directly advance the liberty-
protective purposes of maintaining a legislative check on executive 
enforcement choices. Yet it may in fact serve those purposes indirectly: 
by channeling resources toward one area of enforcement, Congress may 
effectively limit enforcement in others. In any event, such legislative 
authority is equally essential to maintaining congressional control over 
general government spending levels. Even if one doubted that Congress 
could establish such general priorities through ordinary legislation, the 
Constitution should give Congress authority to do so through time-
barred appropriations limits on the executive branch. 
 
 320. Price, supra note 219, at 711–12. 
 321. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1950). 
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c. Recent Controversies 
This framework permits straightforward resolution of several 
recent disputes. To begin with, the recent marijuana appropriations 
riders easily fall within congressional authority. Because the executive 
branch holds no freestanding inherent authority to enforce any 
particular federal statute, Congress holds clear authority to prevent 
enforcement of a given law, either across the board or in particular 
circumstances, by cutting off resources to enable such enforcement. 
President Trump’s signing statement suggesting otherwise was 
mistaken.322 By the same token, were President Trump to undertake 
the immigration dragnet he has threatened, Congress would hold clear 
authority to halt such action or impose different priorities through 
appropriations limits. Less dramatically but no less consequentially, 
Congress’s periodic denial of resources to enforce disfavored 
administrative regulations are also valid. Insofar as they block 
implementation of a particular understanding of the law or set of 
regulatory obligations, such riders fall squarely within Congress’s 
authority to control executive enforcement by limiting executive 
resources. 
Again, none of these funding cutoffs (whether for marijuana, 
immigration, or regulatory action) change the underlying substantive 
law itself. As a general matter, the executive branch may remain free 
to resume enforcement, even with respect to past conduct, when 
funding is restored.323 Even so, Congress’s authority to deny funds in 
this fashion provides a crucial check on executive activities, a check 
that, once again, is all the more important today given the power of 
initiative that presidents have acquired through the ongoing accretion 
of delegated authorities and substantive statutory prohibitions.324 
Funding restrictions preventing transfer of Guantanamo 
prisoners during the Obama years presented only slightly more difficult 
questions. In asserting in signing statements that “[u]nder certain 
circumstances” a provision barring detainee transfer to the United 
States “would violate constitutional separation of powers principles,” 
President Obama stated:  
The executive branch must have the flexibility, with regard to those detainees who 
remain, to determine when and where to prosecute them, based on the facts and 
 
 322. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3. 
 323. For my own further discussion of this question and an argument that regulated parties 
should hold a reliance defense against future enforcement in some circumstances, see Price, supra 
note 318, at 1010–15. 
 324. See supra Section I.A. 
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circumstances of each case and our national security interests, and when and where to 
transfer them consistent with our national security and our humane treatment policy.325 
While it might refer only to policy considerations, this statement 
could suggest that presidents hold an inherent, preclusive authority to 
bring criminals to justice in federal court. To the extent that is what 
President Obama meant, he was wrong. Congress’s broad authority 
over enforcement resources entails power to deny funding for particular 
enforcement efforts or prosecutions. In this case, of course, doing so had 
the perverse effect of keeping suspects in military detention. As 
discussed earlier, moreover, separate (and equally valid) funding 
constraints prevented transfer of those prisoners out of military 
custody.326 But the peculiar posture of the Guantanamo example should 
not obscure the essential character of the authority Congress exercised. 
In general, congressional control over enforcement resources is liberty-
protective. It provides a check on overzealous law enforcement. In 
extremis, it could prevent an unhinged president’s henchmen from 
taking unwarranted action. Asserting presidential authority to override 
such limits based on a presumed inherent executive authority to enforce 
the laws would be truly dangerous. President Obama’s Attorney 
General was correct to repudiate this view.327 
E. Diplomacy 
Funding restrictions on the president’s diplomatic powers 
present the most challenging questions. The trouble stems partly from 
uncertainty about the proper content of the president’s constitutional 
foreign affairs powers. Although presidents from the beginning have 
claimed particular responsibility for foreign affairs,328 the 
Constitution’s text scatters different elements of foreign relations 
power in different places while leaving two of the most important—
recognition of foreign sovereigns and control of diplomatic 
communication—without any unambiguous textual home.329 Edward 
 
 325. Obama Statement on Signing 2015 NDAA, supra note 61. 
 326. See supra Section IV.C.2.a. 
 327. Julian Hattem, Lynch: No Gitmo Transfers to US Without Change in Law, HILL (Mar. 9, 
2016, 10:31 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/272351-attorney-general-lynch-no-
gitmo-transfers-to-us-without-change-in [https://perma.cc/79CE-NVZ6] (reporting testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee that “[t]he law currently prohibits a transfer to U.S. soil, 
and the president would have to work with Congress”). 
 328. POWELL, supra note 8, at 36. 
 329. For recent thoughtful efforts to reconstruct the Framers’ understanding, see PRAKASH, 
supra note 197, at 110–41; RAMSEY, supra note 97; and McConnell, supra note 12. On some 
accounts, the Vesting Clause assigns certain historic foreign affairs powers to the president as a 
component of the “executive Power” vested in the president. See, e.g., PRAKASH, supra note 197, at 
110–11; RAMSEY, supra note 97, at 73.  
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Corwin thus famously described the constitutional text as “an 
invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign 
policy.”330 At any rate, on the particular question addressed here—
congressional appropriations control over executive action—political 
struggle has yielded widely divergent congressional and executive 
views. While Congress routinely conditions appropriations on 
particular diplomatic constraints, the executive branch just as routinely 
claims authority to disregard those conditions.331 
The framework developed throughout this Article can help chart 
a principled path through this thicket. Without attempting here to 
answer every substantive question regarding the proper content of 
executive authorities, we can nonetheless make progress on the 
question of appropriations control by considering the proper 
relationship to resources of foreign affairs powers that presidents have 
claimed authority to exercise. Doing so, however, requires further 
disaggregating those powers. In terms of the framework developed here, 
some powers, most notably the president’s claimed authority to 
recognize foreign sovereigns and personally receive their diplomats, are 
resource-independent. Like other such powers discussed earlier, these 
authorities may be exercised personally by presidents, and in 
consequence Congress lacks authority to directly control their exercise 
through appropriations limitations. At the other extreme, affirmative 
provision of foreign aid properly remains subject to plenary 
congressional control. In the middle, as a difficult intermediate case, 
falls actual conduct of diplomacy, meaning communication of official 
positions to foreign sovereigns on behalf of the United States. For 
reasons addressed below, an intermediate solution, modeled on 
principles developed earlier for indirect funding constraints on 
executive power, should govern further struggles over control of 
diplomacy. 
1. Disaggregating Foreign Affairs Powers 
To clear the ground for consideration of diplomacy per se, we can 
begin with some easier aspects of executive foreign relations authority. 
Too often, both courts and presidents have sloppily lumped foreign 
affairs powers together, presuming general presidential authority to act 
as the country’s “sole organ” overseas, without regard to limits imposed 
 
 330. CORWIN, supra note 11, at 201. 
 331. See supra Section I.B.2. 
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by Congress.332 Even accepting a broad view of executive authority over 
foreign relations, however, different aspects of that authority should 
relate differently to Congress’s power of appropriation. 
Within the framework developed here, at least two key aspects 
of foreign relations, reception of diplomats and recognition of foreign 
sovereigns, may be classified as resource-independent presidential 
authorities. By its plain terms, the Constitution provides that the 
president “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”333 
The president thus holds clear textual authority to meet 
representatives of foreign sovereigns on behalf of the United States. In 
addition, based in part on this clause (among other considerations), the 
Supreme Court recently held in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry 
that the president holds exclusive authority to recognize foreign 
governments.334 Still further, under Zivotofsky, this power apparently 
extends not only to recognition of a particular government or sovereign 
state, but also to determining whether particular territory (such as the 
city of Jerusalem in Zivotofsky) falls within a particular foreign state’s 
borders.335 
To the extent these exclusive presidential authorities are 
themselves valid (a question beyond the scope of this Article),336 they 
are most naturally classified as resource-independent. Both are 
authorities the president may exercise personally, by choosing to meet 
with particular foreign representatives or recognize a particular foreign 
government. Admittedly, unlike other powers located in this category 
earlier, neither of these authorities clearly serves to check 
congressional authority or ensure institutional control over the 
executive branch. Yet both might be functionally justified by an 
analogous concern to avoid congressional delay and obfuscation with 
respect to key foreign relations choices that often require swift and 
decisive action by some accountable official.337 At any rate, like the 
powers of clemency, veto, and appointment addressed earlier, these are 
 
 332. The classic example is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–
20 (1936). 
 333. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 334. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2087 (2015). 
 335. Id. (“The President’s exclusive recognition power encompasses the authority to 
acknowledge, in a formal sense, the legitimacy of other states and governments, including their 
territorial bounds. . . . The formal act of recognition is an executive power that Congress may not 
qualify.”). 
 336. For one critique of Zivotofsky, see Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the 
Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112 (2015). 
 337. Cf. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2087 (“If the President is to be effective in negotiations over 
a formal recognition determination, it must be evident to his counterparts abroad that he speaks 
for the Nation on that precise question.”). 
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authorities that even Charles Black’s enfeebled apartment-dwelling 
president, stripped of government-provided comforts and privileges, 
could continue to exercise on his own. 
To be sure, the notion that presidents could realistically exercise 
these powers on their own may once again be somewhat fictional. The 
lavish ceremonies of international diplomacy, the state dinners and 
twenty-gun salutes, have always required resources beyond most 
presidents’ personal bank accounts. (Query, for example, how effective 
our hypothetical president would be engaging with the Chinese Premier 
or British Prime Minister over TV dinners around a kitchen table.) Nor 
in all likelihood could the president make informed and intelligent 
recognition decisions without guidance and support. As we saw earlier, 
however, these same problems attend other resource-independent 
authorities, even if the problem is particularly acute in this context. 
With respect to these aspects of diplomacy, as with other resource-
independent authorities, the president is at least formally independent 
from Congress, and this formal independence should again preclude 
Congress from leveraging its control over other resources to dictate 
directly how the president exercises these powers. 
This inference, indeed, may help explain (and limit) otherwise 
puzzling features of existing practice and precedent. In Zivotofsky, for 
example, the Court indicated that “[t]he President . . . could not build 
an American Embassy abroad without congressional appropriation of 
the necessary funds.”338 Nevertheless, the Court gave no indication that 
the law at issue—a provision allowing individuals born in Jerusalem to 
list “Israel” as their place of birth on U.S. passports—would have been 
any more valid had it been passed as a condition of State Department 
appropriations,339 as indeed it was in at least one other iteration.340 The 
recognition power’s resource-independence helps explain why. Because 
the president can exercise the recognition power on his own, Congress 
may not condition the government’s operation on that power being 
exercised in a particular way, any more than it could block 
implementation of President Carter’s or President Andrew Johnson’s 
controversial pardons through funding restrictions. In all these 
examples, as in others addressed earlier, giving effect to the funding 
constraints would “require operation of the Government in a way 
forbidden by the Constitution.”341 
 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 2087–88. 
 340. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 404, 118 Stat. 86, 86. 
 341. Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61 
(1933) (objecting to provision for congressional committee veto); see also, e.g., Mutual Security 
Program—Cutoff of Funds from Office of Inspector General and Comptroller, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 
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By the same token, this theory might justify on narrower 
grounds long-standing executive objections to embassy funding 
conditions that could effectively dictate recognition decisions. For 
example, while multiple administrations have asserted that requiring 
relocation of the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem 
would infringe upon presidential authority over diplomacy,342 these 
objections might be better justified as asserting authority to disregard 
funding constraints that would directly override a presidential 
recognition decision.343 
In any event, the formal resource-independence of the 
president’s reception and recognition powers distinguishes it starkly 
from other foreign relations authorities. At the other extreme, the 
president cannot claim any valid authority to provide affirmative 
support to international bodies, foreign governments, or even 
achievement of concrete policy goals. Such spending in service of 
national foreign policy goals falls squarely within the ultimate 
authority over public resource allocation that the Appropriations 
Clause guarantees to Congress.344 
This boundary, indeed, is one core lesson of the Iran-Contra 
scandal. Whether or not presidents have been correct to claim 
preclusive authority over actual diplomatic communication, Congress’s 
fierce repudiation of Iran-Contra remains significant in drawing the 
line at actual provision of public resources.345 In the spending 
component of the scandal, President Reagan’s staff did not simply 
encourage support for the Contras by foreign governments and private 
individuals through talk. They themselves established and operated an 
 
507, 526 (1960) (“[I]t seems . . . plain that Congress may not use its power over appropriations to 
attain indirectly an object which it could not have accomplished directly.”). 
 342. See, e.g., Bill to Relocate United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, 19 Op. 
O.L.C. 123, 125–26 (1995) (objecting to such a requirement and identifying past objections). 
 343. See, e.g., Section 609 of the FY 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 20 Op. O.L.C. 189, 193 
(1996) (characterizing conditions on diplomatic relations with Vietnam as violation of recognition 
power); 19 Op. O.L.C. at 124–25 (asserting that relocating U.S. embassy in Israel would infringe 
upon president’s recognition power). 
 344. See supra Section I.A. Although he did not justify the distinction in the same terms 
employed here, Louis Henkin similarly noted in his classic treatise that presidents “have 
reluctantly accepted . . . [that] Congress can designate the recipients of U.S. largesse and impose 
other conditions upon it.” HENKIN, supra note 82, at 120–21. Henkin also argued, much as I do 
below, that Congress held authority to structure the overall foreign affairs establishment, id. at 
121–23, but not to direct diplomatic officials to pursue particular policies, id. at 119. Like Stith, 
however, Henkin believed that Congress was legally obliged to fund international commitments, 
even if this obligation was often respected in the breach. Id. at 121. 
 345. See S. REP. NO. 100-216, H.R. REP. NO. 100-433, at 413 (1987) (“The Constitutional plan 
did not prohibit the President from urging other countries to give money directly to the Contras. 
But the Constitution does prohibit receipt and expenditure of such funds by this Government 
absent an appropriation.” (footnote omitted)). 
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ostensibly private (but effectively public) entity for channeling such 
funds to a foreign armed group, in defiance of clear statutory 
prohibitions on use of public funds to advance this policy.346 As Philipp 
Bobbitt and others amply demonstrated at the time, such action 
violates crucial limits on executive authority.347 Iran-Contra’s 
repudiation, moreover, appears to fit a broader pattern in executive 
practice. Although presidents have occasionally asserted authority to 
disregard spending restrictions on foreign aid, they appear to have 
backed down from such claims in practice.348 
Attending to the formal relationship between powers and 
resources, then, may help identify some clear cases and thus prevent 
creeping expansion of presidential discretion over all aspects of foreign 
affairs. Nevertheless, the central aspect of foreign relations—conduct of 
diplomacy—defies easy categorization, for reasons I now address. 
2. How to Characterize Diplomacy? 
While the textual basis for this authority is debatable, 
presidents going back to George Washington have more or less 
successfully claimed exclusive authority over actual conduct of 
diplomacy—the official positions the United States takes in 
communication with foreign sovereigns.349 What is more, on this 
 
 346. Id. (describing creation and use of “nominally private” entity). The Iran-Contra scandal 
also involved other arguable legal violations, including indirect arms sales to Iran in violation of 
applicable statutes. BRUFF, supra note 59, at 370–71. 
 347. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 64–82 (1991); see also, e.g., 
BRUFF, supra note 59, at 372 (“The Iran-Contra operation created secret national policies that 
were supported by funds that had not been appropriated by Congress.”). 
 348. For example, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower claimed authority in signing 
statements to disregard provisions mandating assistance to specified foreign countries, yet they 
ultimately complied with these requirements. MAY, supra note 58, at 93–95; see also HENKIN, 
supra note 82, at 120–21 (concluding that “Presidents have reluctantly accepted” Congress’s 
authority over foreign aid spending). President Obama caused controversy by providing funds to a 
United Nations body in arguable violation of a standing prohibition on funding any UN agency or 
affiliate that “grants full membership as a state to any organization or group that does not have 
the internationally recognized attributes of statehood” (as the Palestinian Authority, the group in 
question, evidently does not). Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, 
Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 410, 108 Stat. 382 (1994). To the extent the statute could not fairly be 
construed to allow the expenditure, the Constitution provides no justification for disregarding this 
restriction. For discussion of this controversy and criticism of the Administration’s view, see Two 
Recent Examples of Executive Undermining of Congress’s Spending and Foreign Commerce Powers: 
Hearing Before the Exec. Overreach Task Force of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 28–
31 (2016) (statement of Eugene Kontorovich, Professor, Northwestern University School of Law). 
 349. Writing in 1957, Corwin observed that “there is no more securely established principle of 
constitutional practice than the exclusive right of the President to be the nation’s intermediary in 
its dealings with other nations.” CORWIN, supra note 11, at 214 (emphasis omitted). For more 
recent executive branch opinions asserting this view, see, for example, Unconstitutional 
Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in Section 1340(a) of the 
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question, presidents have put their money where their mouth is by 
openly defying congressional limits—even when those limits took the 
form of appropriations restrictions.350 The executive branch has even 
gone so far as to claim preclusive authority to employ whomever it 
wants, whether inside or outside the government, to relay particular 
diplomatic messages.351 
In practice, then, presidents have treated diplomacy as a 
resource-independent power—a power that Congress cannot directly 
control, even through conditions it imposes on resources for the State 
Department or other diplomatic functions. As a matter of first 
principles, this view is difficult to justify. To be sure, as with other 
resource-independent powers like the veto, clemency, and 
appointments, diplomacy is an authority the president can (and does) 
 
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ 
(2011); and Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 
33 Op. O.L.C. __ (2009). For a discussion of early practice supporting this authority, see PRAKASH, 
supra note 197, at 120–22. 
 350. For examples of such defiance, see, for instance, Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 
648, 650 (9th Cir. 1993) (addressing claims that executive officials “did not initiate treaty 
negotiations with foreign governments to protect sea turtles, as required by [statute]”); 33 Op. 
O.L.C. __ (ms. at 1, 10–11) (noting plans to violate funding restriction); Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, 
International S&T Cooperation, WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/ostp/sciencediplomacy (last visited Jan. 
5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/LV8J-N868] (describing diplomatic contacts by OSTP with China despite 
funding restriction on such activities); HENKIN, supra note 82, at 88, 118–19 (characterizing a 1913 
appropriations rider barring unauthorized participation in international conferences as “a known 
dead letter” and observing that presidents have “often disregarded” diplomatic limitations); MAY, 
supra note 58, at 109–10 (discussing President Eisenhower’s completion of an executive agreement 
in defiance of a statutory restriction); Eli E. Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional 
Participation in Foreign Relations, 289 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145, 154–56 (1953) 
(discussing examples of defiance from 1913, 1916, 1921, and 1924). 
 The executive branch, of course, does not uniformly disregard such conditions. In a careful 
study of congressional instructions to U.S. representatives at the World Bank, Kristina Daugirdas 
found that, as of 2013, “[i]n Republican and Democratic administrations and during periods of both 
unified and divided government, the executive branch has voted consistently with Congress’s 
instructions.” Daugirdas, supra note 201, at 518–20. As Daugirdas observes, this finding 
highlights the potential importance of Congress’s appropriations power in controlling executive 
action, even in areas of formal executive authority. Id. at 533–34. She acknowledges, however, that 
“[t]he desire for funding matters.” Id. at 541. Because presidential administrations during the 
period she covers favored strong support for the bank, they may have held stronger incentives to 
comply than in cases of interbranch policy conflict. Id. at 540–41. 
 351. One notorious historical example of this practice was President Woodrow Wilson’s heavy 
reliance on a private emissary to communicate with European leaders. See BRUFF, supra note 59, 
at 209, 213. For a classic discussion of historical examples and defense of this practice, see Henry 
M. Wriston, American Participation in International Conferences, 20 AM. J. INT’L L. 33, 39 (1926) 
(“Congress may partially cripple a power which it is not competent to destroy by refusing 
appropriations. But Congress has no power whatever to limit the President in his choice of 
negotiators.”); see also HENRY M. WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(1929) (similar). For other examples and a more recent critique, see Ryan M. Scoville, Ad Hoc 
Diplomats (Marquette Law Sch. Legal Studies, Paper No. 17-08, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2926010 [https://perma.cc/FJN8-TQ2Q]. 
Price_Galley (Do Not Delete) 3/7/2018  9:38 AM 
456 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2:357 
exercise personally. Presidents may themselves communicate with 
foreign leaders or travel abroad to meet with them; they may even 
personally engage in negotiations, like Woodrow Wilson at Versailles or 
Franklin Roosevelt at Yalta. If it is true that the president holds 
preclusive authority to speak for the nation, then Congress surely could 
not restrict what the president says personally in such settings. 
On a normative level, furthermore, congressional control seems 
less imperative than with respect to war powers and law enforcement. 
Diplomacy, after all, is only talk, and as Winston Churchill supposedly 
said, “better to jaw-jaw than to war-war.”352 Because diplomacy lacks 
the coercive or destructive character of war powers and law 
enforcement, an ongoing constraint on executive action through 
conditional appropriations may be less important to the nation’s well-
being and survival. In addition, under established practices, even if we 
no longer treat all binding international agreements as treaties 
requiring Senate ratification, giving binding legal effect (or at least 
domestic implementation) to an international agreement generally 
requires some form of either ex ante or ex post congressional 
approval.353 In principle, then, Congress’s legislative authority may 
impose an ongoing constraint on diplomatic outcomes, even without use 
of conditional appropriations. 
Nevertheless, for important formal and functional reasons, 
diplomacy might more naturally be characterized as resource-
dependent. Support for other resource-independent powers typically 
takes the form of advice and assistance flowing in towards the president 
to facilitate a particular executive judgment (a judgment, for example, 
about whether to veto a particular bill, issue a particular pardon, 
appoint a particular officer, or even recognize a particular foreign 
government). In contrast, diplomacy, more like law enforcement and 
war powers, involves projecting power outward. Diplomatic resources 
thus magnify presidential authority more concretely than do resources 
for mere advice and assistance with respect to other presidential 
powers. 
What is more, the notion that the president could personally 
conduct all necessary U.S. diplomacy is even more fictional than in the 
 
 352. W.H. Lawrence, Churchill Urges Patience in Coping with Red Dangers; Tells 
Congressional Group It Is ‘Better to Jaw-Jaw than to War-War,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1954, at 1. 
 353. See generally Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The 
Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675, 1713 (2017) (discussing 
different pathways to forming international agreements and concluding that the “clearest line” is 
that “the executive branch can enter into international commitments on its own but needs some 
kind of preexisting or subsequent action from the Senate or Congress in order for the terms of 
these commitments to be implemented through domestic law”). 
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case of other resource-independent powers. Isolated historical examples 
notwithstanding, the president’s many other responsibilities surely 
preclude personal engagement in the protracted negotiations often 
required for effective diplomacy. In practice, such activity must be 
conducted through other official representatives of the United States, 
and official representatives require official resources—salaries and 
embassies, or at the very least dinners and hotel rooms.354 
Finally, notwithstanding Congress’s ultimate authority over 
formation and implementation of binding legal commitments, recent 
presidents have demonstrated in dramatic fashion just how 
consequential mere diplomatic communication, without more, may be. 
Simply by failing to reiterate the U.S. commitment to mutual-defense 
assurances in the NATO treaty, President Trump may have 
permanently altered U.S. security arrangements. For his part, 
President Obama demonstrated in rather dramatic fashion how much 
power diplomatic talk by itself may carry, at least under modern 
conditions, in shaping the international legal terrain. In two significant 
and controversial agreements, one regarding Iran’s nuclear program 
and another involving climate change (from which President Trump has 
announced the United States will withdraw355), President Obama 
exercised preexisting domestic legal authorities over air pollution and 
sanctions waivers to establish significant international 
commitments.356 In each case, Congress could have undone or blocked 
the deal by stripping the domestic legal authorities that made it 
possible, yet doing so would have required legislation that the President 
could have vetoed. These examples illustrate how, as with war powers 
and law enforcement, presidential initiative may create facts on the 
ground that Congress has limited practical capacity to undo—except 
through its own power of initiative with respect to appropriations. 
 
 354. For discussion of the importance of diplomatic appointments in an era of premodern 
communications, see McConnell, supra note 12. 
 355. Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal From the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 373 (June 1, 
2017). 
 356. For a thorough discussion of legal questions presented by such agreements, see Galbraith, 
supra note 353. For some other analyses, see, for example, Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character 
of the Paris Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 142 (2016); Jack Goldsmith & Marty 
Lederman, The Case for the President’s Unilateral Authority to Conclude the Impending Iran Deal 
Is Easy Because It Will (Likely) Be a Nonbinding Agreement Under International Law, JUST 
SECURITY (Mar. 11, 2015, 8:15 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/20963/case-presidents-
unilateral-authority-conclude-impending-iran-deal-easy-likely-nonbinding-agreement-
international-law/ [https://perma.cc/WU2K-NZBW]; and Michael Ramsey, Is the Iran Deal 
Unconstitutional?, ORIGINALISM BLOG (July 15, 2015, 6:02 AM), 
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2015/07/is-the-iran-deal-
unconstitutionalmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/Z862-WPAP]. 
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To the extent diplomacy is best characterized as a resource-
dependent authority, principles developed earlier would suggest that 
congressional authority under the Appropriations Clause to set general 
resource-allocation priorities and modulate the government’s overall 
bureaucratic capacity should entail power to control the diplomatic 
purposes to which the resources it provides are put.357 As noted, 
however, with respect to diplomacy, in contrast to war powers and law 
enforcement, presidents have repeatedly claimed an effective authority 
to disregard congressional funding constraints.358 In effect, then, 
despite the compelling structural reasons to view diplomacy as 
resource-dependent, presidents may well have moved diplomacy into 
the resource-independent column. 
Even if that is true, however, this claimed presidential authority 
over diplomacy should not properly imply limitless authority to call on 
the federal government’s bureaucratic resources for diplomatic 
purposes, nor even unrestricted access to support from diplomatic 
advisers. On the contrary, as we have seen, resource constraints may 
impose some check on even resource-independent powers. Here, insofar 
as an antimanipulation principle properly governs indirect constraints 
on paradigmatic resource-independent powers like the veto and 
clemency, the same principle might likewise govern the validity of 
funding limits on conduct of diplomacy. 
3. An Antimanipulation Framework 
If conduct of diplomacy is a resource-independent power, as 
presidents have effectively claimed it to be, then the president must 
retain ultimate independent discretion over the choice of diplomatic 
goals, just as he must retain ultimate independent discretion over 
vetoes or pardons. By the same token, however, principles developed 
above with respect to indirect conditions on resource-independent 
powers may help make sense of when funding constraints on diplomacy 
do, and do not, cross a constitutional line. As with conditions on advice 
and assistance for vetoes, pardons, and appointments, appropriations 
conditions on diplomacy are invalid if they appear likely to manipulate 
independent presidential judgments about particular narrow 
diplomatic objectives. At the same time, however, funding conditions 
that set overall levels of support for broader categories of diplomatic 
activity should be valid and enforceable. 
 
 357. Michael Ramsey advocates this view as a matter of plain text and original understanding. 
RAMSEY, supra note 97, at 112, 417 n.61. 
 358. See supra notes 349–350 and accompanying text. 
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The easiest case for invalidity under this framework involves 
conditions that seek to control the specific viewpoint expressed by the 
diplomatic officer most naturally positioned to engage in the relevant 
diplomacy. If Congress, for example, provides funds for a special envoy 
to negotiate a particular treaty, or for that matter for the Ambassador 
or senior State Department official with general responsibility for the 
country in question, while precluding the envoy or ambassador or 
official from taking particular positions in those negotiations, the 
condition may be disregarded as an unconstitutional infringement on 
the president’s presumed Article II authority over conduct of diplomacy. 
Much as in other examples addressed earlier, such a condition is not 
coercive in the strict sense that it altogether bars the president from 
asserting a contrary view. The president could always call the foreign 
leader in question himself, or he might employ a different official or 
relay his views through a private emissary. Yet the restriction may 
nevertheless materially obstruct the president’s chosen diplomatic 
goals, and it may, once again, do so in a way that obscures whether 
responsibility for the resulting policy properly lies with Congress or the 
president. To be blunt, if the president cannot employ the personnel and 
resources most directly suited to accomplishing the diplomatic goal at 
hand, then his pursuit of that goal will likely be far less effective. 
Foreign leaders may well perceive use of incongruous substitute 
personnel as signaling lack of commitment, and in any event key 
contacts and expertise within the U.S. government will be closed off to 
advancing the president’s objectives. For all these reasons, such 
limitations seem likely to impose a substantial practical impediment to 
the president’s asserted exclusive control over conduct of diplomacy. 
This view at least holds a long and distinguished pedigree. In 
one important early debate on diplomatic funding, Daniel Webster 
argued on the House floor that while Congress could deny funds for a 
planned delegation to an international convention, it could not provide 
funds subject to conditions dictating what the delegates would say.359 
“[W]e must make the appropriation without conditions,” Webster 
argued, “or refuse it.”360 More recently, Louis Henkin (among others) 
has advocated a similar principle.361 
Among recent controversies, furthermore, the Obama 
Administration’s disregard of the OSTP riders might also be understood 
 
 359. 9 ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 94 (New York: D. 
Appleton & Co. 1858). 
 360. Id. at 95. For discussion of this and other historic debates, see Nobleman, supra note 350. 
 361. HENKIN, supra note 82, at 119 (“[S]hould Congress provide that appropriated funds shall 
not be used to pay the salaries of State Department officials who promote a particular policy or 
treaty, the President would no doubt feel free to disregard the limitation.”). 
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in these terms, although the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (“OLC”) instead justified its view on the broader theory (rooted 
in past OLC opinions) that the president holds unfettered choice of 
diplomatic agents.362 While the director of this particular White House 
office might seem an odd choice for diplomatic engagement, existing 
cooperation agreements (negotiated before any such rider was in place) 
designated this officer as the point of contact with China for purposes 
of negotiating further technology-related agreements.363 In that 
context, the office’s director might at least arguably constitute the most 
natural vehicle for conducting diplomacy on this particular narrow topic 
with China, with the consequence that stripping the director of this 
authority constitutes an unduly manipulative condition on 
congressional funding of the executive branch. 
As a second type of invalid restriction, conditions precluding any 
communication at all with particular foreign governments or 
international bodies may likewise be invalid. To be effective, the 
president’s asserted power over diplomacy must entail authority to 
obtain assistance from someone somewhere within the federal 
bureaucracy to relay the president’s diplomatic positions to foreign 
counterparts. Without such authority, the president would be limited 
to personal communications of his own or perhaps communications 
relayed through private intermediaries. As compared to communication 
through official channels with the benefit of relevant expertise within 
the government, such means of diplomacy are again likely to be so far 
less effective as to make restrictions on their use unduly manipulative 
with respect to pursuit of the president’s goals. Accordingly, to take 
another recent example, President Obama (like earlier 
administrations) stood on solid ground in disregarding funding 
conditions that barred sending any State Department representative to 
particular United Nations bodies.364 Such conditions were invalid 
because they impermissibly denied the president any appropriate 
official means of engaging diplomatically with foreign bodies whose 
decisions may materially affect the president’s chosen diplomatic 
goals.365 
 
 362. See Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy in Section 1340(a) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations 
Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ (2011) (ms. at 5). 
 363. Id. (ms. at 2) (describing designation of OSTP as the United States’ Executive Agent). 
 364. Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33 
Op. O.L.C. __ (2009). 
 365. See id. Strictly speaking, the condition in question did not preclude sending 
representatives from other government departments (to the extent appropriations for that purpose 
were otherwise available), but OLC noted that delegations to UN bodies were normally led by 
State Department officials. Id. (ms. at 10). 
Price_Galley(Do Not Delete) 3/7/2018  9:38 AM 
2018] FUNDING RESTRICTIONS 461 
On the other hand, Congress should hold authority to structure 
the overall diplomatic apparatus at a higher level of generality. 
Congress may fund certain embassies or other components within the 
State Department (the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, say) more 
generously than others.366 While such choices may channel diplomatic 
initiative in particular directions, they do not carry the same direct 
impact on the president’s choice of objectives that could render more 
narrowly focused restraints unduly manipulative. By the same token, 
although this power has been historically contested, Congress should 
hold authority to initiate diplomacy by requiring opening of particular 
embassies or consulates against the president’s wishes, so long as 
Congress does not exercise a de facto recognition power or prescribe the 
particular diplomatic communications in which the government will 
engage.367 As in other areas of executive authority, general funding 
limits and mandates fall within Congress’s overall authority over 
resource allocation within the federal government. Such constraints 
should raise constitutional questions only if targeted far more narrowly 
at particular presidential diplomatic initiatives and objectives. 
Finally, for much the same reason, Congress should also hold 
broad authority to limit use of nondiplomatic government personnel for 
diplomatic purposes. The executive branch has at times characterized 
the president’s choice of diplomatic agents as entirely plenary.368 As a 
default matter, such freedom of choice might well be justified. The 
president’s presumed authority over foreign affairs might well support 
a default rule that presidents may employ whichever agents within the 
federal government they deem best for advancing their chosen 
 
 366. For another defense of this view, see HENKIN, supra note 82, at 121–23. 
 367. For discussion of contrasting examples from President Ulysses Grant (who complied with 
such a restriction despite raising constitutional objections) and President Carter (who complied 
only partially), see MAY, supra note 58, at 93, 114–15. In another more recent example, President 
Reagan objected on constitutional grounds to provisions mandating reopening of foreign 
consulates, Statement on Signing a Bill Authorizing Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983 Appropriations 
for Certain Federal Agencies, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1072, 1072 (Aug. 24, 1983), but he nevertheless 
promptly complied with these mandates, with the one exception (later excused by Congress) where 
the host country apparently objected to reopening the U.S. consulate. Compare Department of 
State Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 97-241, § 103, 96 Stat. 273 (1982) (conditioning Fiscal Year 
1982–1983 funds for opening any new consulates on reopening of consulates in seven listed cities), 
with 1 GALE RESEARCH CO., COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS YEARBOOK 1984, at 
172, 174, 177–78, 188 (1984) (listing as open U.S. consulates in all required cities save Mandalay, 
Burma), and Department of State Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 137, 97 Stat. 1017, 1030 
(1983) (amending statute to impose condition only “to the extent such reopening is authorized by 
the foreign government involved”), and H.R. REP. NO. 98-563, at 65 (1983) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining 
that this amendment “clarified the authority of the Secretary of State to open new consulates, 
notwithstanding that the consulate in Mandalay, Burma has not been reopened”). 
 368. See, e.g., 33 Op. O.L.C. __ (ms. at 5) (indicating that Congress “may not . . . place limits 
on the President’s use of his preferred agents to engage in a category of important diplomatic 
relations”). 
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objectives. As with advising more generally, moreover, presidents must 
remain free to draw guidance from anyone within the government they 
choose, so long as the requested advice is either a de minimis imposition 
or germane to the office’s functions and not unduly distracting.369 
Within those parameters, however, if Congress provides resources for 
particular government functions—law enforcement or nuclear security, 
for example—it must hold authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, if not also the Appropriations Clause, to reserve personnel for 
those purposes and not for distracting diplomatic undertakings that the 
president chooses to pursue. 
To summarize, then, the constitutional structure, at least as 
refracted through the lens of current practice, may well grant the 
president authority to disregard funding conditions that materially 
disrupt specific diplomatic initiatives. Yet Congress remains free to 
dictate more general funding levels for diplomatic activities, and by the 
same token it retains complete control over actual provision of resources 
to foreign governments and other beneficiaries of federal largesse. 
Executive disregard for funding restraints on diplomacy, furthermore, 
provides no support for developing a similar practice with respect to 
war powers and law enforcement. Because those powers implicate 
different formal and functional considerations, Congress’s power of the 
purse must continue to afford broad control over how the coercive and 
destructive aspects of government power are exercised. 
CONCLUSION 
While the constitutional separation of powers limits 
congressional authority to condition executive appropriations, 
accurately identifying these limits requires disaggregating executive 
powers and considering the proper relationship between authority and 
resources in each context. Certain executive powers—the veto, 
clemency, and appointment authorities being key examples—are 
resource-independent. Congress lacks power to control their exercise, 
whether through restricted appropriations or by other means, because 
the president may exercise these powers personally, and because these 
powers generally exist either to check Congress or to ensure 
presidential control over a distinct branch of government (or both). In 
contrast, Congress holds near-plenary authority to restrict use of 
military or law enforcement resources. While presidents have claimed 
substantial discretion over the deployment of such resources in the 
absence of specific restraints, Congress nonetheless retains broad 
 
 369. See supra Section III.C.3. 
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power to impose such restraints if it chooses. Hard cases arise between 
these two poles, mainly with respect to presidential advisers and staff 
and the conduct of diplomacy. In both those areas, substantial practice, 
if not also more primary considerations, support some executive 
authority to defy congressional funding conditions, but this authority 
should properly be limited to circumstances in which the funding 
constraint in question appears likely to unduly manipulate a particular 
narrow judgment properly belonging to the president alone. 
Throughout, I have attempted to defend this framework 
primarily with formal textual and structural arguments, buttressed by 
appeals to functional considerations and historic practice. Yet the 
framework’s underlying normative appeal bears reiteration in closing. 
Separation of powers necessarily limits Congress’s authority to control 
either the judiciary or the executive branch, whether through 
appropriations or by other means. Both those branches have specific 
constitutionally assigned functions that exist in part to check and 
restrain Congress. Yet the framework elaborated here preserves a vital 
legislative check on executive governance in contexts where it most 
matters. Congress retains substantial control over the structure and 
availability of resources for various purposes within the government, as 
well as ultimate control over actual national policy in nearly every key 
area, save perhaps actual conduct of diplomacy with foreign 
governments. Even more important, through congressional control of 
military and law enforcement resources, ultimate responsibility for the 
federal government’s coercive and destructive capacities remains in the 
hands of the people’s representatives in Congress, and not solely in 
those of the president. Even beyond these specific authorities, 
moreover, ultimate power to cut off funding altogether and shut down 
the government, though much maligned for its abuse in recent years, 
remains a last safeguard against unwarranted presidential action. 
These limits provide guideposts for legal decisionmakers, 
whether in the executive branch, Congress, or the courts. Yet the 
framework should also inform public debates over when presidents 
have transgressed proper legal bounds. The unmistakable trend in 
separation-of-powers dynamics over recent decades has been towards 
increasing executive governance. These facts on the ground, however, 
need not—and should not—be understood to reflect constitutional 
imperatives. Here, as in other areas, they may better be understood as 
reflecting an accretion of implicit legislative delegations.370 Much of the 
power the executive branch exercises, even in areas of perceived core 
executive responsibility such as war powers and law enforcement, is a 
 
 370. See Price, supra note 219, at 742–48. 
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function of legislative choices over time rather than constitutional 
necessities. Legislative choices, unlike constitutional prerogatives, can 
be legislatively undone—if the legislature has the will to do so. 
Though a source of frustration and obstruction for presidents in 
everyday political battles, Congress’s power of the purse provides an 
essential ongoing political check on presidential action, as well as a 
potential failsafe against catastrophe. We cannot afford further erosion 
of this key remaining limit on executive power. 
 
